University of the Pacific

Scholarly Commons
University of the Pacific Theses and
Dissertations

Graduate School

1964

Pragmatic and dialectic conceptions of methodology for inquiries
into freedom and their implications for education
Richard John Gallo
University of the Pacific

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uop_etds
Part of the Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Gallo, Richard John. (1964). Pragmatic and dialectic conceptions of methodology for inquiries into
freedom and their implications for education. University of the Pacific, Thesis.
https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uop_etds/1567

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University of the Pacific Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

'

. ,_'\,:.

PHAGitAl'IO .tu'illl D!~Cl'IO. 9QI,'!CKP~!0~8
OF Ml"THODOLOGY
. ' ''"' ,_- ,._ . .
,....... ,

FOR

_.,

nrq, UI1Uil:8 UTTO J!'!U!:liiDO:t&
IMPLICA'l'IONS FOR

t.ND THEIR

:W:OUCAl'!Ol~

----:Proliltmted to

The Jl'a()ulty of the rJohool of Eduoation

In Part:ta.l Fulf'U.lwent
Of the Requirements tor the Degree of
Mae ter of' .!U"te

July 1964

=

This thesis, written and submitted by

is approved for recommendation to the
Graduate Council.

Department Chairman or Dean:

Thesis Committee:

Dated

04 ~' . ;,!.. z? . /)1/
¥
·'··

(['.

Wl:u11.t is of deep interest to orut
correspond.in~

interest to another.

:ilut

um.n

lli&J/' be of

magnwt~inity

UQ

may

proil'l:pt each to work togetil®l" lil.nd be of mltlttu>l assbt&nce.

Without tile constructive help of .m;v undergraduate

te~chete

wrto awakened my cul'iold ty in the phil&mo);lltical enterprise
and ,ny &riMluate teachers who wez·e ever rllind:f'ul or the
:phUo~Bopllical.

iltlplications of educational prao·t:tees• this

thesis would not h$.ve been oonoei ved,

Special thanks are due Dr.

s.

~ro

Jantzen, Dean of

the School of' Education, 1:1r. Willis N., POtter, :Dean
Graduate

Sc~tool;

the

Proreseor Pedro Osuntll., Afllsistant Jt'l•o:feslilor

of EduoathnJ i\\nd Dr.
osopny.

or

Willi&!~

Uietlll&nn, P:rofellllM>r of PllU..

Their co!lllllents and ori Ucis~ have bt:i.lped tb.ilil

investigator in bb work,.

Without the generous !f!.uil'ltanoe of tho l:tbr!ilrians at
the Utaiverf.IUy ef the I'lii<oU'io, the :New York l!Ublio Library •
and the West Islip l?u.blio Libra.ry tllil'l etudy could not

have been

o~Jmpleted.

5:::

:PAGE
l.

'I'HE .NA'l'l.lltE 0 11' 'r'li!E: HlOD:.t.EM , • • • • • • • • , •

-

l

l

•• •• • • • •

'I

'"
2

Me~hod of ee.oh

• , . • • • • • • .•. • • • • •

4

The ;problem.. •. • • • . • • • • • • • •. • • • •

5

ifal\!e or

tl!l.$

s ·tud.y

• • • • • • • • . .. • • • •

7
8

• • • • • • • • • • •
J

]

g

Jolln Dewey . • . • • .•. , • • • • • • • • • • ,

9

Tllt~ory of m.ethGd . • • • • • • • • • , • • •

10

Im.pl:!.o.atione for ed:t;t,oatio·n

24

• • • • • • ••

"""
~--

-~

!"levll.'lrfil Comen.tatore 1 Yiew~S l~oout

• •
Theory ot' lllethod

• • • •

21

• • • • • • • • • • ••.•

27

• •

~
~

Im.plioat:tons for EHiuoa.ti()n

HI,

Gonce ption o. f Me.thod

• • • • • • • •

• • . . -.

• • • • • • • • • • • •

inquiry • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

•• •

35
3!'1

::sa
...

.lj,<:l

••

42

• • •

48

~

v
PAGE

• •
The.nr-.r of freedom

••

••

•••

!mpliea.tionll for Education

:OiiHllOOJ<'lltOY •

•

•

•

•

•

57

.

.

63

'11

, ••••••••

12

'

·~

'

•

. . .• . .. •

• • • •

72

•

•

•

73

• • • •

74

•

•

•

•

•

•

Res tri otion of intellectual epi"!ere
Criticism of misconceived

~

~

...

•

• •
Soientitie attitude •

.
.
. .• .

•• • • • • • • • • • •

•

aohol~sticism

•

••

-

74
76

•

76

•• , • • , • • • • • •

'19

, •

Conception of Method

e

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

. .. ' . . . . . . . . . . . . .

62
63

Truth or fa.1dty of de:f'initio.ne • • • • • •

91

Dialectical dt>hate

96

• • • • • • • • • • • •

Dia.leoUoal study o:f' philo$0 ph.ie;a.l iti.eae

•

104

•••••••• • •
• •

114

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

118

l?hilosa;why of> liberal edtHiation • • ,. • • •

119

:tmplioa.tionz for Eduo!ltion

OOI.lllllUI'li ty

V•

0011£!?.1\.l'l.IBON AHD

C:Ol~TR;~T

OF l!li:THOD • • • • • •

~

114

0]' '1'illi TWO OONO!i;P'r:tOl.ifS

• • • • • •

• • •

• • •

-

12l

vi
:PAGE

• •

Adler

. ..

C<Jmpa.:rb on

... ·-.'. ..... .
• •

•·

~-

lilll d

It . ._

•

•

,,

Contr.aa t •

•

•.

•

It

•

• • • • •

.....-.
.

'

124

125

.

Crit,ioism, • • • • • • • • • • , •• , • • • , • • •
VI •

121

130

IMPL,ICATIONS OF Tli!~ T\iJO COl~CEl?TIOM! liUR

. .. . . . . . • •
.

• • • •

134

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ,•

136

,. • • • • • ~ • • • • • • • •

158

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •, • • • •

148

John Dewey

Mo:rt,imer Ad.ler
BIBLIOGRA,:P1!Y

.

'

• • • • • • ..

.

.. • •

• ••

•

•

••

•

•

153

'§~

~

-

1.!:a.ny of tihe O!'.mtroverrUes i&olll!;J on in.

aaiHUUiin.g the

idlllolo~ical.

dema.:~?oa.te

:For

involvin~

law, govf.l.rn-

e~ple 1

in

cliooU of the world, the ll>ta.ndai'd

of tree41.om .ts the l!leuure use<ij, by
obeervers to

tl>eolo~,

educ<>tiotl~

Jiient, l$tb0.1!', pld,loaopby:, a.nd

world toda.y

Iel!fu.ee

M-e CQfiiCGx."ned with tht problt!ll of f:rud,QA•

freedom a.re importa.nt in the t'i.Glda of

th~

llU.!l1 wee~ tern

pql:i. tica.l

the totttli t\l!..:ri,~m. f:rotn i;h.e f:rea; the

eme:tgence of new na.tionll! is of1al'rt de:t'emillld :l.n theory by

appealing to

t~ltll

right of

a

poople

tneJntUtl"l'es;-the

pr•v~:I.J.ing-

in /1.111er1ea 1m ill.

~Wmifest&Uon

freel.~·

Yitalit'.Y ot'

o:t

~

to dl!ltlill'lll.ine

.tbe-Negro-mov~mllmt- -----~
=

d!i!1Un."mination to olrtain

g;rea. tllir freedl'!lll !il.nd equal:!. tzn the a.U111gi~mM of
ptl<!!plli!l

.

tlliJ.ny

to a world. uourt ia with!Uiild beea.use '!,;hey f(llar that

U would. cuttaU their

ru~tion's unl.'ei~Jnty

In tl'd.taeation, il'lsuel\1 involviil$

ct:U!l.tral.

ltmly ed.tAeatorli!

~m.d

imd.

t'reed~:~m

fl'e!ildOm~

a.r<! al0o

in:eti tutions Qf high'llr le<lU.'n-

ing are o'OnOA&rned &bout tktllt req,ui:t·e!ltent o.f loyalty oaths

frol!l colleee s'tuden'till wno
It could be

<U.U~umed

obt~.~>in fed~n.·&l ~&oholarl.l.hip

funds.

the.t hardly any eduoa.tn in Amedea.

would dony the.t the dnelopm'llnt of freemen .is

M.

esiHimtial

2

pivotal poo:l.tion that t'roJ<(ldom playa in Atntu.•ica.•s life.
Columbia. Unive;reit;r, for its bicentennial celebration1
choae to emphaa:la;e M upeot of the topic lind published a
work enti tl<~d,

i'hereo(•

l£M• § &a"li l,g,

ZQ;!o!fl~

sui !f1! ·•·ttru!

TJI!le

St. Jolm 1 s Un:i.vereity, in T:l;rooklyn, 1'f!C(;Ii.nd

Qeors;e Vf&.shingti:m Hono:r :ll!eda.l rrom the

Ii'J:fil~o.ill

1:1:

Fow.da.tio.n

lll!.t Valley ll'o:rge for He publ14a tion. Qoi@stRt $.( J'l'$Hl4Sl'!>l•

The. choice of these topics is int'U4.1a.t:Lve of the oonoun of
.

.

.

some teachers in h.:igher

edtu:I~,J.tion.

·.·

wUh

.

isa\t~~lil

involvi.ng

freedom.
While

i!ili!!UfUI involvin~

importance in tile

cont$iipo:rt~.:t';r

frelildoJll. ~• of O.l'uoial

scene,

d~oput~ntlll ~e

not .

f'z-ee f:t'om diff.erenoea of opinions, and tha.:.l.:t' controversies
are nat f:r111e froll'l confusion Wld ;ll:i.sund,erliltu<U.n$.
ly'•

Oerta.in ..

in e. deomo<l:racy, onl!l would l:l'-'1 jullt:Ltiabl;v' t-roubled

attemptB to tmpGI!$!il C<'!nformi ty,. .But ti1.e ve:11y

t~.t.

~:U.f'ferenoe£1

of opinion .do call fo:t:' a.tte1npte a.t underlltandinG the

ia~ruee 1

so tb.a.t intere:il"ted pa.r"tiaa 4ould be a.ffol'Q.ed evidence t(>

make informed jt.u.'lgl1!ents of tlleir own abGUt tile aun.•its of
conflictin« cla:l.me t.o t1·utll.

Ige~~:a A~gut

:Ji'rUS.§!tll :Jil:Ais.ed

When expreasions of ideas about freed(.lm in

litera~

ture appear to indicate a diffe.rence of opinion about th.e

~

m~t.ning

of froedom or the oonoe.ption of method fo:r

det;~.l:l.ng

with inqtd.r:l.ea inh. the problem of tree<tom. IM1 oooalllion

:f'Qr

~

iuve& Uglltion prelilente itu.l.:r • . 1'wo f.llllinent thinker&,

John Dewey ( l859 .. l.95l) and, Mortimer Ad.let: (b..,. l902h a.re

p:rahed :t'or the :l.mpol'ts.nce of tklei.r idea.li! about tl'llll nature
of' f'reedma,.

Sidnty Hook pra:l.el\ld Jolut DQWey !Wd Brand

:al~M<ell.ard eOlllpl:I.J~Iented

11ortimel'

rouor of !'h.i.loliloph.y at

l~ew

aympolilium of Dewey's work,
~sienoe

and

E[ge~om.

s .:l,dne;r Hook,. .l?ro•

York Ur!:l.ver!fity, edited a

~

In his

Adl~r.

ll!Weat:; .\'!GU.ot!lt:Eher .9.!

pret~e

Hook: illxpla.ined why the book wa.e eo

to the book, Sidney

n~JU~l.e<h

1'h.e cent:ra.l rea.1um :for the vitality of J)ewey 1e id.eao
ie thdr conctu:n with tile two ~~lain tt<lii1nee whtoh &re
tm:l.quely relll!.ted to the dia'iline;u:l.t~hi~~ fea.tu:rea ot'
1£lode:rn <ml ture. They f.l.'re, f:l.:rmt• tll.e nat11re of
uientific inquiry and ito implications for mllm' a oon...
oept:l.on of. h.illlaelf• and of tha cnlllino&; ndt iulcond,
the I.UfPir&.tion for a world &t f'rec ;aen !Wd.. free .
lliOehtillla wnioh denp:l.t.e tb.e triWilphs lilt' tota.lita.ri.-n
:t'ee;imee in tl:te wol,'ll,'!. l'l.re s.tr.cuiger in :POP"l~:r GOfllllc:l.oue..
n~S~sa 'limon ever before in histo:vy. 1
Brand BlMii.lhard; l'rot'elil!l.\Gr
hie readen th!ii;t Adl&1'' e

ot Pb.Uoeophy at Ye.llii• informed

:l.de~m

o!'fii!Hd a. g&Ml'liill clarit'ioa-

~

tiOn or the Ilroblem ot' freedom.
.Adler• e book, This h

In

rev:te.wir:~g

.1m .f2t ll!tlllfdQ!!, h.&
,just. the sort of b1:H'l.i:

stage ot' tile ancilllnt oontronrs;r.

new theory to tht;a

~~~&ny

Mortimer

'll'l'O't&t
need<~d

s.t t.he present

It does not add a

€llrea.dy in the :t'ield; 1 ts a.im.

ia. to c~t tb!ll field• ta dtaUnguil!lb the ifil~;ues into.
whiGh 'the problem rua.y be broken 'llP and for ea.oh of
thtlllllt to. aa:y pree:le!lllY' Where they dU!'!IIr. ':l.'hG .book

itaelr t&kes no PQBiUon on any of these 1sau1nh

It

!lllilrely expla.ina, oompares• analyzes, alasaifies. • •
tndud it is only fal.i:r to say that :U' one wanttil a.
getutra1 clm.rifioatun of tll.e 1)rollllam of free\1<)111, there
is nothing in English to compare witb this book. 2

1\laQh J;Jhiloao:,Pher, J'ohn Dew<l!y ami Ntor·tb.lll'l' Ad.\f.!r, , ·

plainly lltlitted hill .method .for dealin" witb the .problem

fra!'ldom,.
~~Jillled

In his wo:t·k,. Fr§edelt!

.~ aYJ.\M~!.,

ot ·

Dewey emphe.-

tnat to li!olve, the problem ot freedom; pr:l.i:tlary con-

eidera.tion mJlst he directed to a new ap:protitoh;

we artl concerned with the problem or .treedol!~ .:ra.tn11r
than U.s liHllutiQru;t in the oonvhtion that solutions
m.re idh until til¢ problem llaa been pl&OilHi il:l the context of the elements that oon1:ltitute culture ~~s they
interact with the ele.melltlll of na;U ve llull«il.n nature. 3

l
j

In his. Wllrk, fhe

Xd$a.

!.( FrMdy, A<iler lll:&prea 111Mi

his ideas about the metltod he

/1'1£\.$ uli:lin~u

We have adopted the word

ltQ.ialf.lCthal~*

to designate

the t&«!k ot\ ren{l.tlring an objective, impartii!iol, Md
neutrally :f'l.ll.'lliUl&ted :t'fll1lllrt of.&. ma.ny aided dii:ICUlilldon,
euCh &Ill the discunitU'I to be found in tne YolurdMtul ,
literature on freedom. Those who pla.y. the role l.l:f'
obenverm e.n<i inttu:preteru w\11 sh&.U oall *'dialecUr.~iue"'
we aiUI.ll Ulil$ ''diahctic.n to nue the metb.od t.lley 111mploy ·

in

Iu:t

reconstruotin~

the eontrove:rey llilobout i'l'eedom that is

2;ara.nd Blanlill:lard, "What. li!ak~e Men ll':ru." . '.rl~e ~rer
~ ~ey&er. S!bpteuiber 14• 1956. P• 6•

<gim!e

3John Dewey, Ji'lt~es\~1! ,mu\ QttltM;:e (l'l'ew Yorkt G. P.
l'utna.m' s Soni:l t 1939). P'• 2:3,

~

--

~,!!!

PrRQJ.fll!!

The ,documents show two pb.iloeophere prai.Ud for the
value 0f their idees &bout freedom.

]loth l'IHhltived ttriimte

for the way they proposed to &.pproll\.ch th\'a problem of :f'ree-

dOln•

The oonaepticm of method which ea.oh a.dvooated for

underBta.ndiq tbe proble<ll 0£ fnedQ:Il 1e now to be 1ihmt1•
fled.

The elements of Dewey's

pr~:tgmatio

di&ll\lotieal met!lod are to be exll.llli'llEHi.

ntothod and Adler's

Then the elements

of the CJt.>noepticm of eacb. li!J:'e to be oolllpared

~:~.nd

contrasted.

In other words. tile prooedtA:t'& or method which ea.oh affirms

a11 :tndividual o:r dbt:l.netiVe ie to l>e identified, oompa.red

and contraztea.
More

lllpeoit'ic~tlly,

tmewera are !llougnt to tile follow-

ing quetttions;

i.
Dewey

What :1.0 the conception

~vocates

2.

fo:r

\Wbat b

il:HJ.t~iries

ot

.Jnliltllod which John

into :freedont?

the oonoe,ption of'

met~tod

that Mol'tillter

Adler advooatoa for in<auiriee into freedom?
~,

in tMir
•h

What simil.,ri Uea or
view&~ (ll'l

Wi'llttt

dUsim:l.lii!.t>ithu~

are inherent

method?

~-~~~

tl.le

implie~•tio:ne

of their viewe on

In . liln li\ttempt to understand

tn~>

'

ooncept ion of metllod

~:

tor inquiries into t,reEldo.m which each autll:or prell!enta, an
$&1Hiilltilll.l ta.ak :1.::; to be fai t!l.fUl to the illO!»llil'!gW Of .tl;.e

words e!l,ch has

lUi~'>d•

Speoia.l uorunn.·n 1&

tll!:t'lll with theuslil wr.~rdfl.

get 'Qeyond the

word~!~

t~en

Several l"ea.d:l.ttl.£1! are

to

oome to

:I.'~·Q.Uired

to.

of e41!.ch to llie ter.ulinology, i.e., .lv)

thli! me&n:l.ng o:r the worde.

JUI!!t as :tn <t1athematio111

al d.i:ffe.l"s from the number,

tHiy

Ute nuiiier-

in r:Hlding, tile word i.s

distinct. from the terminology.
!t h

obvious that

iti Ellil for

under~Stlmdins

employs.

Therefore,

dictf.o.n~~l'iee ~\:te

the a peeialhed

~t~peoif'ic

not fin&J. author-

voeabul~ry

each

care :ta taken tG a.rl'i ve at the

precise .mea-ning of words uaed ·oy ee.cn.

Eepecilll.ll:Y when the

aathor indicates in his exposition tl'm.t be l:!Ut'erl'l to use a
word. differently

fro~~<

othl)):r a;utllo:ru, then very careful

attont:illm 1111 €;1 ven to the l!ltllW'ting he wiehee to convey.
~de

When tl'lo a.uthar' a mean:l.ng ill underl!!tood, j:udslllen ts are
about tbfJ

propo~t~i tiona

.ne is affirming or d.enying.

'!'he

reason!lf offllr$d for hili! atatementa are aougb.t.
Adlllittedly, ne :1. tb.er the pllilosGllb.ioa.J. writings
J<:~.l'in

hend.

or

.Dt'iW(liJ' nor thoiU .of M:ox•tillle:r Adler are easy to compreThe problem of llllders;tanding e!loh :1.$ rendered more

di:f'fioult by dittt!imilari t:r in the mea-nings they give to
simila.:r Wll!rds, a.e l'ldJ. as to the

ooo~sions

siil'lUa.r meanings Wiling different words •

when they pre.sent

Caution is used

"""

'l

rwt only to tali:e note of nominal d!vergenei1Ht but a.luo to.
a,void

~r:r!U'

wnen a e imila:t>i ty or words hid, a di vergttnee or

ll!eard.ng. · 'l.'o enable. the reade.r to eueok..tblll acoura.ey ,of . tna.
ittte:r:;p:retat:l.on• . source

:ref'G:r~ucef::

a.re pres<mte<t.

An un.d.l:lrl!ttu'lding of the eonception of
oaiHlll1 by Jollrl Dewey

~nd M.o~·timlllt'

. l!.cUe:r :fi!lr

t;~etho(l

advo•

into

:l.tl.l;tU:l.l'i.eHI!

the problem. of freedom ir; of oona id.€J>•abl.e vlfl.lue tod!'!Y.

:ooth han some farrte

~m<'l.

following i.tl the ctmtempcn:e.rr

Meriomn..and :mlU'O:lff<um llloenej ·both lm.ve: >Hlme influence in
'

!

J

ph:ilosqph.ie<tl and l'lducational ai:rl\ll..!ll'lj !l(>th .k1a.ve directed
their att,enti(ll'! to treedorll•
tors to

und~l"ntMd

U1llilllX'll~l'lding

It h

of so.me value fo:r ed.uoa...

and b1>1 aware of' wrua.t a.g:teenHmtm o:r. <lis ..

of the poul.tiona of ;rohu Dewey and Mort:l.(!l.er

Adler would 11ot con!i!t:L tute a meG achievement•

~ven

viewed only as a. tueorethal awe.remess without any

oaJ. eonsequenee11.

if
p:r.aoti~

Such ltndet•aiautding ;;:ou.ld .aasi11t tile

educator to avoid an undesb·abJ.e intellectus.l Plllirocl'!il\l1sm•
evl!n i f he

db~reed

with the :poeition$

~ttf

one or the

other. or iloth.
Yet it$ value eould exten.d f'a:rther into the practi ..
cal lt'e$lm.
help tile

A atud;r of the views of Dewey and.

edue~J.hr

to

f'<:>rmulat~ him

own

Adl.«~r

,ju<l.gouo~ntl'!

could

<'>bOl,lt Me

own conception of u1ethod for inquir:l.ee into freedom.

;rust

a$

llducato:t o:peratelili with $.ome t.lleory of deiaocrs.ey,

,e~el:l,

even though he mtil.y not b:plhi tly s t0.te •1t 1 Bo each
edtu~ato:r.

b.&s

sol!U1l

conception lilt a JU€ltho4 for understanding

freedom e.nd noMe ai!!Hirtians to .make about
gation ot' the t.!:u);ughts of
pl1iloaopher~a

could help a

t~ae
per£~1!m

u,

An in'V'&eti•

two intJ.u:entia.l American

reach a mor111 inf'oJ;'Illed

judg•nent aJ:mut quel!tiona '<>f freedom,
IV •

ORGANIZATION O.F 'l'HE lllil<!AINJI!,R
OF 'l'H:E 'l:11ESIS

'!'hh
study.

con!ll!lud~J«:~

Chaptl.'tr II

question..

the first

de~lill

f>f

the tilix enapters ·of this

witll a l'.evin of the literature in

The thi:lrd cllll\ptor preaents Dewey' a cGncept:ton of

method i'or hiS inquiry into freedom.

Chapter !V presl!lnts

Adlel' 1 B conception of 111ethod for his inqui.ry into freedoill.
'l'hlll fifth

potd. tions.

e!:~aptu

offers

Oh~~>phr

a1.

f.':Oillpa.rison and contraEt of their

VI lllUf!lllmrbea the findings of tbe ttu1tlis

and corltaitUil oanelusiona GontHU.'nins; the. illlplim:l,tionlil of
their v!lllwm for edu<Jation.

An appi'lndix <ltm tains solll.e

biographical and b:l.blio,ra.phicllll. inforcm.tion

Dewey and Mortimer Adler.

~bout Jal'm.

·. ~=

Blnee thb s tuttr it! coneerlltld w:llih the iden t:l.fiua.•

tion,

co~rhon,

and contr!ii.h of the· conception of the

metl'.od y:rope>!Hild by John Dewey ti.nd Mo•·tilll"r Aliler for in•

quiriel!l into tr.u1 problem af f:ree\iom a.nd thlil illl.l.llioat!Ona

of their views for educathn; tne literature ia
4T.round the major aapccte ot' the study.
v1ew1.1
by

ax'&

or~&<~t.nhed

Oolllll1entators 1

prennted about the' method or process .advocated

e.ach pn:U.onpher for nis inquiry into rx·e<f!dl:llll•

O<nllmertta...

tot·s• ·ideas about the illlplioationa of the a1ethod ot' each
:philouopll(lll' :f'or education

Ollinil!ln.
of 11:lle

(O.l"lll

offerilld•

Their ide&e a.r111 a.rra.nged a.ceordingto the a•grel.l

llHlr®teilt~~ttGr' ~

fa.vora.ble or unt'a.vora.b1e o:riticiuru.

Fli>Vorable copinionu are ;jii:t'OlillilllltG<i first.

to inolude a t•ange of o:piniolllh
J

tirsi ft:nt

Job~

An att.ew.j:rc is

'fhis p;roeedure iiJ dotHl

Dewey !il.nd tnen for MortiiiiGr
I•

SEVERAL

~~U~.de

COIDm!~''l'N.t'ORS 1

~

J~dl1n•.

VIE\Viii,

ABOUT .TOU.."i DEWEY

Thill section of the studY eete forth what no!lle

collllllentatora h&ve wri tter1 about J)ewey' s poei tion.
PH&lilnte

fl~M>e

It

of the li tere.ttl.rJ~> that deals wit;h t.he oonaep..

tion of method which Dewey advocated fox-

11m

inquiry into

lO

'l'h!QI:Y of Jlle'§.}lgg
It would not be

to &fAY

e:x~gera.t:l.llg

Dawl!ly re ...

th~>.t

garded his ideas' on logic ~till central to bill! ;plli,loeophi~al

doctrines,

'£he :t'a.et that l1e wrote on the subject over

thirty-five year period

indic~tes

which he a.tta.elled to it.

his

the great importlii.!lce

He adopted

<~.

polilition early in

a.nd retained it with elll\i>orationa &a his philo..

o&.re•~r.

Eiophhal thinking develo:(.le<l.

Hi$ treatment Gf lGgio&l

theory can be noted in five articles compiled in

!!I

~!VM

e.

TAeou

§JL~4l!i

wrUtam in 1903; in the e:xpanll!ion of

tne0e views thirteen years later in his ooolt, li!Biil§tJ!B j£
Jil!Jilerimen~al

in

m

Loj'jii!lB in his popularill!athn of tbl!lm in 1910

B tlli!!kt and finally in his

e:x,preuion of them :in

ln9..1lir;r.

1\~313

tlll:l>ture, technical

in hie 49Bi@t J;h.e tJleqr,t 91:,

This extended sequential treatrl!ent of' t.ne thea1e

in Dewey• e n:t ting refle.ets its importance in hi!:> ttdnldng

and philoupny 1

~md

affords a.n

insi~J;ht

into llie eenoeption

of rne thod f'or inqu:l.rien into t'reedo!ll., ·
When George

n.

Geiger was a :Profeuot of

:Philnso~

at Antioch College, in Ohio, he wrote J;lew!Y ,in fers:MecfiiyJh

He prabed Dewey' a cotH.leption o:t' thinld.ng becauee of what

he considered Dewey's unique method of ce:r.tifioation.
Dewey'f>l

c:~e:rtiUcation

of thinkine was unique because he

ll
d~J,~tmQ.

ma.d'll it

the t.hinkhl$

u;po:n Wilt<,t l!l.Ot.tt&J;ly

l)lt'OI\l!llliU~>•

think1n~

tiorx of

'.t'his

lo~:l.ia

a lreaatlt of

dif:r:e:r.·~ntiated Dtnrey'

s aonoep-

from that of the trlil.d1tio:nal eiilpi:riaiat$ 1

Md ra,tion.aliotlll' i.lonll"Ell,ltione..
I.UI

.happ~ned &1!1'

The;r ooneeivl'!ld

a.nd. net behavior• mlil.ldng . it a

"SJ±'

cor.apl~te
.

thinking

lllJ"Ste:ry.

:Oe111'fiY':; eo:ntu'lption unr.,velJ,e.d the !1:\Y!llteey., 5 Beoa.ullle at
tht va.t·ious e on:f.'u:atng · eot!not$iticm: of th@ ter£\'1 "thinking,"
G~i,!&e:t'

.. -~.-.ted toot "it ilaa beoome a sywbol for

ttkint t!la.t

GOO!!$ 011

nea.d. ,.a

in our

a.:Lm\H~Ct.

IW.Y•

In lte.lping tlle readur

undere tam! l'eweyt Ill conception of th1nkill€h he re!'llrred to
the fam;I.Ua.r

!

l
]

~htir1otion

r~>flillct:l.n r.~r

of

c:ritifll<ll.l th:inkiae;

:trom ima.gin$. t:!. ve i'timcy ox• eua tcllllif,l'Y uno:r it i.o~~l thinking.
Ol"i tical th:l.nldn>J dit't'ued.

troa

:!'ollowin" of bai::lit ps,Uexnm •
ing

Wia.$ gt;!ll\lth~lly <~<nd,

da;rdr.ea;llin~

or

·~hfl

blind

Cri thQl or :refleeti ve ttA:l.nk·

l:l.il'\ to:rte&ll.y dstaralil1$d by a p:to'blem.

w•

·think only when wOI have to.
~nd da.;rdrea.-ning
rout;itt(;l by...~wall, a preyblem. C®rt/4inlY i:ly now thie ia .
to l:le expeott~d. Dewey• s argument hne• afl in kno·l'lledge,
truth. value, ll1.nd almost anything el.liH:I• b &Emill'Ue and
hiat.o:d.oal. 'l."lle ar:l.gin IU!d thlil dirtletive pu:tpou of
th:ink.il'ij)j <liltill what eononn hiill,. fo:r wUbout l.nitial impulse an~ aimed &t soa.J., tllii:lkin~ would be wi tllout
meaning.
~ w~ a:ugs~st

th&.t

tlla.t we are fG'rattd out of h<lib:l.tu.a.l

--·----- Geiger,-~~~
5

Genge R.

Oxt'ord. University Proas.
1.)

nu.•

:v. e6.

~., PP• 86·8?•
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logical forms in their origin and not in their
r.o~ical

syntax.

impecc~ble

forms were the instruments which were

used to oontrol inquiry, ao that the inquiry ma.y yield
warranted assertions.

Geiger indicated thl!i.t thie tllemG wa.a

expounded by Dewey in hili! 112.!; U tltir.!:!f, a.nd. developed a.gain

with some qualifications ot his tern1:lnology in Jtqs;tg.a
All logical forme" Dewey insists, "arise within the
o:pera.tio.n of inquiry lllnd are concerned with tile oontrol
11

of inquiry. so that it may yield warranted auertiona.••

This mfilll.lll'l tha.t the formlll origin&.te in the operations
of inquiry. (14:4) As a.lWa.Yiii,Dewey ie looking at
origins. It is here he finds the fJustification 11 of
1og:l.c 1 ratllel' than its impeccable syntax.9

n was the

I

I
j
]

influence of Dewey's logical tt1eory which

·3dger :round at the roots of Dewey 1 u experilllenta.liam.

Ex»erimentalism was the term also applied to Dewey•s logic.
It eonnotated in Deweyte thinking not only the experimental

work of the physical sciences but elilsentia.l.l.;y the eonnota..
tiill1

of actiVe and eemtrol:l.ed knowing.

Thill type of exper..

imenta.Usm c.nd logic had a. universal application.

to be applied to every area. of expel'iellee.

It ought

Indeed• Dewey'$

entire pb.Uoeopey had irleen direct<Ni to applying such a.n

o.ttitude to everr area. of experience.
'.!.'he U(l.lllfl

logic.
}!$ WI!UI

Ilion.
8
9

•'experimlmta.lit~~m 11

has been ginn to :Dewey• e

ll'ot because he h:l.mlllelf' wa.s a great experimenter,
not, exceJ;r&• or ~H>Url'.le, in the field of educa..

Moreover, it hits been noted by even the lllol!lt

~.,

PPo 87·89.

~ •• pp .. \\1'7~98.
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sympa-thetic critics that newey waa not exactly ,!!!! curan;!j
in the matter of the latest experimental work in physical science--a. fact he was the first to awnit. But
"experiment" is a. wide-reaching term, not confined to
the routine of the laboratory or to tlle apparatus of
technology, vi tal 01.e they are. •Experimental" carries
above all the connotation of active and controlled
knowing; in the s~e way it suggests a logic in whioh
human thinking does make a. difference, in which there
is an authentic reconstruction of experience. Dewey' a
entire philosophy has been an a.ttempt to apply such an
attitude to every area of experience. 10
Dewey did not discover the thinking process, logic,
philosophy, or the soientifi c method, nor did he claim to
discover them.

:But as he understood those entities differ-

ently, he expressed wruot he eoneidered his understanding
about them.

He could not accept some other expressions

1

about what was true.

I

subject.

He made his own expressions on the

As exemplified in his treatment of logic, he could

not be satisfied with any tradi tiona.! formulation of it and
proposed his own formulation.

His point of departure, which

was partially a nineteenth century tradition, was scientism.
Realizing the a.ohievementa of soienoe and wishing lJhilosophy

l'

to advance, he proposed to reconstruct philosophy.

He wished

to seek the meaning and evaluation of philosophical ideas
in the institution of working programs.

He wished it to

progrese by the acceptance of' the scientific method of
!zypothetical approach, i.e., as understood in scientism.
Geiger expresses this meaning of experimentalism in these

lOIQig., p. 102.
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.What ·!i!JC]lf.l:t"i.mentlllliam signifies b

a .game:t'a:t orienta-

tj.on, one o.f <ll:Xpeettna hypotheses of any natura in a;ny
1~iel.d to oa.rry with them the eonditicm of !<heir Jueti•

1;1r r&Jeetion. • • • .:aut ·if eaeh area· ot. o:xon:t'a.ll
tool ilil tb.e operational spirit• wnhn e:xpeots concepts
.to a.cb.ieve 1:\it:Ul.ning and . va.lutfht! by We?J ot the: ins u ..
fiea~.tion
;pllir'f.1iml:H~

d.s:tlltt.Udl!l ita awn procedures, ;ret the

tution or wo.x-kil'lg

:p:rogr~ •.

·.

.

·

The eoll.lllientlitor disouJ!Iilles tihe oGnc.epi;ion of a method

tha.t he elaimed Dewey advoell!.ted for l$.ll inquirief!l• . An

inquirY into t'veedom b

ody onG pa:rt:l.oula.r inquiry.

the oo®'f>li)ntQtll>r, at le!!Milt

impli<.~!tl;r., W1l>S

method, which he tmd..erstood

.D~&Ifl'fiil,Y'

Uence,

wr:l. ting about a

advoca.hd for inquiries

into f'reed.om,

Reflecting on the syllogism above• alternative
ieee were considered for the majGr
untenable.

~W.d

prem~

lllinor but tney wne

Tb<t evi.denee of the oo!lllllentator•lil at.atemeate

could not support t.he a.eaertion that he dil'tcusaed a. mllthod
whiCh he did not claim Devtey·
To

lti:IIH'lrt

that an

otllu inquiries

l0 to

Mt~~Wlte

thinking,
ing

th~~t

ag~'ir<st,.

bt{~ui:cy

~W.d

E~.dVof>&ted

for all inquil'ies.

into freedom 1a different from

net juet a. pa.rthul!!.r kind of inquiry

tha.t a unique diohotolllJI' :pe:rs.ililted in Dewey•a
kind. of

lilut.~.lilillll

.M:Or(l;ove:r, it

hill vms eo indatentl;v fight-

runs

~a:LnlSt tiM~

one ot Dlilwey' a !llajor Wl)rka• hh l;p1Jil.lt

~

llta.in eurrent of

'J.:!J.eory .Qt. ;tnQY!U•

JoUpll L. :5lau. Asaoeia.te Profelllilo.r of' the Philoeoplly

15

of Religion a.t Columbia UniversitY; presented a. pa.JiltU" about
John Dewey's lh'>oial philoeophy.
l!l.n exposition of Dewey• s eooia.l

In the general
philot~~cphy,

he

<.~ontent

of

)~resented

a

filubetantially identical account of Dewey's proceu f'or
_recorwtruoting experience.

While he did note that Dewey 1 a

reconstruction of social ·theory was r<H~inbctmt of the
tradition of the ethics of aelf..realize.Uon• .l.ik:e the etta ..
oa.l philosophy of T. H. GrtHlln, the B:!:'itil!lh philosopher,

J?rofueor Bla.u pointed out tlla.t Dewey's thiilory differed
shliU'pl.y fro.111 thon ()f Grun and othere of the aue lilchool

''in hi$

:l,!lliliBtl!ltlOO

thi'l.t the tilllEl na.d QOlllEl. to a:p;p;t'O&.Cih 1\Hlcill!.l

thoug;ht with a new ulethod•"J.;t

Expresaod positively, Dewey1s

metl'1od for :Blau was a method didinguiahed by i tfi noon..

cretene&s t:reua :methode used by !iilU'lier l\!ahntista.'113 E:!t:..
J

preased

ne~«:U vely,

:Blau ea.U. tlla.t Dewey was etre1111'1ins*

•• • tile reJection of what he oalled ••tile loe;:l.e of
general MtiGne,ll that is, the tra.diUonal l;ogic of .
univereals under which we subsWA<~ tile concrete par'tioular 111 ituationa with .wid.ci~ .we •~re 1•eall;ir conoerl10d•
Dewey uaerhd that instead ot' dea.ling directly with
p!ii;rtieularit 'the tra.diticnally aeo~pted logio at.H>~
stitutes diiHIUIH!Ihn of the mear>ing of concepts and their
dia.hot:!,eal :rel;.o, t1onah.ip to one anotller. 1•U.
I>rof'$$sor .Elau .did n!1ta that the ttllilthod · wtw

-·---..;......--:r..

l 2.To1Hipi1.
Blau, "John D~nvay and. lll:t~eriolil.ll Social
Thought, e ~!.!b@l'! Qollega, ~MRtfi:, 61; l27i, Dlii!Hllllbiill.' ll>W19"

1aJ;.:W.
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euloe;iet:ioally teri!led "soientU"io" 'beoa.uee ••we are !'lOt to
utlderatand that thiS is the only ll.lethod

\uo~ed

by stHentietlil"

or even tha.t "any scientist would explicitlY forl!lula.te or
oonnious.J.y

IU'Ie

this i1.1$thod, ulll Dewey' ~J nll'lw lo~:l.e of

soeia.J...so:l.erli;U'ic investigl!l.tion
· phi losophi oiJI.l

w~~;:;;

aupQrior to the· old

app:roa.on.

lle thou~h't tlla.t lil!lOi'l. ~.>. l!lethod. was inevitably s to rue,
U I&. !l'!!!ill!ad 2!. !i,i §!i!<>IU'l and in 1ts . pla<~e he .wished to
lilubsti tute a logioi a.t inquiry, refl«letintt fihfll p:roced..
url!ls tlla.t a laboratory inve!lltiga.tG:r might u![g tn tM
study of' a question in any of the tH~ieno•u1.

While l?rofes!!lor Bla.u in this section of hie <.\rt:l.ole
made renrenoe in ai,;. of his footnotes to Dewoy•e :fiuon..
!J.;~ructi.9.n

the

.

.

.!l\1. :§'fiiloeoph:l(, he does not lecwo the

1mprt~lllaion

that tb.e re•rk; a.:re of only

p~:~.l'tillula.r

nifioa.nee in undnst&nding !)ewey 1 e philosophy.

ly

generaJ.i~ed.

u~dt:r

wi.th
eig-

He erx;plic,i,t..

that:

What newe;r aa.i4 on MY eubjuot oam1ot be under&tood
di~>truat of 11 geJtera.l
notioma, •• of abstr.aotions lllttde in tho oouree of inquiry
~md thon a.IIHi>Ullled to e:dst in faot bllu!auu of tneb
clarity .and dietineti veneslli in tbou$]!1~. Hill spoke of
wi thol.\t keeping in mind hie

the l:13!'POI* tatUation ot• eonolllP'-S. al!l '' 'llhe ,~>b.ilonopttic
fallac;r• 1' and ins is tenUy repeated .tb.rougnout all hb
wriUn~e the neH~d ror regi!<rdtns all idea.s aw k!1:£lotheaes,
".to be ao1u1pted u b!!.f!lt'IB of «~.etiona wnioh ·teat them,
not lMl finali ths.lll'l'

15
16
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Since Dewey's theoFy of logic led him to regard all
ideiii.u a.u hypotileue a.nd. of i.nstrum~mta.l u·tU.il;y • he
a.lM extended this notion to aooial insti tutiona.
Oonluiquently, he conceived of uooial institutions u
the sta;te• family. eQrpora.te busineu, and trade unions
as forme to be tested anew in each concrete situation
to determine their value in that specific situation. 1 ~
ProfeeMre Geiger and Blau were not disoulillling
explioi tl;y the oono.eption ot· method used by John Dewey for
inquiries into· freedom.

But their ideas do show that they

detHlribed hie conception of method or praoeu of' inquiry

and explicitly held it applicable to all fields of inquiry.
Consequently they implioi tly at•e deso;ribing hie coru1ept:ion
of llUith.od for inquiries into freed.om.

It ie not being

auerted that .Dewey used thb method for :l.nqui:dee int<>

freedom ( .thougn it would be eur;pris ing U' he did not) or

that the commentators' ideas explicitly maintained that he
did, but only that the oommenta.tora• ideas i<llplieitly oontain tile idea tnat Dewey's conception of method is ap:pli ..
cable for inqu:il'hHI'I into rreedon1.
Ernest Nagel, who te;ught at Columbia Un:!.verai.ty from
l945 to 19!55, proposed an approach to a genuinlil philosophy

ot soience 1 ont thEOt aimed at a
schntit'ie proceduro. 19

pai.ut~king

<1na.lys:ta of the

He acknowledged Dewey, a.mong oi;hers,

leiW.
9
l :Ernest l\la.gel. l;\oVI}.ta.il{n :tte!SQQt AM Qthgr ~.t!i!!lie@
J,s the fb.ilosqp1n: .9.( !i!Slie!Ce ( clleneoe1 The FrtrQ Prese, 1954) •
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he exp;resged hie diss.pproval of Dewey 1 11 analysis because

he maintained that it did not ta.ke note of the dillltinct
log:l.cal functions of scientific confltruction in determinate
si tuationa and did not legblate to the scientist the
methods or limi ta of his specific enteriJ:Irist.• "'''O

He al.so

oritiCi$ed Dewey's philosophy of science because it was
inoompll'fte in that it failed to ana.l;ru all the details o:t'
scientific procedure. 21 :Nagf!lfa analyt~h and criticism
would aeem to point to a poadble weakness in :Dewey' e oun..

oeption of freedom i f he engaged in extrapolat:!.nt; eoitmtit';f.c
ideas uMri tically into philosophic disoottrse •
Je:t•ome

j

n.

Nathansort discW!lud the geneti<!l method and

cautioned about the geneti.c fallacy.
1aethod

~d

He gra.nted that the

validity in peychoa.nl'l.l;v11lis and. other fields,

but wa.rtUIJ<i that it was unreliable in demonstrating the
truth or· falsity of a.n idea.,
By a.nd large it a.seWl!as t.llat we get a better under.
standing of'persons and situations if we loo~ at them
as »rocesses, seeking their origins and tracing their
development for wlla:t.-light-they can- thl'ow on wltatever--is beifti examined or &.na.lysed. In a. ltu>{te 1aeuure
thill it\ the method .of psyl)holanl'.l.lysilll, Which ulUia dreams,
the free aal!looie.tion of ideas a.nd meu1ories, and the
identification with the doctor in order to bring to
consciousness important incidents in the ~dult•s

----·---20 I'-i"'
~·,

2

~ ••
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. forgotten ehildb.ood.. •tll.e anumpt.:ton b$ing .that i.t we
can only l.\lee clearly the origin of porsonlil\lity conflicts
we c~ put them in s. realistic eett:l.ns .and ~llllY neurotic amcieths. The atu:1cen of the genetic method in thh
and othb :fields b evidl'!nce that it can· yield tnU•
ful results~ on the other hiiimd tl:lere is lil.lwuya the
danger of ooflllllitting wba.t h o;lbd tbe genetic t'allacy....
that is• of' aUUllling that an idlil&. has or hll.a Mt valid·
tt:r in the light of it.tl hietory. ,,. evid~ance of the
truth or f!i.llili ty of an ide&. the l)ll'!neth method ta
demonstrablY unreliable. By wa:y of illuetra.tion•. U' it
oould be shown tbat Hitler was mentally unba.l~~mced 10
·tut would not prove any thins !l4bQut one. of hilii ideas~
the truth or :falsity of the «master-ra.oe~!:)i's.ntasy would
have. ta be es ta.blhhed an other srounds •"'"'
·

. .Nathanson's d!tseript;ion gf the genet!(.! method seer1.1s
to reumble in

IHlml.l

Geiser, Bl.a:u* and

J,"eapeots tlllil ;nethod or proeees that

Na.~el

dli.uaeri bed as proposad by Dewey.

:But lfa.tha.11son introd;u,oes the truth... falsitY qU!i\lity of ideas.
J!e demonst.rated the relhbilit;r of the

~er.u~tie

method as

evidence for th.e t:rutb or fa.ldty of an idea, and thie,. does
j

not uem to be in flireement wi til Gdiel' and Blau 1 s lUtder..
at!M'lding of the eertifio.,tion of uit.ieal .&r reflective
thin.ld.ng.

They had eilt:preuM the uni verintl

of Dewey' I! theory, while

:position,

Na.th~~maon

a.p~)liuab$.li t;r

would not a.ceept eu¢h a

lie, a.t ha.et impli(litl,Y 1 would not EOeoept its

validity :ro:r Judging th.e trutn &r. ralflity ot

ide~

about

treed~>lll•
Jl.notlu~r ineonsbt~mt

-------

a.e@ert.ion ie present in the

=
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literature.
cism.

This concerns the nature of Dewey's empiri ..

Geiger was insistent about the tv:I.U$ph of Dewey's

logic over traditional empirioism and :ra.ticnal1sm.

1938 1

Willi~

But in

Gruen had expressed a reservation about

Dewey's logical theory..

He acknowledged that his

Jaog~g

was a great pl'lilosophical work, out was eautioua about
coru1eding tl'mt Dewey•a empiricism esoa.ped the deiD<mde !\If
!

I
I

los:toal empidc:J.sm.

This was hohn1oal but trivial to

Gruen, even though :l.t was centrll.l to Dewey's position,
according to Geiger.

Gruen wrote:

Nor would it be ap:propriate to raise here technical
issues mach as Dewey's attitudes to the dootrinea of
losioa.l empbhhm, to whion.... he seeme to the p:re1umt
reviewer••l'Ul ie more <JP:POilllild. than 1e de~~Wtded by the
basic doctrines ot his own logil!lal tneory. With auoh
triv1a.l reservations one
'lihat Dewey'$ M:!.f£1! is
a. iJ'tl&t phi.loeophical work.

cauze""

1'he rllisgivinge to wh:I.Qh Gruen merely

I

~Allttdl'ld

seems

to have been explo1ted alllloe.t fifteen years later in a.
work by Eorao41

s.

Thayer.

Thayer oon<Hlded tlia.t Dewey•s

theory of inquiry prcuumted in hiS

ment ot the first m&gni tude," and

X.9S~I
8

e.e e.

wa.a "u accomplish..
~bur:r•-a.n

intx•icate

account of the proceli!s and all the eubeidial'Y details in"'
volved.-·is a llltl'iking ac.oomplishment u

wulia.m \h:-uen, '*The lratur&~olization
1!&!9n, 147:427• october 22, l~sa.
23

~

can be f\lund in the

of Log :I.e,"

enmtna.t.icn of Dewoy' z work revoa.led three· pr<:>blema1 ·f£t.ui
"each pro\ilem illl located u:t the very lleal't of J>ewe;r's ao ..
t~ee

count> of the

· fundwnent&l

~;~nd eha:INil.~te:dat:f.o

rea;burtal

of inq,uil'Y•" 25 The three fea.tuns were located. in the
initial, intermediate• and final ph:anl!l of tihe proo!lnls
of inqui:ey-;. ·
lU.11 empirUal criticism of Deweyte statel!l.l!!nt ot' the

ind<ttetminate situation. in thtl initial pha.ee 1 r9sted on
wW:l.t cn.•:l.terion. p$int o:t' view, or relative to what system

of rillference was the situatien to be understood as ;poeaeslh·
ing these eh&racteriattell of d.oubtfUllten, :pt:~rplexit;r, or
oor1t'U$:1.en.,26 Dewe.v•a deurl,ptiion la.,ked opGra.t:Lona.ll;r

determined meMine; or
J

e~upirie&l

sie;n:l.ticance for Thayer.

!n eva.l:t.tating the ueoond funda.m&ntal

c~racterilli tic

feature (the intermedia.te phase) of the prooeu of inquiry•
Th&ye:r i!howe4 tM.t "Ilawe.v puts fGrth the view that all in..

quiry containe a pra.ct:l.eal·fa.ctor on the ground of •what
oex-tainl;v ooeur~J. • .in a.t least !.a!ll! ca.gu;' .,2'1

21SI!l!!J1
.

.,

p.

n.

26.lll.U.·.

ll•

n.

»·

l6Eh

.

27~ ••

So l?.e
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reworded Dew.fly'e posUhn to make !t

and

!1lXl)res!ll'it~1

it ae·.

f<~l.ll)vm~·

<ampirtc~Uy.

n:Ud

..

l!lW!n ,1. sit:uawuz hU. 1M !fha:dor!!il ang . staa.l.
oM:at1l!!r1BUtl!! whiq!l ge!fit ,U. u n lilrme · e, ~
· wu ·~ ·:yghe:t:;! .!!i !!!.Wwiutrl ·. Qi!'Ml!!!it~ . .tt' ·. · t.} ·. ·. ·
initia.h!:! !. !:!!lb.MiU.i~ uUvUx QaUeg ~ngutr.tt. m
~· aatt:t.U.t l!. ~ ~· .U. "U~~::t..nsa !!IR2lUl sgnnUhnl'!,
At .1 i~I&tnJ. .~ '®UUa.J: ,u.n wbieb !letines .!!
. df1itRlU®1i!+l JituEt;Ul.U!• . · ·
· The. ml!.jo:t' portion of' 'l'hq'ert e work was aimed fl.t

anf.l.lyzins th!ll beuea involved in. Dewe;r• e formula'tion or
l!'l>~e

the third.

:l.n tho

patt~rn

for14lii.tiorl o.t hypotheses &f.J

resolution of

lit.

problell4

inH~a.l.

plans of a.a.tion fol' the

;.fter 11av:tne;

~a.l;vliled

undlllrBtand:b:;g o.f e:x:iat!Jntial particular
noted that

Dewey'~>

may be eitlaer

re&!iHHl. wu

b.e

p=

mubotani>ia.ted or pred:l.et1one to bl)

~ainat eC~tua.l

tial fMte of 1nquiry 0 muat be

ments· u

p:t>G~osi:tions,

proce<l.ure,

that .liltatelll£nte re.porttng the

prediotione.

.Dewey's

etat.emliilnt tht.tt ;partiou.la.)l' prop(lsi Uons

al"~

&ubet.a.nUo.ted• iOiila

tha.t of the

of inquiJl'Yt

Mo:~:eonr. ll«:~

tlllk~m

did. not

d~ta•

:Cha;ver' $.

the creden-

ae fa.Ctli! !l.ttd not as

r~gard

pe.rt:l.oullilir

~~tl)l.te.•

those. whbh,. eonto.ined. definite mera,tion of time and

plaee as o.dequa.to grounds tor d:l.stinguieh1ng propolilitions
asurtint£ f!a<llethina; about. individuals 1\\.t

a. \1~ l!llld pleoee,

and pro.;poe.itio.ns asserting something h l'HI the case about
ela.sses at "nt;h'e co.llections of

individual~:~

at a tb1e

~~md

~
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In addition to those several difficulties which
Thayer found in Dewey' a analysis of propositions, he also
took exeption to a more gener,al aspect ,of Dewey• a theory
,of propositions as such;

~.e.,

tb.a.t propoaitiona are not to

be regarded as true or .falae.30 , Thayer contended that
Dewey in hie Logic had denied the truth-falsity aspect of
propositions.

He realhed that Dewey considered proposi-

tions as the means for promoting the pa.fiHJage from a proble{[la.tio si tua.tion to a determinate one, and tl:mt in that
context Dewey considered the propoaitiona
ineffective.

!i>fl

effective or

He understood that Dewey conceived .of ideas

a.s inetrUillents.

Thayer knew the special distinction which

Dewey introduced between propositions and judgments.
Judgment may oe identit"ied as the settled outcome
of inquiry. It is concerned with the concluding objects that emerge t'rom inquiry in their statue as
being conclusive. Judgment in this sense is distinguished from propositions. The content of the latter
is indeterminate and representa.U ve t'<nd is carried by
syrnbols; while judg!!nt, as finally made, has direct
existential import. •
Discussing this distinction,
29

1'heyo;~r

insisted that a

Il!!!!~' pp. 94-95.

30ne refers rea.del' to Probl,ems ..2!: Men, p,J. 339-40,
p. 287.
31 John Dewey, Lof}ic: The 'l'heory Q,! Inquiry (New
York: Henry Holt and Co., 1938), p. 120.
and to

Lo~ic,

-=
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CQl'ICl!lilion cont:radiotoz:;r to. Dew.;y• a waa

WIM":~?~nMd •

. Whell~JVU l>l'H~ inr:a uiry employlil the co:t!<lllllll· ion or
warranted. lMJse:rrUon A of SOllllil previous inql.ti)."y a.a
·~ meQnf:l a:r. i.MtrWJumt .tor arriving &.t .··~A ~11fi,~.la~J1o:ai
this wa.r:x'anted &IHlelt'tion A b.alil the fun<~tiona..l .role
. •d all tht .otM:tr tao:t:ru.:.rrali1 1rlli¢b Dew~y IM'3aisna tG ·

pro;posi.t.hnw... And the:t'e ucu~111. to be very U ttle reason
why A$·. in lliuah m. ()ll!;l\11:, .~ M,t bo retta:t'd$<:1 <?.$· •!ll. true
pro;pcdtion,. If th.:ts .iii! ll!.coepta'l)l.e1 howevn. it follows,
as a.~a:l.na> t .Drewa::r. t~t :truth <~>.nd. t'aJ.tH ty a:t"e ;!lll'opo:rtielil
of pro.PQI'l:l.t:!.onta. Or at l.e~~~.~Jtt. th111re is one more reason
wl:zy- .pre>Xi!>dtionu U£11 b~s§ rega.:li'di~4 lil.l:l k2adr>..g the prop..
erties of truth-falsity. 2
Thayer Obe to thb eoaclueion lHHUt.un hi! thought

tbat be Blit.W the ino!llnshtenoy prettutnted when one .Pl'OP01li•
tion in the initial stage of :l.nquiey became tbe warranted

assertion ( oonelue:hn) in the final

st~e

a.nd

y~tt

the

,proposition lat:iked 'the trutlt.. fa.leity pro pod tion, \fhile

the judtiunt

poes~HilUd

the ;proplllrty.

In his mind it was a.

tfon·tradiction to a.uert that the 6ame etate.lfllmt can <>t one
time lfe w1tltout the property it latn
we:rl\1 oonei.etent in

pou!UJae~..

If Dewey

tne &:PJJlieatiQn t>f .!lis lelli:.ical tne.ory

to hill! id!IIIM! abo1.1t freedom, they would l:le .open to the tJI'tllle
eri ttdsl!l$ •
J.WaUq§jiQm!. ·J:ti:. l'l4Uutllm
:t'he

divel?£~HY

of opinion wh:l.ah w&a nid.ence in the

presen.!m:tion of eolllillEint•rtorlll 1 views on the ol)noeption of
metbot:l !or an;r inquiry into freedom iii! also pre111ent in

25

their views on the implications for education.

The more

impressed they were with the theory. the !Uore emphatic they
would be about i te implication for eduoa. tion.
George R. Geiger was impressed by Dewlily' s formula.•
tion of the theory of inquiry.

He considered :.?ewey' a ac-

count of the steps of reflective thinking a valid analysis
and saw in them the continuity which existed between common
sense and the moat rigorous of the .sciences.

For him they

represented an easy transition from lay intelligence to
scientific.

The scientific method of hypothetical a.pproackt

with its operational or experimental tea1per and i tB i.ll<Uapensa.ole spirit of tentativeness and hypothesis
in modern culture,

~~rere

needed

He inconsistently proposed a dogrna.tio

approach to end dogmatism when he wrote;
·These are the only weapons which can overcome the
suasion of allegedly final judgments and of dogma., a.r1d
they .ma;y oonsti tute the uni~J!e .contribution science
can make to modern culture.~
Joseph L. 13la.u, accepting Dewey's notion thl<t the
hypostatiza.tion ot' oonoe.pts was the philosophic: fallacy
and the philosophical corrective was the treating of ideas

as hypotheses, maintained that Dewey's views possessed a
special significance for edtwation today.
Wl1en a la.rge part of the world ot' letters has again
falled prey to the reductions of the "logic of general
:33

•
Geiger, U• 01t
•• p. 106,
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concepts,." a :r.•e..empha.raie of Deweyf.ll!,_li faith !!hould !lllill.''fe
<~orreoiive .. 3 4

a.a av!lluablt

E:rtu.let :Na;gl!lcl's interest in a plliloso;plzy of sohnce
led him to e,pprMiate Dewey 1 s OQrttriln.!tion to the :f'hld but
a.lao to vhw Dewey's philoso:pby of aoience

lie encouraged

eo ,.anti t U

a.

~u.~

inoOIIlplete.

atu.dy of all th.e d.da.ile of

.tliOre tho:~.·ougn

~ oee<tu:re •

.Jer~

utility of the

Do !lHi.thlmi'.IOI:l t!IU'l'OW&d doWtl conl'li dt;:ra.bly the
{!;eneti~ mothod~

in I'Hilnte a.rea.e. he was

Wh.Ue he conceded ita valUe

·:hteililtent that thtll au1llll:Ption. that

the truth or t"a.lai ty of a.n idea :h1 der;mmJt:rable in the

light of Ulil h:l.!i!tO'ry, h dell!lon&tra.bly unreliable.
viewin~

Vlill:l.lli.l!l \lruen,

the ph:U!}!tlOJ?hioal dootrb1es

wil.ioh Dewey ,ProJto.sed, would lu•ve nol'lsidered them

button to the doctriniile of hsiolill empi:rioiJ>l!l
wi til.in

tlu~.t

f,l,t:ld.

Ill.

oontriw
of' value

f'rlltniework.

Horace s. Thayer• while e.oru!.!id.&:ring

·~he kfW~q

a

strUr;il'lt$ aocom.rili!!!hment Mlong ph.ilo!!!ophical works, exvressed
very sariouB :r!llse:rV'l'Atiow.s about the tlantr:tbution. of Dewey' til

conception nf roet!lod to the theory af
b.a.ve ua:ign&<l Ulil doctrines
philql!lophieal ec.I'M'illm'l

with~J!It

l~>gio,

<l.l'ld oould not

~ si~nifil1ant ~tatue

the

in a

!Jfl!."\'{')0t:tonr,l prr:Jpo~;~ed.

34
.:roeeph r,, I.llll.u• 11 .Tchn Dewey ':.nd 1\ltt<ll'li.a~t.n Sooi110l
Thouibt," 't•I!!Ullil?;:lil Qgl;&Slfjlft Ji!liH>t!i. 61: 121$•7 1 Deae&l:>er l£159;.

This eeouton of

~e

s tudf sots f'orth what some com-

mentator Ill hlll.ve wri ttl\lln a.J:>out Mortimar AtU.er 1 s ideas.

It

prEieente eome of tne .U teraturo tt1.a.t deals with the oon-

oeption of' method that Adler advocated tor M inquiry into
:rre•dcua,

Then it deallil wi.th the commentatora' views on the-

imPlit:aUons of .Adler's idear.J f'o:r education.
'lite general prooedu.re whioh was followed for John

Dewey has been followed here.

Since the ideae which

collllllenta.fH>l'lil expres11ed were not free t':t•om differences ot

opinions, their

id~s.s

ot' the eom•uentator 1 1i1

are s.rra.nged aooordina to the degree
t'avorabl¢~

or unfaVQX'I!l})le oriticililm.

Jl'avorable opinions ue presented fix-at.
;previous ap;p:roa.eh, an attempt has

be~m

l!lituUa.r to tile

ma.de to include a

wide range of opiniQns,.
XhiU'\!

ot

Mj)}thg!&

~

It ie AA assUIII:pt:l.on of thi.a stud;y that Adler• o con..

oeption of dialectiC! is

&

centra-l idea. of hh dootrines.

The tact ·Mmt he wrote on the subject over a. thirty-year
period indicates tbe gr!ll&t blport.ance wh.icb. he

tt.

attaor~ed

to

He adopted a. position ea.rly in his eareer, and l:.'etained

it with elaboration as his ph.ilo.sophio"'l th.inldng devdoped.
llis treatment of dialect:l.oal theory crumot be miaaed in
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wi tb Jerome MiChael in the 'IJl'i tilli of grime, 1.t!aY! ~n,g. S.gc~a.l

Scienjt!, and in the study made use of the theory to dif•

ferenUate

the~

nature of philosopllioa.l. and ee:tentifio

studies in the!!ie fields,

!!!!':U Ji!!&n uas

~!!!!

·.21'. • • pub-

lished in 1938, atterl1pted to point out that in the two
different t'ields of knowledge, the psychol..,giou and .Pb.il-

osopll:f.oa.l• because or the two apecifical.l.y diBtinot levels
in tneir a.pproa.ohee to :rel!!.li ty (their considerations o.t' two
different aspects in existing things) two different explan•
a.tions are del'!IMded, and the distinction between tb.e two
eaaentially diverse obJ E!Ots to be gras,Ped in rea..U ·t;y xnu.st

be understood by the psycllologist and the philosopher.
A

:!2li~egt.l.q

.Ji:W,loep~hy

.21'. Mu:ra.le: '!'gwa:rd Jtlle

l..<?J"*~

H:La

.ef J?oJ,t ti.Jl!l:

displayed in l94l the functioning oi:' hb did.ec ..

Uo in understanding m.oral d:i.Scusf.lione and problems.
a.lllaec:Late editor of tile !l,rea.t Jl.Qok!!

U

tilE~

Al'l

'fle§}ers worJ,!.,

and editor of the two volume li\Ynl012"lii!UW.t Tile (!:re§!.t liteS.!!!

.2! the weeuz.:n llldd, published in 1945, he made extendve
use o:f' dilltleot:Lc to sort out the great ideas l!.l.lnong the

great books a.nd also to pree;er.lt an analyiiilh of vru:ioua
ide~M!i

tre&tlild in et!i.oh. o:f' the gre&t ideas.

hie worklil were :published:

In 1958 thre\'il of

with Louis Kel$o dialectic w&s

applied to eoonoJJaia-poli tieal theory :!.n the wol'k 1
Oapi~elhi

Ih!

Ijl.!'l;j,f'estcn with Milton Mayer dialectic was

-

X,

applied to, Eiduoa.Uon t;hecu:hs 11'1, 1),\evoliutJ,_qn

in l!td:u.o.a.tion;

a.nd as ed.i tol' with a team at tile Ins.ti tute of J?hilosopniea.l
Research hit! two .. volumed wol'k,
:J?UbUehed.

V(')lume I

!i..2.!l At !he

~Utl.Qn!

·.vtMil

.nut .tW ·.sA: l!l1~,

wtMil

subtitled A ;Q:I.alegj;Wl, EXMlina-

..21 Freedom.

titled A Jt~fllloitA!Il<b 1£ili~Url 9.!,

Volume II was sub..

!!a!

Ooq~,rox~t!;i!s ,About

theme of dia.:l..eotio in Adler's writing re:t'lee,ts _it.s importance
in Ilia ttl:l.nking a.nd phiblllophy 0 a.n..d. af:f'Qrded insignt into

hie theory ¢1'

~eth¢d

for an inquiry into :tr.eedom.

J'lrand 3lMshard35, protesaor of ph:Uo.sophy &t Yale•
after lla.'vins made the observation that on ·the .iseue of
determiniEHn versus freedom, one would t!aink

could be said had been sa.id already.
work on _the eubJ ~tot. wa.s justi:f'hd,.
!.( Efeesoll! wal'l! 689

~g_es

everytnin~

that

He wondered U a new
l'Hlali:i\:l.ng tlul.t

l!t! t,de§

and only the nrat volume in a

two nl.ume t;;1Hldy • hfll still considlllred tlle undertaking JIJ_st:l. ..
t':l.ed; 111.nd ntledtd at the present stage or the

eontroveny.

This h Jt\st the aort of book needed at the .!{rennt
et~t!l of the ancient oonh'oversy.
1:t doea not ti~.dd a
new theory to .tJae many already in the . fields i te l!tim is
to ohart tlla.t tiela, to distinftu:leh the iasues into
which the ;pro'blem _1ll8;Y be broken up and 1 for e~teh ot'
tb.esill, to sl/i.y what the diapu·ta.nta have in common a.nd
wb.ue preci.aely tltey differ., The book itself takell!l no
position on any of these issues. I t meri!ily eXJll!it.ine,

---------------
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comp<tres. ana.lfzu, cla.asifhe, • .He threads his way
through a 111a:ae o:f' heads and subheads wi tn a.dmirable
patience, thorouikii1Us and l1.1eidity, Indttt>dt it is
only fair to say tbat if ems we.ntfll a $11!1Hl:/.'4l.l. olari:Uoa...
tion of the prob.l.el'll of freedom• tll§it> is nottling in
English to compare wi til this book,'
Profasl>~:>t•

!3l.a.nlllha.rd til.en ;proceeded to

<'~:JQll.ad.n

·tha.t

Adler' e !llli.in tlleldlil wa11.1 th.a.tr Philolllophe:rs .hiiiov-e ml'i$11.t by

freedom three funlilf1intirrtally Q,..iff'l!irEmt tili:ll/:iW •

l!'or :Profnaor

BlalUi'lhard. the three :really are dif:!:'e:rent and the difference
il\lc flll.irlY e.wy to

IUil!lt~

Someti~t>es

fl:'tactd.\im was Ul!>llld to rnean

. an innlllr freedom beyond the reach of uutward Gireumata.nees
(the

treetlolll of self.. pe:r:rection) •

meant

~ fx•eodo~~<

froedoal

Clf'

.At other timee it has

tb.&t depended on the13e dl'cumat1113loes (the

eelt-rcealhation.) ,.

And

it ..!.las allilo mel\U'I.t a.n

unoQnlltrained power of t.he ulf to ol<ooee a. oourse of its

own (freedom ot l!ll'llf ..determ:l.n!il.tion).

:l?rofeuor

then pr<>lilen tH!Id several l'lXamplee to ind.iea.te

:al.~nllllil.rd

II ollie

o.f tile

autnors whn !'tad lliX:i!1'CHHHHl the pa.rUeu.la:r;• mea.ning"' of' free ..

dom.
'Bla.nlllh!U'd ended !'lie revililw Vii th a ger1eral

Q.n .the impartia.lity Whioh !il0rt.imer Adl111r

M~M~ent

d.i~i~play$d

:l.n

prct!IH.. nting .the various fill)eeiea an.d auosp@oi<U; of tlle dif ..

rennt

th<~~orieil

on freedom. and ., t~>~.tad two minor eoiupla.in te.

I1!11 doubt.ed tba.t the l\lpaee

~i ven

to medieval

,wllilc~>.ophillre

wa.a quite .juatit'ied by their interest or vte:l.ght and a.lao

51

little or
l\l!o'.t'a!,u~art,

nothin~J

A.

u~

mentic;med about W4 D.

Hos~>,

J. Mo

Dotze, Jamu Martineau• and canning

Schiller would be remedied in the next 1/('l;ume ot· the wo:r~, 3 '~
Leonard :Krieger• 1; &:rtiele3S offered m. rtnriew o:t'
tl:trEHt

books o.n

frud~;~m,

He eimult!meottlllly conai\lered

Mo:l.'t:l.llle:t' Adbr• e di&leotieal app:roaall, Ch.:ritl ti!>..n HliW' a

ps;rohologieal, 1\l,!ld Theodore s. l!lillllnlcr&w1 e h.i!:lto:rioal Bit,J?..
p:rGaoh. 39 Witl:un~t dhto:rting hil!l idlllalil~~c the :remarklil whieh
a.:p,Ply to A<U.e:r• Ill st1;4dy will be presented.

;r.eonill.rd Krieger,

dUcWilnin!l Adler's tb.eoreti¢al analysb, termed it pioneer-

ins and

l

sylll.po;~be~:l.o 1

in

tl:1e

nensa that the work broadened

the .ll.tlilti of villtion ollm.raoterillltio of tbe discipline into

an un#JreetHil.ertted :rnee.ling a.pproaoh to the
dQ.IIl and

Ol'gani~e~Hi t.lU~

enl.!\U'a;ed vhw.

~ol>lll)ll!

of' free ..

several. fidda oi' treedo11:1 under this

ne e:;cpl<i>ined tbe work in these

ter1111h

'l'llue ~he t4l!a.m o:f' pllilouopherB who wo1·kllld under
Mort:l.mlftr Ad1!1lr to pro<S,uoe .lb.! ~ .$l:! Jll:e!}do!§ take
.liihili'Hi!opb.ioal nothnlll of freedom. as their material,•
but aubjeet them to adi:t>ittedly, "nonphiloeoplaioal"
and 11 comprelU!rtt~i ve" approach, which li.lschews the

---------------37
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:sa.r,eon!U'd Kl'ie~Jer, "Freedonl: Theory and Practice,"
48t292, December 1958.

~ ~Yil!IW~

39M!'>rtimer J.d.ler, - . ~ .f!! Jj'tUd!M!liJ Ohr.hUa.n Bay,
Jil:t.UiAAm; and Theodore Ha!'lllllerowt b!U2.m•
~~ ,&lVolyti.!f\ Ji§Sationf Eeonot!lilllil jj!::ttd ~!oli ttce .!!
Ge:rr~ l&)Ji...J.a
•

l.b!.

.

~tlUQ~ •.!.!
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tro.di tional philosopllioal search for val.idi ty in favor
of a. "nonpar. t:i.~.um n reaons truction of ·the .historic and
contemporary theoriee_ of freedom into a few fundamental
attitudes toward 1&.40
Krieger

ft~rtner

found the work to be thor'?ughly

honest because it embodied the aoholal:'ly qualities of

Jll'S•

cision and self-oonaoiouaneEHl• and at the sa.;ne time bold

and

imagin~J.tiVe

beoa.use ita a.uthor as an intellectual as

well as a scholar did not lose sight of the rueaning of his
f'indin,c~s

for the total shape of freedom.

He ex1Jressed

these opinions acknowledging tlw.t Adler•c work exl)licitly
confined itself to abstr<)l,oting the ideas of' freedom from

representative theories of 1'reedom while avoiding any
inquiry into either the historical connections

~c1.nd

tkle

existent ia.l conditions outside these ti:leoriee or tile reb.tiona withthe other values within them.

He further re-

emphasized tbe erudite characteristics of' the work:
Indeed I cannot reca.ll ever having seen such a cle;tr
self-revelation of the a.s1ounrptions and methods governing an analysis and such a. willingness to [Jay t;he price
of' re:peti tion for the sake of co!llluunicabili ty. 41

Lyman Bryson was also complimentary in his appraisal
of the sophistication of' the dialectical method and the

construction

or

various issues involved in ttle ancient and

contemporary writings.

4 °Krieger,
41 I"id.·

~·· p.

.Q.:Q•

cit., P• 292.

29"",,.

;

--

'fhE~ dilllileetical ruet.hed. !!.Ill. used buU.'(\1. ie no mr::re
eompa.:riun of texts. '\Vi th aueteri ty or· p1u:poee lil.lld

ri$orous e.;ppl:toat itmJ J\,dler .and. 11:1~ , C)Qmpanilllns. eree.ted
the ea.tegoriiUl into . whioh the elements in all tMi:r
variety of phi.l..oll!o)?hical exa.mplee 1\lould be fitted • • •
The rnt~t·ie a bra.cin~ outline of what ha.$ been be-

liend.

.

·

.

While I.,.Vnum Bryson adad,red the Uholaxahitl that went

I'

into the work Mli the e.rea.tin anw.lyl!lia whioh roote.d out
tim tertlla and. e.lemen ts of di±'i'erenoe MIOng the great number

of ai41tnU'iaant wri term on

wt~at

tbe;r ell.lJ. freedtHilt lu1 did

not thj,nk that tlle dialeotioal method

W'li\1!1

neut:r{:l.l in the

eemu!l timt it did not imply Judsmenta ff!lr or a.gainst. the

doetrinelil

ana.l.ya~ed.

Some re~dera, like ~eelf 1 will find t:racee ot
Platonic rea.Uem in the ~a.tegol'ielil &.l:l.d in the discueUon
of defini tion:e. Th.ie. b. an ancient .~HI. powerful trad..
ition ~nd ~ be the most ueefu! etandpoint fro~ wh.ion
to wol'k, but it it! not neubal. 3
:rn s:vUe !)f his &li!IH:ll'tion of the non-neutrdity of

the liia.lectic111ol method• Iir!llan .Sr;raon indicated.,
or not my atatement ie true

1a~ee

11

\Vhether

no dift'er11tl'HHil. in th.e

value of tho an&.lyuis" and "1 t would. not

dil~aini~Jb.

the ao:Ud

str1Ui!ture of tn.e. diliu)v.ssion .• n4.4
narvey Swadoa

-·

_

.

B!'fl!m.

__...

not e.atisfied with tlae aeope of

___

l!r~;>:rk

Adl.>tr' s

~e

and might have been 111a.til>fhd with a. less

4.>l~n Bryson, "Wkla.t Men Will Die Fo:r •"
41;lS, Septe1Ub1!!1"

4:5.t~ ..

44.U.l.t!..

()#

lll58,

sa.t!l:rd§.'t

monoy goine; into t:i'l.e $tt:tdy when he fb:Lt that it oould b.avlil
been·

cont~ibuted

tG p11oplll f'igb.t.ing f'or t'reedo.l'lJ.,

· Ha.n ·it been urutl.erta;.kllln by one determined man; tnb ·
ef'i'ort to uta.bUs.b. points of concordance betwll)en Joh..'l
Dewey nnd Duns Sootua, :S€l:rtrand. :auuell a.nd ]).quina.s,
might be tM;aa:ht to be u a.cc~;~mpli!i!hment both enter~
tfdnin.g 1;1;nd in !'lome degree mfltdtodoua; 'but tt~!\l:re ca.n
be thtHie• C$11 there not, w'no are given pauiH11 b~· the
very ma&a i YeneneJ of' the te!Wl'a orash pro~~:.:ragl du~ing
the snen-ye~ period wlMiln othe:rr pbilollloph,ers in other
lands .... enin~t Spa;in, I~un~J&.r'y1 P.olana, Ihtsai~~; .arnong
otl!wJt.'$ ..•W<ill'e not cml.y lea.:tnin~; 'but demonstrating in
their Plil:t'IU.l~Ul what .frelll!iom and itt~ ll!:nsenee could mean.
A fraet.ion of the rfJlsourets se•utl.ngly Jlloured wi tllout
stint ::tnto the aettvities .d the Itust.itute of I'l:liloeo..
J?hioal :Reaea:t'!h lllil,illht na.ve dotUl mon to sudain tno~:Hil
dillitm.n.t libe7fta.r1anll in. tne:l.r tl~Ol"EE pr~ga;a,tic !lltud:l.es. 45
E., M. Obole:rt a Utrrs.rian a.it Id!'OltCI Stiil.te O"llege in

Pae&telh; wilih offering the sb.ortellt :review ( 140 words)
ef thost.l mentioned he:re,

a;lt~0 ~:txpr\llssed

and unintelligent cri tieittlll.o

Pie wrote

the

JIU)I!t

dlilrogatory

thh about .Adler• s

work .•.
• • • thil p:ro:f'(ll!lll!led object wa!ll ;;, nonllie tori!lal 1
ml:npniloiHl])hi.oal, nonPl!l.rtb.m• eom.p:re.b.ans he, "inter~
;pretative aMMl cont'itructive" work on ~*the ~re~Hllcnts
a.b<ltrt freedo~ tlua.t exbt a.roong tllose wllo dJ.sagree on
that llluhjel1.1to 11 'O'nfolt'tU!ltl!.t~tlyl the re$1llt is a ilioholar..
ly ;nons trod ty, overilaposed w th its own methifH1oloQ,
and likely to be :pE~l'll!Mently V&,i;gll.bl!ll only a.s a. widel"t'l.tlS ing b i bl:Logra.plli,oal aouro••

4

l:>nw:-vey Swl.t.dos. "'fhirudng J:aonine. '' f.!Mism, 187:362•
Novelll.ber 15, 1958•
46
E. II!, Oboler 1 X!i brAa .i!J:!.rutlU\:&, 8$: 2294• ~la:ptember
l. 1958.

....
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Implications

tor 14»9!litn

The diversity of opinion wldqh evidenced in ·the .
presentation ot' the comruentu.tors t views on t11e conception

ot method for an inquiry into freedom is also present
in their views on its implica.tiGn for education.

The more

impreseed they wer• with the method, ttua 11.1ore emphll!.tio they

would be about its illlPlica.tions for educatitH'h
:Brand ijlanl\!hard

W4l.l> am~.re th~~tt

men h&.d been diaeuils•

ing freedom for twent;v-fiw h\U'ldred years.

As a scholar lle

was acquainted with the !1W1Y pl:lil()li!ophioal tluloriee in the

literature and he welcomed a work that attempted to
tinguiah the issues to which the writers

~~d

dis~

addressed

themselns &l:l.d ·to point out wlmt they had in oollll!lon and

\

where they differtu1..

The intellectual cbri ty and neutrau ..

ty or imllQrti&li ty with wh:l.ch the various epeeiee and s.ub-

epeoies of the different theories wert preslimted were

helpful.

Ewn with fJ:l.e resl'n·vatiGn he had exprensed eon•

eel.'ning the inclusion ot too much matuial on lJUidioval
Illlilollolmerf! and tbe omblllione of >:I!Qterial on neveral other

writns.

he

eUll affirmed. that for a. gene:li'al. clarifioation

of' the problema of freedom, there was nothing in Englillh
resembling tlie book.

Leonard Krieger praieed the new &.speet of tbe 111tucy;
the pioneering Mil synthetic qualities whi<l.h wen ma.ni:f'est
i.n tlie non-phUosop!lieal Md. comprehensive appro&ch to the

problem,

He col!llllend.ed the ach.ola.rl.y

qu~li the

of p:r.eeision
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and self-consciousness and was specifically appreciative of

.Adler; s. olari ty and explici tnesa about the

(~ssumptions

and met.tloda wl'ti ell guided the analysis, a.s well as the

repetition of points for the sake of oommunioabili ty.
;cy;nan Bryson thought that the usefulness of Adler's

work extended to professional tb.inkers as well as to t!'le
thoughtful citizen.

Not only was the dialectical examina-

tion of the conceptions of freedom useful, but the task
should. have been done long ago on every ma.j or topic of

moral and political philosophy.

1

l'he immen.ee usefulness of this a tu<ly to professional
thinkers is obvious. ·Adler ill justified in saying that
this is a kind of work whieh should !lave been done long
ago on every major topic of moral and. political philoso·
phy. Ita usefulness to the thoughtful citizen depends
partly on his appetite for hard worl<, partly on hie
pleasure in lucid and awesom.ely exhiit.uati ve analysis,
and partly in how much he feels responsible for know!~g
what he is talking aoout-~and possibly fighting for.
H1;1rvey Swados found lHtle merit in the work.

~rhe

at"teru:pt to ·ea.ke stock of what most of the significant writers

in the woot 1s heritage wrote about freedom could obt;dn ilis

approval.

A simple concordance on the idea.e of several

philosophers might have suff'iced.

Tho Jlloney saved could

have gone to help those fighting for t"reedoill.

·ro E.

ifi. Oboler, the schol&rly 1uona tros i

ty was likely

to be of permanent value only as ""' wide-ranging biblio-

47. .
Bryson,

.QJ!•

cit., Do 18.
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This chapter presents the thinkitlg of .Tohn :oewey

lil.bout the coneeption of the metl:l.od he advoeated for inquir,.
i,es into f:reedom.

Piret• the genero.l 1>ou:roee of

informa~otion

a.re presented, along with the :reasons :f'o:r their po.rtioul&J:'

meleo·Uon.

Second, information is studied to identity the

method used by Dewey in

develoP!~

his ideas on freedom.

Third, Dewey• s t¥1eor;v of freedom is presented.

La.stly • tll.e

implications of his ideas for education are preuntett.

:Because
J

Dewey enJoyed a lengthy oareer ae a philo..

sopher and published prodigiously, the investigator was
faced with the tuk ef uleot1ng information that wo1.ild
a~equ&tely

~

reflect ideas about hi!! ooncepti0n of uaethod for

inquiry about freedom.

To tre.ee an l'ivolui:J.on of hh

thoughts on f:t'lUJdamt tl:u>ugh a valuable experience, would not
han been essential. for thbl study.

to present hh
most

thoU~hts

~H>naiJ.Jtently

lt seemed 111ore aui tai>le

in tile tom and expression which he

a.tfirmi:ld•

:Beoauu of thiat the obsest

attention was directed toward hie mature works.
Thb auumption see111ed valid• since Dewey himr;;elf
had testi:t'ied to the grli!>dttal but radiCal change in his views

!!iii

Willili~Jll

lien:ey Werlcmdl!lter. collll11enttng on the

Sli~Jlle

point,

obae:rved. that during the Firat World war- and its aftermath:
• • .hta

philot~.l\lphicui\1

pod ttl. on underwEmt t'u.rtller
.A turnin&~ poi.nt was

transtorma.Uon and clar:l,ftoa.Uon.

thue reached in 1925 when, in Ji!¥1l!U':hfUIS

!D.£1 AAtyrt•

it beca111e evident tha.t, for Dewey, prob1ellll\l (}f con•
temporM-Y realiam reoeded into the ba.okiJrol.md while
&.t t.b.lll l!!a.llll!l time the pllU"se>phiea of' Plato a.nd
Artatotle receiVed critical lli.Hention.. Delniy th.en
heolll.llle convinced that "in the l!llC!llents. ot' <lreek thought
ca.1•r:!.ed a.l1.mg :ln the modern mind are to be found the
generating causes both to the probltll'ltll that have e.logged
&md stultifiltd modern pl:lilot~~ophic intelligence, and of
solution& :wn1Qh have wepeatedly been proposEui,. often in
&beet intellectual del\lpe:ratbn.,. li'ollowing this turn
in his thinking• Dewey wrote tl•e llllll:ries of ma.Jo:r wo:rk0
ill· philolllotlhY which, togethe:r, ell.lbody his ma.ture
tb.inking aond which must be baste ~~ MY adequate evaJ.u ..
ation ot' his position as a whole.

C.oneequGntly, it is m>t in spite of the profound
clr.u:mges that Dewey' a thinking had undergone, but rather

ueoa.use of
to the

th~tm

ma'la~;re

that it is neceesa.:rt to di.:re<Jt the study

express :lone· of h:l.ill tb.ollli£htl1l on freedom from

h:hl tnllltrwuenta.Ust pertoli.

Dewey's dauihte:t' sel.®oted the

tntrol'luotory essay which he wrote to a monogru.m o! ·tne
_philosopb,y

dep<~.r~nt 1

the fomuUq of

l'Jhic~o

ott the occasion of the Decel'lnia.l of
University,

1/U;

the

c~mtribution

--------48George

Plim~ton AdQme and William Pepperell Mont~uc.
eds._ QRntempgr§U JW,ettcap ~hilos~umt; f[fMI.M\:J. fltat;~ments
(New Yorlu The Ma.cm:I.Uan co., 1930) u. 2 •
49

wUl:l.liiJA H. l'll!lrkau~tater, /;. Ui!l!tqu

At ~qaopnis~

tdeal !! 4meri!! (New Yorkt The Ronald Press. 1949), p. 14.
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which mal'ks hie ":f'i.nal and compl(:lte break with his early
Hegelian idealism a.nd launches his instrumental theory of
reflective th.ought." 50

But the change was not an abrupt one,

for Dewey in a. letter to WilliatJt

Ja~~~es

in 1903 remarked

that the roots of' his new theory go back about a dozen
years.

51

Morton G. White in his !llhdy of. the origin of' Dewey' e
instrumentalism finds a crucial juncture fo·r Dewey's thought
it1 the theory of' conflict.

In 1.894, Psychological ,a,eview

carried an article in which Dewey wrote:
To me it appears as sure a psychological as biologiM
cal principle tha.t men go on thinking onl.y because of
pra.otical friction or strain somewhere, ~uat thinking
is essentially the solution of' tension. 5 "'
The funda.IHmta.l insight gained through the notion is
the point. in the o:pinion of \Vhite, at which Dewey breaks
with previous philosophers and veers ot'f into his own theory
or logic.

The role he assigned to tile problematic situation

was to constit1!te the central motif of his logical writings.
The work of the next forty years does not t'ind a substantial

modification of his instrumentalist theory.

-----------------

Rather his

· . 5 0 Paul Schil:pp { ed.), '.!'he Phpgso,Ql!Jl: .11.£

~

Dewey, . ,,.
Vol •.. I .oJ.' l'ij.e Jtibra:rx .QI.f J.iving J?hiJ,o!l,..OJ?hersf Me. nasha.,
Wisconsin: George Banta. Publishing Oo,, l939J, ~. 33,
51
Morton G. White, The Origin si Dewex's Instrumental.
ism (Ne'ir Yox·k: Columbia. University Press, 1943) • p. 99.
59•
"John Dewey 1 "Social Psychology," PsychQlogica.J.

R!.!.!!!!t

1:401, 1894.

41
theory concerned itself with developing what was latent in
hh und.erstandin!if of his orisinal notion of cont:Uct or

tem;ion, which cllara.oterillles hlllllan behavior in

lit.

problematic

hom Hesel' s concept ot' confliet, and Darwin• s,
plliloaophy ar:d. vee ll.t Dewey• lh 53

d tuation,

Yet once it was fixed, John Dewey's theory of
instrumentalism controlled &nd govnned bill ,Philosopb.io!ll
outlook.

'l'he evidence of the attention which hl!l eone:l.stently

and continuously devoted to hia
out.

lo~ical

tl:utory bear thia

This is also made clear from the pul:!lilllhing history

of 111ome of his most important ell.l'ly w:ri tinge.

Ire does not

sum .to have gone beyond the :J.nstru.mentelirst stage, for
many of hie early articles were later reprinted without

ob.ange in ooll.ectione of esea.ys for wb.ioh llewey wrote the
preface.

S111vera.l t1 tln &rruged ohrono.logioa.lly subs tM•

tiate this idea.

Two articles on Rena.n written in 1892

show up in Qhvagtere Mil

~v~n:lfs

publ.iahed in 1929.

;eedgggg!g CreeS. (3.897) wa.e reprinted !leveral
as recently

~ttl

time~a~

~

once

1939 by the National Eduoatian A.l!laooiation.

Hh ~tlliea.i, ft!nSlUl!!l'l lJQdei![lx;!n~ Jii4ueiH91 ( l697) provided

the framework for

Hie

Jl!UlQ!lS.~C\~2Jl.

iifsu:al

I'l'1,nc1,ile~

1a EfuMl&ljiQQ ( 1909).

.11! Ph!losglll!;IY. ( 1920)

Vtt.l.lil

brOU!ll:ht out in

an enlll!.;rged. edition with a new introduction in

lw4a.

"""'

·.II> · OONCEJ?TION OF Wi:THOD

l!illlPi.ft!i!ll

;\{!~~!\;

The,ou; of PhUo§OAAiaal..lru:l,l.\il'.J1:

To gain an insight into the oonce:p1;ion of method
Dewey advocated t:or a.n;v
'

inq~iry

into freedom wM.ch would.

'

be faithful to Dewey's thinking ol'l the nbjeot; it was

conl!!idered nuese&ey' to ap:r;:re.a.oh tt trom
hie philoaophy.
'

Aocordingl.y• a.n

the OQl'l'!Hit:ltt

m~alysbl

of

of the salient

.

ideas of his Jll'lilolllophica.l doctrines h.! und.ertaken to shed

light ol'l hia conae:vtion ot• method fo:r an inquiry into f':ree ..
d.om.
'l'he reason tor app:ro.aohins; the probl!llm from tlll<.t
;point of view res te on the a.uumption that pllil<HHlJil:tlu:•a'
oonoeptualiaa.t:!ons take sb.a.pe from their Ol.mtr(J.l tntu1t1ono •.
J\lSt as an understarlding of Themism wh.iOn t&ke111 cognizance

of the prilllllt.Cy of exil'!tenoe and of the intuition of ex:ls•
tential billing o!Jlll com• to grips with the pb.Uosop.by of

<txistenoe and existentie.lism of

at.

Thontam of Aquinaa,

while an un<Lerstani:Ung which e:rn:oneoudy conoeh'ee of his

pb.Uoaoplly of bebl& as a philoeol;lll.y of euenoee or a
d.iall!loth of essences QOI!lpl.etely distuts .hill t&aohing• u
an at te<npt is t.l'l!ll.de to ,peru'lt:rate to a vital undet-s tandin~& ()f

Dewe;y•s philoiHJ>:Plly.

While on,e 111&?/ l:le willing to concede

that the philosophicl!l.l writings of St. Thomas e,:re lllore

underatlll.nda.ble and

intelli~ible

of existential bein13 :!.s

gra.~;~ped•

when his central intuition
one

lll!V

wonder wherther 1t

18 not l!lt:retch.tng th\11 :po:lrr& ,to !llUll: e-:11

view in John

o:t'!ered. an
vlith

mu~h M

Dew~yt

a

w~ritinge.,

inm1~ht intt~~

anal~oua

po:iJit llf

Joli>6Pl1 IH•tne:r l:l$eill$ to have

DeWflJI''Ill phil.oeo:Ph1 when, coneurrillil

id€1!a, he wrote:

Grant thlt\t Dewey• e ~mal.yeia of stU.enilit'ic expert;.;
mente.tion is :tn !tu principal oontent:tone .sound ~nd
valid a.nd you will have to grant pretty'muoh everything
else fundruu.ettta.l in hie philosophy is $otmd a.nd val:l.d.M
Expe:t-i~ttce•

of phUoso.pby•

telle us w·e

for Dewey, constituted the l'!ub.ject..llflatiau.•

Experience i.e bo.th of and in n!'l.tu;re.

l/l:~tperbnee n~•:tul'lh

"Tl::lin&tt~

He

interMU!li in

certain wa.ya ,m;:!. eltperienc~:; tt1ey are what is e;!tperienced.... 55
Philosophy be!iiriS in &nd. with ezperhnoe.,

I

I
j

ienoe is the ati!!.I'tins point of .Philosopb;y.

:Y'or l:l.im.

e~per ...

His initial

d.:!.stinotion is lilefrwesn grol'ls or

i:Whii'U,'Y

fined. or reflected

"The dist:l.netion h one

e:~tperience.

expe:denoe and re ..

between wbe.t ia l!lxperience>i as the result of e. lllillim!.UI or
incidental re:t'leet:i.on a.nd

w~t

experienced in consequence
of' continu~ui ud reguJ..ated n:f'lecti ve inquiry." 06 In lll'll"ery..
h

day life the obJects of pr:t111a.ry experience a:re met.

Oonceptt~t

thous;hts. wishes, d.ree.raa• :I.Uusiona• t:ill eonstitute the
subJect..atter of primary exper:l.euce,.

?hey :rtu!ul.t from the

"'==

44

aU:bje.et•m.&.tter of primary experit;ince does not tu•ise within
, the

organililua Ul\leU. · · The objects of seeorul.ary 111.nd

~Ullltm

refi.ned l!l:ltperienoe are those. ,which come about t'l':ota primary
bec~uae

exper:l.enoe
in~"

These J.attu
fly

of tbe intervention of syatemll.tie think·
l~re

proper to the tlulllli!.n drga.ninm,

using the data. of primary experience the .hu.ma.n

organhm constructs the uootuiary objeeta.

The ideas,

belie:t"l1, theox-hst or h;Y'pothetu!a of the aeoondary objEH'.rts

whiCh. resulted trow reflection upon the prifll4l'Y axplllrience
are teeted or verifhd by a. return h

experience.

the. things of crude

By means or the objects of refleotion primary

sxperienoe i& Ubdetl\1 t<!)od better •

Prifll4ey experiences are

no longer isolated detaUa but tHe

o~:~

.!lieaning frou1 being

related withil:l a whole ayll1Hillli of rlillateli obj eH.tts.

oo.nt1nuwn or

ex,periet~oe

The

ts uaainta.ined, fpr now the thinge

of prinm.n experience a.re "rendered continuous with the
rest of' nature and tul\l on an import of th(l things they are
now seen to be continuous with•"
cont:U:mum,
oontinUU~a

:I.e one.

,Pl,"im.ae~y

h

67

In DeweY's notion of the

,iVen to its anity, . J.U.a notion of

implies the primacy of unity

It 1lil a <lontirru.um in \Vb.ieh

Unction between things in nature.
57,.,4 ...... "

~·· .t~•

·~

v.

~~Jv-n

th.ert~

This

bf.ling.

Reality

is no real din ..
intJ~tgrated.

unity
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is with. this principle tha.t he sidewteps the aotua.l amount

of .real differences th•re lll:ra between things, ili·.g.;, the
<iiffe:tence bet~en .subject and object, mind and Jl'latter. 58
While the eubjeot l!llil.tter of pltilosophy can be found in
experience eo eM a Jll.ethod of phiJ.oaoplli:dng. · He tells um:
Experience presents itsel:f as ti'le l!lllthod, and the
onl$' method, for ..getting. at natur111, Qen«trating its
seorillts. and. wherein nature eQirioaJ.ly dililclGselil (by
the use of emp1ricll.l lltethod in natural scilllnce) daepent>t
enrichuand directs the ru:rther dne1op!llant or experhmce. ·
.
EXplllrhnliU'~•
wili~

the

ie syno:ny!lloUI!l

!ll(l tcheH:i

tor

DeW>~~y,

w;!.t~1

is firet of e.ll a ruethod

the !llllltbod of

~£eienes..

he wililhea to tntrod.uce to ph.iJ.oi.lopny..

'l.'hill ia

The

etll!Jliriea.l !lletb.od determines the nature of his pltiloaopcy.
J

What empirica.l !llettlod exa.ete of pllilosC:r.Pl1Y h two
ttlilllf:illt First• that refined. methods and :products be
tr&<Uid 'back to theb• Ql'igin in primt'l;ry exper!enae,
needa and J?l'oblellls out of w:!lich. tneya;ril!itJ and which
t~1111y fJa.tisty be ucknowhd(iJed.
Secondly, ·that the
secondary !llethods and conelus1o:ns IJG broue;ht back to
tho things of ordinary experience
aU their coa.rst~•
ness and erudity for verification.

G8

Charles w. Morris offered a s1lllll!lllrbed insight into
the two different meanings of Dewey 1 a ideas of experience

a.s subjeot-sw.tter 111nd expuience e..s method.

5ihh1tt

~··

59ru_q_H P• 2.,

6o;ou..Q,. •

it do•Hl nO't seem ur!:fair to ;D@wl!!y 1 !! thought to, a tate
tll.lli ·fitter in tnU way: Ex:perien<Hl aa aubject~mutte:r

alw~ttys

:l.ndh&te& M appea.:dna character within ar1 event
field o:rgaonhed around and partly coneti tuted by an
orga.niam, tll.lt a.ppea.ring Cloil.lpol'len ts of tilie field being
"there'' to'/.' the organic o1uater of tm.e field although
not rul!eeui:l.rUy known to be therer experience a.a method
:requ:l.ree. that knc.nvledge be Ioncerned with Wld res pillet~
ful to that wnienappear~;. 6
'l'o verify the theory of the cMt:i.nuity Q:f' expon>ience

Dewey invokes &n ev·idene& the theory of evolution preunted
bY the ;peysioal l!hlhnee of biology.
b.e.e philouptliclil.l significance.

Thil.l biological tMQry

The th.eo:uy atreesee tll.e

oontinu:l. ty of the more complex cn·ga.nil.lm

m~U~.

from l!!impler

Mil less complicated orea.nisms and ultim111tdy f:raJn lil!ll.tter.
Tl"~e

interaction between organhm and environment, indeed

the evolu.Uonary process developing within and because of
the envir<>nmEmt, bear out Dewey 1 s contention that the logi-

cal or philosophic enterprise ab.ould he 1.;umtinum.w with tho
experience out of which i t ha.d originated..
I t is aetonil.lhing th!$t. in the faoe of the a<h&.nolil
of the evolutionary method in na.tul'&l science, iiul.y
logiCian can per~:~ht in the &eaertion of' a rigid. differ ..
ence betvnltin the );).roblem of origin &nd nl!l.turel between
genes:h and anlll.lysil'!; tlliltWI!lert hietort and v111.lidit;r.
Such asaertion simply . reiterates am final a di~ltinetion
which grew ttp in pre-evolutionary science. It auerts
&.gainst the most J~~arked adV'&nee whiel'l lHilhnt.ifio meth<>d
has yl!lt made a survival of a cruds period. of logical
aoientit'ie prooedure. We have no choice save either
to ooneei ve of thinking 111,a a response 'lio a specific
lltiJllUlus. or else to regard it ae somethin' "in itself,"
having Just in and of itself certain traits, elements

61
cnarles w. U.or:riaf f'>i;z& 'gl],eoriee 9114~nd. (Chicago:
'l'he Uni verlli ty J?reu, 1939), Po 292.
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. ~nd laws. !~ we give up the last view, we must take
the former.
The force ot' D.ewey• s argument is directed at preserving the integrity that exists in experience ttself.
Erolutiona.ry tl'leoryha.s accounted for the integrated interaction of organism (!l.nd environment.

It does not iJOsit a

ga.:p but an interplay of different types of forces in accounting for the equilibriUIII of organic energies on the
organic side and the presence of satisfying conditions in
the environment on the environtllenta.l side.

Wllat is so on

the organic and environmental level is so on the level of
experience,

On the level. of experience, self and object,

organism and environment are "functionallY united. 1163

A.l'l

investigation and an understanding of experience which
makes use of the products of reflection--distinctions
( subjeot and oi.lj eot, knower and known)- .. muat realize that
these originate in experience l;l.nd must be reintesrated with
experience because in nature the organism and environment
are one.

The function ot" knowledge and the knowinga of

knowledge are understandable only in their inUrrelatione
with one another in the whole organic process of interaction
02 Jotm Dewey, S,:t,udies .in Lo!?iic§!,l ::£heo:r;;v: (Chicago;
The Univerdty of Chicago Press, 1903), .PP• 14-1~5.
63
;rohn :Dewey, •IE:x:pe.ri.ence, Knowledge <~.nd Value,"
The Philoeo~h~ .4!. John Dewey (Vol. I, of T~e Mibrary 4!
Living Philgso·el!ers, ed., Paul A. Schilpp: Menasha, Wisconsin, George :Banta Publishin,.~ Co., 1939), p. 584, fn. 51.

b~tween

organism and environment.

Dewey's re!iQnce upon evolutionary theory to buttress
his postulate of the integral continuity of expe.rierlM hae
a significant O()nneotion with the whole atruoture of Ilia
,ph.ilosephy •

It influences his theory of'

l<no~;!ed.ge

and

deter1nine$ the epis tetaolo&v .he preeents.
Let us tu:t"n from thia conception of the mea.1nu·e of

I

I

I
~

q

true knowledge and the nature of tru~t philosophy to the
existing practice of kMwin(ih !!owda.ye if a tll!iln 0 say a
ph.jreiciet or oh.emist, wants to lmow sometning• the la,<.~t
thing he does is merely to conteiJlplate. Ue does not
look in howeve~ earnest and prolonged way upon the
object expeotin~ that tt1ereby he will detect its fixed
and characteristic form. He dou. not expect any amoul'lt
ot aloof sorutil'l.Y to reveal to him anY' seorets. He
p:rooeede to do somethillih to bring some energy to bear
upon the substance to see how it :reacts; he pl.acn it
.
under unusual conditione in order t? induce I!IOJne ohange.o4
AnW'!ling that Dewey understood

ca.l theodes of past philo&ophers

what the· epietemologi-

JUEll.!.nt,

we realhe that he

ela.imed these thelu:ies to be invalid because th.ey did not
pro.oeed in their investigations the way DewliJy understood the

oile!llU t or peyl!ietst proceeded, and the WfM! hlil ola.illlf;jd the
philosophers should l:u"ve proceeded,.

For Dewey, knowledge a.rieee in inquiry.

"That which

ntisfaetorily terminatee inquiry, is by de:l'ini tion
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knowledge."tJ!> ' :For him the es!l!lilntial difference between pru ..
vious

ph~lolilo:phica.l

:rea til! on the

accounts ot knowledge a.nd hi.s account

~filsumption

that llilii con textual account of ll.:now..

ledge considered it as the outcome of inquiry while the

others d.id. not.
Theories of knowledge tlw.t conl\lti tute what is now
called epistemology have ariuen beoa,u<;e kllowledge a.nd
obtaining irl:tori!W.tf.on have not been conceived in terms
of opera:Uon by whhht> in the ~:~ontinuum of expe:r:ilillmtal
inquiry • establhhed beliefs are lll"ogreuively obtained
and utiliJUtd. Becau1HI they are not eonetrueted. upon the
grounds ot o;pera.t:tone and oo:aed nd. in te:rmt> of their
a.otua.l :Prooeduree &nd eanl!!equeneu. they are neeeua.rily
to:r"'ed in terms of preeonee,tJt:l.onl'! derived from various
sources, uinly oo«Haolo(iiel.lJ. in aru:.hnt &nd mainly
. ,
peyehGloghal (directly or· :l.m:Ureotly) in .tucHiern th.eory •06

I
1J

Cotnishnt with beth. the evolutionary and. empiri,oal

oharaeter of his tllinldne:. he ba.sed. Ilia ·theory of logic on
his theory of tlle soienti:fio atet1lod of inquiry.
nition wllieh Dewey otfe:rell

a~a

Tb.e defi•

the moat l:ligl:lly generalized

oonoll!ption wtd,eh ean be Juat:l.fiably t'o:rmulated waa:
Inquiry is the controlled ox• 1Urf.!cted. :t:ra.nafo:rlila.tion
so
determinate in its constituent distltlotions and :rela;..
tiona ali! to connect the element~ of ·the original
.
situation into a unified wllale • 0 7
!l)f an ind.ete:rtdna,te ei tuation into one tl'lat b

It h&e been pointed out previously tha.t the point of

departure tor Dewey'lli a.naJ.ylllil!l !\If reflectivt.'l<hinking is
tH'lJob.n Dewey, l.!~a!s, the tnel!tY 9J: Ingui;r;y: (New Yorkt
Henry Holt !'l.nd Com.pany t 19 38) , P• 8.
66lll.U •• pp. 534 .. 5,
67
.J:.ha•• p. loth

-=

50

th!!i eon:f'lict o:r tenlilion whieh ahM>acteriaes hUI!Ian behavior
in a probll\!lllatie situation.
. is the

e~ietential stattUI

which .:be eo:noei ve.e of'
obscure.

llllll

Tb.e crucial point in hie theory

of the indeterminate situation

dhturbed 1 troubled, oanfusEHlt or

Since knowing ill oonQerned IVitll doing, witll

wa.to.hing reMtionet with U1e induction of onange• the resow
lution of' the indeterminate situation will. result from the

overt a.otiono Jll,lld ope:ra.tiona of the orga.nhu:u in the prooiiHiW
o.f inquiry.,
It illl the s1tulliLtion tha.t has thei:H11 traits. te are
d-oubtful beoa.ui'Hll the d tuation is inrte:rentl:t doubtful.
Personal etatea of doubt thlltt ~:n eookad up by !l.nd are
not rela.ted to sotne e:xdstent:l.al aituation tore pa.tllo~
logical; and wh.en they. are extre1ne they ooner&itute 1:.'.111

me.nia Qf doubtitl$• Co.nnquently, ei &ui!!.tiona that are
d.ieturbed and tro1~bled, Ol>nfuud ol:' obscure, cannot l)e
etra.ightened out,. oleared up and put in ordiiltj~ by
lllt\ni,pulation of: onr pmrsonel ah~~nrtdQ.,.:.""'-~~---

SinCII the notior:t .of :problemtic eitua.tion is at trtto
llea.rt of ilia thto.ry, :1. t W!>Uld be helllt'ul to lilbta.hl. a more
exa.<Jt underetand.ing of his conception o.f situation.

Situ..

a.tion ie eynonymoue with objects and ev<Hlta in a. contextual
wt~ole.

A. dtua.tion

doet.~

not dtHiialnate a e.ingle object or

event or .even sets of events.
experie!loe
H
~ol(.J.eme

a~

1/hell :Oewe;y 1 s notion ot

subjeot-matter is reoalled, llie eonll!eption of
.

.
.
. .
.
I t .should M noted tlla.t J.n
,publiahecl in 1946 Dewey came to diatintuieh

X: bid., PP•. 105·6•

.st.! m

doubtful trom indeterminate. The significance of the later
distinction l'E!eted on the .interposition of an inquirer.
whereas· tlle above a.sfler&ione posited the doubt 1n the

s:ttu.a.tion.
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matter indioates an appearing ohllf.ractei' within an event
field organized around and

~rtly

constituted by an

organ~

islllt the appearing elemente of the field. being the1•e for the

organ:l.c cente:r of the field, although not neoesearf1y kru>wn
to be there.

The over-all pervasive field furnished

obeer~

vations of thh or that object or event determined by the
ht.1.01&n orgli!.n:l.sm' a a.oti ve Maptive rea pons e to be .atacl.e in
carrying forward a course of behavior.

object or event Dewey observed:
ia

l'liM~J

In disc:nu:uaing tile

"Observation of the latter

for the $Uiil ot' finding out what that ti!l!l. ill! with

reference to some active adaptive

respon~;e

canying forward a course of beha.vhr • .,Gil

1

which ia being

~~~a.de

to be made in
The deter!llin~a.tion

about. the object or e'Vent is what it

si&nifies concerning the way the enUre situation is to be
dealt wi tn.

When tlle initial pll.a$& of the recognition th.at a

situation requires inquiry h01.s been re01.lizedt the ne:x:t
phase in the inquiry process is the under&tanding of what

the problem ill.

Then the deter~ination of tlu1 prob.lem..
eoluthn beginm. 70 !dea.e, judgments• reaaonins. and obur ..

va.tion are all bl'ough.t to bear upon the problem.
judgme.nts, reaeoning,

~We

t:tll

e~ployed IMl

Idea.s,

tools ·to transform

'J'ua t

ii4$

the behavioral ohru:'e.cter of th.e

or~an:l.em

ol)ntrcrls inquiry• so sensations are eltpl.ainod as signals
f'o/1:' tile rea.d.justing of behavior., Sensatiem opera.tes as a
piVot of readju!Jting beha.vior.,'11 sensations brini the
organiilma into confrontation with the prt>blema.tilii situa•

tion.,

'l.'b.ey t'unction in a rtQrt .. cQgni tbte eapa.ctty.

'!'he

organ:tsm•e a.djturtillent is interrupted by the stimulus of
rumtul.tion and it

ment.,

lt is bf

comes into

ll1fi:1

llli.IMS

cont~~;ot

trigger a readjur,rt!llent ·to its environof the

stml3e

with nature.

organs tlul.t the organism

In tile interaction betweon

orga.niamliUld environment there is a participation and

communication.

'l'llia :reruu;,per; tile 1\lnvironl!lel!lt and oondi tions

the organism to make it more sui ta.ble · f'o:r futul:'e aetion.
J

'i'he modi :t'ieatiol'l of' the orga.rltsm• which gi vee ~.>ome mo:re
dei'in:tte d:h:ootton to the future action$ of the org&nism1
h

what :Dewey merun1 by habit.
An idea in

:Dewey•e ·tbeory of inquiry is a.

augc~eation

of' sometl'ling to be dane, Gf a poal!libUity of what might be.

They are "antici;pated oonsequenoc;e {foreoaete) or what will
lmPli/On when certain obnrvationf! arl!l executed under Md with
reepeet to observed conditionl3,n 72
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The total field or si tuatio~' ill the strict sense of
the word giVes the datwn or date..

Just a.s there iB no doubt

about the existence of the total field, so there is no dmlbt
about the existence of the datwn or data.
is

What is doubtful

the meaning or eignifioanoe of the data..

Tile idea a.e

having s:i.gnifio&noe ill the mediwn through which our thinking
ha.fl to go to gain the idea Ill?! meaning.

Ideas are instru-

mental for arriving at the J!leaning of ex.istin!t things.

There

is not a li!Pli t between the meaning of the datum a.e such and

l

tlle Qll!lil>ning of the idea ae such.

Ae a reeul t of inquiry •
the lllEHmin~ epec:i.fiea.lly a;:rbee in both datum and idea. 73

I

Since ideas are instrumentalities in ·t;he
inquiry, their intellectual

1

ohar~oter

Ji'l'OO€li!JS

of

consists in what is

done with them, how they are used when they occur.
HseJ.f beool1les ililerely a.n instrU1llent of action.

Thought

In trying

to make this point forcefully; Dewey come a very close to
denying the existence or the mind.
So far as tllou@!hts in this partioub.r naea.nin~ are
concerned• it is true to say "it thinks" (as we say "it
rains,") rather than "I think.~ Only when a person
triu to get oont.rol . of tlle 1!9&$!1 tions that detertnine
the occurrence of a suggestion; and only when he accepts
what follows from it• i1; is significant to introduce the
"I" as the agent and source of thought. 7
Dewey has

!;!,

-·-----75

74

~ •• p.

narrow connotation of· the function of the
.
112·3.

John Dewey, ~ n! think (Boston: D.
Co., 1910, revised edition 1933) • p. 41.

c.

Heath &

intellect.

He sternly limits the are!,!. of intelligence.

He

also conceives ot' rea.IHm as the proceee of verification of
an idea or ideas.

The meaning of ideas is erubodied in some

symbol which :repreeenta the idea.• such as words or p:ropoa:l.•
tiona.

But not every suggestion is an idea.

tion to 'be an ide1;0 it must be checked.

For a suggea•

Its functional

ca.pacity in resolvins the situation in which it arose must
be undertaken.

reasoning.

'75

Just

I

The process of' checking the suggestion is

a.fl

ideas and reasoning have their origin in the

probleznatic situation. so do judgments.

Judgment is identi-

fied a.s the llettled outcome of inquiry.

The subject matter

of Ju<tgment is "concerned with the concluding obJects that
emerge from inquiry in their eta.tus of being conelu:!li ve ... 'Ill

The judgment hQs direct
guished from other

e~istential im~ort

non·e~istential

for it is distin-

propositions.

Proposi-

tions are indeterJllinate Md instrumental pouibili ties for
a future course of action.

Propositions

<~.re

composed of

symbols wnioh nave relation to suggestions or hypotheses
that migtlt blil used in inquiry,

When they are tested. in

action, when they existentially dli!termine the actual outcome
of the indeterminate lilitua.tion• the propositions are judg..
ruents.

Within the process of' inquiry of all the prior
75
76

newey, SLQ• ,!i.ll. • PP• Ul-2.

~., P• l20.
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Jttdgm~n·t

h

l'@~ll':t'ved

only

settle the outof.lme of .the

for tnne ';p:ropoii! :J.1;ions wnicb.
.inqu~:r.y.

They.a.J.one effectuated

the definite !.ixiatl\\lntiOil s:l. tl~ation •.
~rhe

copula..

.J udgt11en t :l.s. composed. ..of subJect• . predicate

and

The mubJect is constituted by the d!i<tUm tba.t !lt<>nde

out in a. s itua.tion in reference· to the ,rJX"ob.tem.. The predicate is

c<mG~ti t'j.\tlild

by the ideas which

antioip~~te

possible

solutions.
Apa.r·t :f'rom

a-11

int.!lu!llive situation wnioh detel'Jllinee

!a corren!J!Bdence !.U.ll ea.ah !!l.Jihtt:t the materi!i!.l thQt

oonstitutlila the olllilerved singul.a.l' thh and the kind of
ob.a.raote:r:hin,g Ji)rediQa.te applieal:IJ.:e..,~o i t 9 predication
ia totally arbi tra.r;r o:r ung:t"ound.ed,. 1
.
The copula. h

aons.'l!itUt!ild by

U:;~

pondenoe to the subject .and predicate.
j

functional

oor:re~

ll'or Dewey, tile sub-

Ject tnattera ()£' the !lubj eot and predicate a.re det<ll'lllined in

oorreepondenoe with eaoll other in Md by th>li ;\lrooesa of'
" • thouSllt, • that is- inquiry • .,78
In Dewey's oonoeptiorl 1 fll(bstanoe ill! constituted by

the intll>reonru!leted diatim;ttiou attributable to it by it;e
specified funetion in inqtliry. . li'or hil11, tl:.te stllle oondi tion

that has to bl:l

~>a.tiefied

stan till!.li ty, "U
a.u d>:!pendabJ.e

t~ t

si~,tne

----------------

irl order th.D.t there •nay be sub··

a<~~:rta.irt

t.n.... t

qua.Ufieat ions . .WWg toaetner

certain

OlHliiEHlUi'H.tae$

will follow
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when certain interactions take :plaoe.-.'19
This is wha·t: Dewey means when he says . that subs tantiali ty is a logical not a ,primary ontological determina-

tion.

Being a substantial object is synonymous witb. the

specific function of' standing for the consequences of
certain operations.
When the indeterminate situation has beoorne deterruinate, the satisfactory outcome of the doing xuay oe called
11 warrented

assertibility" or knowledge.

It must always be

kept in mind that knowledge can only be conceptualized. as

a generaliaa.tion of the proper'ties diecovered to belong to
.the conclusions which were the outcome o1' the inquiry.

The

·warranted asserti bili ty was an act (action) whi ell conferred
upon noneogni ti ve material traits and potential! ties of a.

J

cognitive nature that did not belong to them.

Viewed in

the light of the continuum of experience and the pr ima.ry
integrity of the unity of experience, it ia understandable
for Dewey to e.eaign a. priml!ilry position to the interaction
of the organism and environment and a secondary one to
knowledge which is "intermediate and instrumental; it comes
between a. relatively oa.eua.l and accidental experience and
one relatively settled and defined." 80

79 Ibid., pp. 128-9.
80

John Dewey •. Q.u)"ilt.· for. certainty (New York; Minton,
Balch and Company, 1929 , p. 295.
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mente in his theory .. .;.aellStll'Y data, idea.a,· preposi tioi1s,
jud./j;ments, rell!.atm-•&1'0 :pointers to aotion.·

ThG

ooneeptu~:~J.,

as an ol.'de:t>, is not rdeva.nt to the real order of existence,
but if:l relevant to the hypothetical, the poa's:J.!)lo.

In

reality, 1'l'he conccptUI.i.J. and • rat iona.l' oon tents are
h'tPo!jjloees. ~ 131

:r>eal.ity, and

:rhey <ta:l:f to •nind wl-.at might be done with

1111a111t

be checked experimentally IA>lld be ola.pab.l:e

of being recheol!:ed experimentally before being considered
as age;regated to a body of kno·wledge.

All l!:nowlodge tlil.kea

its origin in tH>me probletll,.tia situa:Uon. to change the

indeterillina.te aituat:l.on into a determinate unified whole.
~.it

gf Trutn

Since M analysis of Dewey's theory of method would
lack an important element i f it did not disousa his theory
of truth, it will now be

pre~sented.

treated in the section of the study

It could ha.ve been
abovt~~

which eunaidered

the Judgmentlil which were wa.r:ra.nted a.sse:r.tions of the outoOlite of inquiry.
sC~tpa.:rately

Hia notion of truth has been treated

beea.u!lle of 1t111 importance for tllill etudy and i t

would Jw.ve aeetlled a digression from the uquence of ideas

presented.

Dewey's

philo~t.Cphy

of tru1lno, The J)arwi.ni&n theory of

evolution deeply :l.nflu.enoed his philosophy of nature. · The

findings of tnodern soil:lnoe · fund.amen tally a;.l terect the

1141. tu:re

of truth and made old epistemologies obsolete. · Knowing
ooneisted in doing; it was the result of the controlled

transfol"lllation of a.n indeterminate e i tuation into a deter-

\'

I
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A merely ~ental eenerenoa without experimental verifica. tion does not en.at>le us to go beyond ttte realm of
cypotheaia. If a notion or theory makes pretense ot'

oor:ref>ponding t1> na.li ty or to tl~e ;f'&ett>, tllia pretense
cannot be put to the test at~d confirmed or refuted
exa.ept by oa.using it .t;o pae~> over intc1 the J:oa.lm of
a.etion at~d by noting t.h.e results wnieb. it yields in tile
form of the ooncrete ohllerv&I:>:J.e factf! to whieh thiw
noti<m or theory leads. I f • in a-cting upon th:l.S notion•
we are brought to the fact wl:d.oh 1 t i>llplhs or which
i t demands, then thta notion is t:l:'ue, A theory oorreaI/Onds to. th~ f<,,l,'ftlil Vlhen :l:t J.ead<1 to t,h.., facts which "te
its consequences, by the intermedi~ry of experience.s 4
However, even while the theory or notion ilJi1f3' be true
in that it lea.ds to the facts a.e verified by experience, it
can still only be held hy:pot.hetioa.lly since it is always

i

l
j

J

subject to oorreetion by unforeseen future consequenoea or
by observed :f'a.ets which were overlooked.

For, qlogioe.Hy,

a-bsolute truth is an idee.l which cannot be redbed, at

least till &ll tile f<>ets have been recognized • • • and until.
it ia no lonser possible ·t:o makl!! other obaervationa and

o th.lllr e;Kpniences."as
Thi.a iii!
DE~wey

tne un,i.quenei>a o:t.' tlle eu;piriC<l..l. .method which

advooateu fOl' 11h.i.l.osopey.

J'hilosophioa.l Mnoept ions

must be submitted to the control of experience.
:prootUlfl

of verifYing the.m truth will be found.

In the
lie too

opt1miatically OQnolud"d that any pllilosopb.er wb.o iil.p;;lies
this empirical method without the leas1;. p:rejudtee in favor

--·-------------82J!)lm :rJewey,
Putnam1 a

Sona~

;eail.oaomi and Qiviliz<~.t,iqn (r~·ew Yor.lc;
J.93l), p. :13.

S3J;b:!.g. • ,p, 1:4~
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•means' Vli!l'ification, or i f one prefer111, tlwlt verif'iCOition,
d the:r: a.ctue.l. or possible, b the definUi on of truth ... d 4

Yet fifteen years later, in answering Rua3ell 1 s
critique of his theory• Dewey a.ft'irmed his theory of tru·th

as a oo:rreapondtJnce theory of truth,
:~ own view takes eorreepondenoe in the operational
senu it bea:rs in a.ll !!lases e:xoept .the J;miquG epiateruolegioal ease et' the alleged relation between a "sub~
ject" and an ~o.b.jeot"·; the 4lea.nirll!& 1 tHwelY Gf anlilwelintl:
as a l!;ey answers to condition~} imposed by a. look, or as
two corresp;mdenta "answanr• ea.oh other; or in general,
a.s a. reply is a.n a.deqt<a.te answer to a question or a.
e:t.•itieism.. ,..aa, in ehort,. a SQl<&tiQn &.nswers ·the require ..
mente of a. il."oPlepa. On tilia view• both. ~rtnera in
"eorre!li,Pt)ndenoe'1 are open and &.l:loveboa:rd. inatelld of
one ot' them being forever out ot' experience and tht~~
other in !t by wey of a "peroeptK or wb.atev101r. Wondering a.t how somethins in exl)erienoe 'by d.efini tion outside
experhne.e. wtt:!.cl:t it is, upon t.b.e l>a.sb of' epiatemologi·
mal doctrine, tb.e sole meli4ns of "knowing." is what
or:l.gin.a.Uy l'IUMle me aus:pidous of tl.i.El whole ep:l.atemologi•
ea.l industry. In the sense ot' eQrrespondence as o:per*
athnal ®ttd behavioral. (tbe meeing whiell. has definite
parallels in ordinary experience), :r hold tc~a. t !ll.Y 1t.I2!
of theory ia the only one ent:l.. tled tra be called
correeporuienoe tlleory of' trutn. 85
·

In DE!wey 1 s mind, his theory of trutn as developed
in hie I&d!! essentially resen;bled the theory preaented

· above.

In lliS

·expressed

~mgic,

by o. s.

he

~indorsed

the no t:l.on of' truth as

Peirce,

The beet definition of' truth from the logical t~~tand
point vrhiel:.l h known to me h U~a.t of J>eiroe: 11 Th!,'! opinion

84,J;.W.' p. 23.
85new<~y, PrGbJ.!ms .!Ut .i!J!! (NeN Yorlu l'hiloso))hiaal
Library 1 Inc., l946), pp, 343 .. 4.

-~
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which is rated to be ultim~tely ~greed to by ~ll who
investigate l& what we mnn by truth., and tb.e object
represented by this opinion hl the r,eal .• " A more com•
plete (and more suggestive) sta.hment b tito following;
urruth is that concordance of a.n abst.raot statement with
the ideal limit toward which endless investigation would
tend to bring IH.lientific belief • which concordance the
abstract etate~nt may poseese by virtue of the aonfee•
don of its inaccuracy ancl. one-sidednesa, and this
confession ie an essential ingredient of trutn." 86
Without developing the .impliea.tion of Dqwey' s expliei t avowal of na.ving found in I'ei:rce the beet definition

ot trutn, it is possibly more underatanda.ble to on this
acknowledgment as lilymptoma.·t.io of Dewey' e &nau.mptiona con•

l

earning the natur111 of aoientifie knowledge.

I

utilize J?eiroe' 11 conoeption of t:r.u·'-h within his own philoso-

J"

Without going

into that analysts, it suft'ices to note that Dewey doea

phy, and considers it CQnllistent with hb ideaa,.8'l

It tnua t be recalled that within the proet'I!Js of

66:oewey, LQgigr '~b.e :tneorx .sa! ljnquir:y Orew York:
!Ienry Holt & Company, 1938), P• 345, fn.
8'1

Denton L. G~Jyer, The :Pf~tlr.!!J.!trf lh.t~gr.v of :cr'ath .i!!,
;Q!!velgget,l k. P!it~l• Jyl'ls all Dewez
llinoist Univerlll. ity
ot Illinoie, 1914 • P• 43.. He concluded hie study with an
alternative (iH'lt\t.:rary to Dewey' e position in thie matter.
Ire wrote: 11 I f we believe th$-t Dewey .does not ma.ke a. correct
deduction from the pragmatic method in this development
1H!)W&l'd truth. thl\ln we are confronted with the alternative
er either accepting the Deweyan theory of truth or reJecting the Peiroian theory of olearnesl:h Tha.t h, u· we
begin with l'eiroe on method, we !!lUSt go clear to 1)ewey or1
truth. And if we reject Dewey. while believing that Peirce
gave a. correct deuription of the method of ecienee 1 then
it aeeme that we must conclude that the method ~;~f aeienoe
~tnd the method of philosophy are not the Batlle.n
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process of inquiry things are considered. in· their inte:t'•
relations with each other.

'l.'hings or events are true in

their application to exiatential lil:l.tuations.
oons titu ted by the use to which the idea h

Truth h
:put:

• • .in the pn.q'tlee of inquiry verification of an
idea. or theory io not a. ma.tttr of t'inding an existence
which answers to the demanQ.s of' the idea. or theory, but
· h a matter Qf the systel'lla.tio ordering of a. complex Bet
of data.6 by
means of the idea or theory a.s an instruruen~
·
·
tali ty, "' 8
Consequently propositions are not true or false. but va.lid
or invliil.id, i.e., true or :f'i'l.lae consid.ered in

:t·e~a.rd

to the

settled outcome or inquiry,
Tht "truth" a:f' any present .vropQdUon is 1 by the
de:f'inition, au.bject to the outeorae ot continued inquir11\llll; i te 11 truth" • if the word ruua t be uaed 9 ie pro vi ..
sional; a.s ne111.r the t:ruth a.s inquiry he.s ,!!!:! ~ come,
a llllil.tt.e:r deterad.ned not by a IJUelils lil.t eome future
belief, but by the om and pains With Which inquiry
hae bun oondueted up to the present time. Adlllbs:l.on
of t!~e neceee&ry eubjeotion of e1Tery preeent pro.,posi ..
tion to the re111ults to be obtained in future inquiry
is the meaning of :Peirce'$ :referenee to 11 oonfm:H~ion of
inaccuracy and one-eid.edneas" as
ingredient of' the
truth of the present pro:poui ti,m., ·
·

te

As ltu been lJU!Intioneo.• id&!il.$ 1 conupts• propoaitioml

are instrumentalities.

81lro!4•,

:P•

Instrumentalities may oe fit u:r

..ua •.

139 John Dewey. "Experience. Knowledge and Valu.e," '!'he
PllilQiilOJtbx ,gl ~ !{ewex (Vol. I of T.Qe J41.2riNY .W: LitiJ:!.l
Illailol!lo!J:!etf!.. ed. l'a.ul A. Schil.pp: Wiseonsitu Georg(!
Banta Publishii'Jg Co~, lS 39) • .v. 573.
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unfit for the. task, efficacious or inett'aoicioua for a Job,
but they a:re. not true or false without possibility of error
or probability coefficient of a.ll pro};)ositiona.

Truth or

tala ity apply only to the final outcorae of inquiry.

In

order to be true in the sense of useful, an action amst be
r:~ex•tinent

to the solution of th.e parUcular r;roblern from

which it aroee.

Vihile Dewey intendeC the utilitarian

criterion of his theory to be concerned with the oontributior• to the reol·g&,niza.tion in experience, and not 1vith
purely personal profi.t or caprice, he has not provided any
norms, absolute in themselves, whereby truth or falsity,

right or wrong ma;r be deter;:u.ined,
TO&QrY of Freegom
Dewey's w1·itings ex11licitly contain certain dis-

.tinotions <lbouc the nature of freedom.

ThiA section ana-

lyses his oonoeytion of fre<:ldom in the J.igl:lt of fundamental
distinctions or principles in his philosophical under-

standing of the subject.

Tho startir1g; rooint of his exposition is his attribuUon of a, 11referential action to a.lJ. na.tu:ra.L things.
"J>.:t•eferenUal action in the sense of selective beh.avior is
a unive;L·eal tx•ait of all things, atoms rmd molecules, as

co

well as plants • animals and man • .,!:!
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Dewey· asserts the reality of pref'eren ti.al a.o'tion
att,ribut<able to all natural things to unoer.line the
tinuity of man with the rest of nature.

con~

Yet it is not the

only qual.i ty of differing naturQ.l things·.

Ina.nima. te

prefererltial action (stnne) lacks capacity for changing
its ;uode of conduct.

Animate preferential a.ction (dog)

lacks the a.otive role in initiating and direct:i.ng ctumge.

\ill

HUman preferential action indh;putably imnl ved. an ability

to choose among pref!'lrences, a. capacity for actively and
pur:posefulJ.y c!langing :i. ts mode of conduct. 112

Preferential •wtion with choice otmracterizes free
hUlll&l1

~.~ctiom,,

free a.ction.

Pret'ercnti.al

~:wtion

without choice is not

If men performed pr e:f'erenthtl or

fH~leoti

ve

actions which did not involve choice, these aotionll! would

not be free

bec~•use

then these "Lotions would be the same

as those of other natural things that do not act freely,
.A further refinement of hie doctrine of human free-

dom involves his distinction beti'I'O<>n native and actual
freedom.

The potentit'l.li ty for freedom is a.. native gift or

part of" our constitution in tllat we have the capability for
self-direction or choice..

93

Actu!:l.l or positive freedom is

91
John Dewey and James H. cl.'u:rta, EttJ.iQJ! (Hew York:
Holt,IUnehart and Winston, 1932), p. 339.
9

~ewey,
93

QJ2.

cit.• , p. 276.

Dev;ey a.nd Tufts,

~·

cit., p. 340.
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not a. native girt but is acquired, 94
The locus of lllan' s pot en tiali ty for· freedom nsidea
in the :power of htunan intelligence to anticipate the future
and project different courses of oonrluot together with th.eir
probable consequences.

95

In line with his behaviorisms,

Dewey affirms the two esc:ential constituents of cnoicea as
freedolll to consist in the individual's variable life
.
96
and the self's intellige.nt insight and foresigrlt.

his~ory

The individual achieves the actuality of freedom
when his aotionc are guided by Jmowleclge which lllttkes

fore~

possible and seoureF; intentiomJ.l prepara:tion for
97 Conoeqt<ently he rejects the conprob~•ble consequences.

eig~!t

1

l

ception of contingency in the will or freedom of the will
because for him:
The lmeinesE of "will" is to be resolute; that is, to

resolve, under tne guida,nce of thsgght, the indeterminateness of uneertain si1metions.
Such choices constitute "true choices."

Dut choice

for Dewey is not merely intellectual because the signi ..
fio1>~.nce

of choice lies in He taking effs.ct in outward action.

Dewey a.ffirm!'l "an intrinsic connection between choice as

95

96
97

Dewey, ,EgJJ.oso!Jl:l[ atld

Qivilj,~ation,

Ibid., P• 276.
Dewey, ouest for Cer&a.!nty, p. 250.

93T'•' d

~-

PV• 275-6.
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freedom and power of a.ction as freedom. 1199
When facing the problem of contingency or indeterminateness, he rejected the opinion which posited the
indeterminateness of "free will ...

He considered the doe-

trine to be a desperate attempt to escape from the consequences of the doctrine of t'ixed and immutable objective
being.

100

Dewey insisted on the need for insig!1t or

knowledge in actions to preserve preferences.

Preferential

actions,
, •• become true enoicee under the direction of' insight.' Knowledge, instead of' revealing a world in whictl
preference 1a an illusion and does not count or make a
difference, puts in our possession the instrumentality
by means of which preference may be a.n intelligent or
intentional factor in constructing a future by wary
and prepares action. Knowledge of special conditione
and relatione is instrumental to action which is in
turn a.n inetrUIIlent of production of situations having
added eignifiaanoe and grder. To be capable of such
actions is to be free. 1
Dewey's insistence on knowledge a.s a.rl;instrUIIlentality
and on the necessity for the employment of such knowledge
to achieve free actions is central to his position.

He does

not conceive of man•s natural freedom of self·determina.tion
as a distinct kind of freedom.

Nor does he think man•s

circUIIlstantial freedom of self-realization to be a distinct

-------,,
99

Dewey, Philosophy !A!lS! Civilization, p. 285.

lOOibi<\.
l011Jd4..
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kind of freedom.

For him both are aspects of tile individ-

ual's acquired freedom of self-perfection.
Choice reveals the present self (self-in-being) and
tlle future self (self-in-becoming).
delibera;tiOI'lB, viewed on the

~!Urfaoe,

Man~

a in tellectua.l

are concerned with

values of particular ends of self-in-being.

In telleotua.l

deliberations, viewed below the surface, are concerned with
values of particular ends. of self-in-beooJning.

This process

of self-becoming, of :progress! ve rea.liaation, Dewey calls
growth.

Growth is freedom.
It is from such a vantage point that Dewey can come

so close to denying freedom as an essential and permanent
quality of man 1 e na. ture when ,he ea.ys, "We are not free
because of what we statically are, but in so far as we are
beoollling different fro111 what we. have been.n 102
Cons is tent with the evolutionary ele111en t in his
thought, he counsels that attention ehould be directed
toward the process of evolution instead of
ulterior goal.

tc;~ward

some

Growth is the final goal to be sought not

other sta.l;io goala. 1 03
aut in proposing growth a.s the goal for acquired
selt~perfection,

he ie not denying the individual's ability

l02Iill·, p. 29l.
103
:newey and TUfts,

~· cit.
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to live as he ou(!;ht in conformity with an ideal befitting

human nature.
ot'

~lY

His conception of self-perfection is devoid

goal which equates self-perfection with conformity

to llloral laws that are concretely the same for all men.
If we state the. moral law as the injunction to each
self on every ooca.aion to identify the a elf with a new
growth that is pouible then obedience to tile law is
one wi tb. •noral :f'rtutdom. 104

Dewey is very absolutistic about his own conception
of growth 11.s the only sui table goal t'or mlim' s acquired
freedonl of self-perff.lct:Lon.

Ue notes that:

••.• ;practically a.l.l. more.lhte have made much of a
distinction between a lower and a. higher self, speaking
of a carnal and spiritual, the animal and the truly
human, the sensuous and the rational. selves which
exist
by side in man and which war with one
anothtU."o 5

mif8

But Dewey does not accept eueh a, distinction ilecause

J

he insililtu

The only distinction that can be drawn without redtAcin€1: morals to conventional! ty, self-rigil'l;.eous complacency, or a hopeless and harsh struggle for the
unattainable,. is that between the attained static, and
the moving dynaraic aEilf.l06
I t Bhou.ld be obvious by now that :Dewey does maintain

tha.t freedom t'rom external restrictions oa.n be actually the

illusion of freedom.

That actions not directed

by intelli-

gence ma.y well be aoUone of caprice and not to he preferred

~
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ove;r thoae guided. by wie!iitr

coun•H~l

or colllllt<'W\1 •.. :!!'or DQwey

cucte:mal o1' ;(ll'lysical freedom is not an &nd in i tiH11lf but a
mea.n\1! to freedom wbich lies in the trained power of growth,
in the intelligent exercise of preferiUl<l&lil •

The indi vidual• s

natural freedom or self-deterlllina.tion and. eircum111tant1al.

freedom of selr..realization are aspects of the acquired
freedom of self-perfection. a.tld not distinct kinde of free@
dom ..

happiness.

~l'he

na.ture of real freedom ia essentia.lly re·

lated to the nature

ar

ha.wpineu.

• • .an individual is not hee.d.ed for freedom unless
all hie plana and purposes aim, not at some .statio or
final goal• bUt at the continuing process of growth
itself, through which he will find at once botll his
freedom and hill\ happiness. To whl:l.tever degree a.n in·
di vidua.l a:[8fin~:~ them. he attains the111 both dmultaue ousl;r •
He.ppineee oonehh in a deaire fulfilled,
whil~t

:Even

deeirn ee:n involve oppoai te things desired, <>ll the

dedre to ;zin

IIIO!lll'l

m<:mey to the poor and the d.es.ire to

money and not to tti ve a.ny to the poor. neYerthelesa
both snare in the oomtllon quality of' being fultil1menta. 108
po~&aeaa

But while tM raateri.al content of both.. d$e1re.a is different

_______

theY a.:re alike in their formal aapeot. 109
,

107

108

Ib~ •• p. 340.
:tbif. •• p. 270 ..

l09llW\•

'10

eimultaneously attained in the same act it must be under• toed trta.t not evelly act of fulfillment of a desire (formal
haoppitteaii) ie an irtstwce o:f' real t'reeciom.

:f'u.lfillment of illusorY freedom
was ba.l':l.ed on

a;t growth.

1iW intdliiEII'l.t

bt~oauae

It .may be a.

genuine freedom

preferenUal a.ctton directed

So the miser attaining his desire for more

illotuly, achieves formal ha.ppineu..

He hail fulfilled his

Hi$ deebe for llioney may grow and grow.

desi:ru.

Yet

hie desire a.nd choices are mere illusions of freedom and
al'e merely illu11ory hap:pineu.
praoeelil of

Pl!o~ress:l.ve

Hie eharaoter is in the

deteJ;'ioration,

Dewey subordinates

the attainment of' deSire (in aotion) to the goal of dynamio
~enuine

growth.
It does

~u~em

desirable at this point to relate

Dewey• a conception ot method for inquir;r and his conception
of freedom.

surely, it b1 being lll.t>sumed that Dewey con•

oeived a:t' philoeoph;v as a. rational explanation

or

reality.

Like other philosophers, b.e presented hb rational explanation of reality •

Like other philosophers, he h.a.d hh

conceptions a.bou t the nature of
Md pt•oo:t'.

ph:Uoaophic:u~l

a.rgumentati on

Like them, lie corudde:red hie poai tion superior

to their pressntatione.

!,ike them, he atteuupted to be

intellectually honest in presenting his 111ews and in hia
presentation ot their views..

.~

;g~egy,er;hrm

Bf:j,aJi!i!tl .

The. adaptation of the empirical method to philosophy'.
orienta.ted Dewey's outlook.
phUoaophiea.l method.

~00.

It

form~Hl

h1o;

oonot~~ption

of

influenced the course of nia

epilltemology, logj,o, etl'lios, and metaphydo1;;.

That it

should not have informed his l'lonoeption of method for Jim
inquiry into freedom would havli> b<;en e!!Xtremely Ui1Hke1y.
Deweyt a notion of inquiry • a.a baa be 'ill o i;u:;erved, .wall

primarily cont.Hilrned with extstent:La.l a.itua.tiona .which e.re
eonfuliled.

An inquiry undu euoh oon(Utions seta out to

resolve the iilitue.tion • . When the situation is resolved,
the hypo'l;h.etioa.l proposi tian which dete:rmi.nated the ai tuation
h

the jude;ment whicb. ts valid.

If oonflieting hyl)Otl'teUca.l

p:ropo$1 tion$ .were onoe entertained in Mle inquiry 1 when the

inquiry is terruinated oonfl1oting propositions fore irrelevant.
What is most revealing about l:lll!weyt s (!)onoe;ption
freedom h

qf'

not so muoll tlte nove.lty of muthodology out

rather tl:ecnoveJ.ty of hit:; eonoeptiorl ot· one di!iltinet freedom Wtlicll hsw two aapeots suoordinate to 1 t. ·In. thilil :ra ..

lliPeot ·be is influ!!moed ·by lliil, own logioa.l thoory 1 a
dep~Snd.enoe

on evolutionisUc interpretathn.

l'hat prinoi•

ple leads him to J?Oilli t growth as tlui ideal of human freedom
~11d

to deny the reld distinctions between the freedom man

enjoys by virtue of hie intelleotua.l na.ture, tile freedom
he ponessea when oi:raumsta.noea enable !lim to fulfill hie

=

~

wl~h.etJ~

""~'~d

tile freedorJI he

p()o,;;e~Suel'l

.by ;rirtue. of hie

a1t.b:tli t.Y t·m a.ot in &Coord.. with an idea.J. Ql'lfittilli!S b:uman

! 't is wo:e'th notin,g tha,t this in. not. taking aeo.ount

or

tll~~

knowledge ooncern:h>g. the philolllophioal idealiJ

eel vee "rhi.cl:i lJhi:toeophorlli lmd.

J)ewey' s logic o.r theol'.Y

of inquiry wae not atte.llpting to point ou.t or
·the way we come to

on a supjeet.

tt;l'I!Ulp

·thlillu~

dil'ltin{~Uilllh

the mea11ing of anotner' s ideas

He felt he knew

wh~t

some previous philoao-

pMrll! meant and thst thie: did 110t oonstitutll the main
probl~Hil•

'rklill im:oort,ant thing .for him wa.s to find

determine which or tlleir ide.a.s .wl'lre

tl'L<e

~>

way to

t"o:r. tile present

set of e:trouml'! taneeilh
So i.r1 1mderstanding the method he advooa.t;ed for an
inquiry into

fl'eedo~n,

the important qonaideraUon for nim

was not the metholi for dettrtl.lining
by freedom but

wkt<~.t.

philoaophere meant

tt1e x!!o:re im.por tl>nt rn!JOtter of de aiding on a

method to teat philoeophioal ideas ubout rreetlom.

III.

IMPLIOATIOUS FOn IIDUCATION

SchuHUc At!Ut.u%!
The schntitlc method was the inspirlii.tion for Dewey•s

pragmatic philosophy.

When he turned hie attention to

eill.tn:sational questions, it iS not eurp:rising

influence his educational pllilosopny.

th.a~t

it would

WHll con.lliistenoy,

he insisted upon the scientific attitude as indh!peneable
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cJ!o:r~l. ::~Snda.te

llll.id u:pon ·tbl\l vublio aQ.hool· had to hoW$ tili!i

l!fe:i.<Hltifia. attitude.
aon;~!O!l

G:rlil.~ting

·&hal; ehe problem of the

ae11ool in. a demtlCrll.oy h4d M cotttHI:t'l'l i t n l t with ·

prtlViding,

txni,raraal oducat:l.on, tltet'¢

Ct;rnaideraHon.

wej,ghty

and 11ow thir<ge
d~termined.

al:J.o~tld

For

WKklil

ar.oth.er

Jll01'lil

Wb<li.t na~\ to h¢ decided we:t'El

blfl

t!~:Ught

WAAt 1

and how theli(!) were to be

Dewey#

until. wh!l;t a1'ltiloll be taugt~t a<.nd how it is taugJ:1t i~'>
settled upon tl!e ba.e:l.e of fomation of the Boitllntifio
at"\H tude, the l!lOl"Ca.l,l.ed ed.uoa·l>ional worll: of the school

h a.

ey

doogerously ~ t-or-mifile

i~

concerned• 1

0

.

affah" as far ae democra..

Dlill!I!Hil'Q.CZ,

Addition~»l

evidence indicative of the interdependence

in Dewey' a mind between demtHilraoy and aohntific method was
presented by Marc Belth irl l'!.ie doctoral dist,el'tation for

Columbia. Uni versi t;y •
In the lii!,Yth of the Group tne ded.i,oatiOn is to

<~on

eonverl!laUon and e;;!;eru.;,nglil of idee.~J until !'lome
agreement is reached. For. it ie held, so long as
:oeople .continue. to taU: to e.aoll. othar, it is inevit!1.ble
that some ooncensua will be arri vod at .and thua progreu
t.in:uoum

~de.

'l'ha:t. Dewey oont1'ibute4 to .tM.s lllilm h<~.rdJ.y be
denied. :.aut that he hue written against. tilts, also, ita
a.n tndil\lation of how da.ngereum he thqugnt 1 t,. Here he
has vn-itt en: "'J.'!le idea. tlla.t thl) conflict of parties
,
will.• by mam'!.:.\1 Qf public dh~uasion, br:!.ng {)Ut neeelt®lll.~'Y
public trutna in a dialnt:ic ot pol! tical. w<~.tered·dovm
nrm:i.l'ln of' the :H;ee;elia.n dia.lt'!etie, with. He sy.nthlHlis

-------

74
a:tl'rived a.t by a union of antithetitlal eoncepl;i.cne.
The method has notb.ing in eof411lon wi tb. organized
competitive inquiry whioh has won the triumphs of
science in the field of' pbysieal n&ture.,ulll

The erroneous a.pp:Uo!i<.tion of scientif'io cri'teria

as the ultimate nGrm o:r va.lid .ll:nQwled($el.l. 2 J.ed him to
restrict the roality of inllllinent tbmAght as the i:ntelligi ..
i;lle objeot:l.vha.tion of a tra.na..objeotive aubJeet.

The

a.daptive beha.vi.oral relilponse of the or{$aniam (hb Watsonian
assumption~~>)

knowledge.

determined tile character and content of vaUd

ConiUH!uently, he insisted on the absolute

neoeuity c:f :pilysieal activity for valid lctH.Iwledge.
All controlled :f.nquiry and all institution of
grounded as•ertt-on-ne.eT~rartiy()olftlilns a. p:rag~ig§.~.
factor; an a.oti vity of doing ~nd utaking which reshapes
antecedent n:zstential material which sets the problem
or inquiry.

Qriticism q{

~ise~c§tved

§2Qo!§St!c1sm

Tk1is operative eha.:ra.oter of Js;nowledge became a.
eorollary in his theory of the learning process and pro•
vided the aeaumptions with wh.ich he can cri tieise a
111
Marc Bel th The ~ncji!pt 21. DempelJi\fV£ !n I}ewer' s
,!lllfbtct.tiq,n !N!Ilw York: Columbia. Un1vers1ty 1 1956),
.P• 342~ ( Q,uota.tion from Dewey' e "Lil:>era.lism and social
Action," p. 71.)

ln.uu:.

USJohn DliJwey, J!luonm~ruotioflJ.!l J'hilqsQphv (New
York, The New York American Library, 1925) 1 PP• 112·3•

113

newey, ~og~o: Ihe theq~ ai InquirY, p. 160•

-
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Blis conceived e ohola.s th oone!llpthnJ
W:lum. ed!loation, undn , tn.$ influentut d a. echolastic
C.O!lCtai>titi>n of knl\lW"ledgei! whiCh. ig!lOl'Oijl eV,er;ythlng but

schntifieall;r formulated facts and truths fails to

recognize that primary or initial subJect matter a.lwa.ys
exi1:d;t~ as matter. of. a.n ~ctive doing, involving the. ul'le

of the body and the handl1ns ot the !Jla.terial• the subject
of' instJmction b bolated from the needs and

~~~&tter.

purposes of the lea:t"ner, and so beoo111e& just a. thing to be
memoril'led e.lld reproduoi!Hi upon derui:U'lli.o Reoosnttion of

the natural course of develePI!lent, on the contrary,

1il.l:ways set!} out wi tb. s :ttua. tions Wllioh hivalve lEl£U'fJing

b;r do:l..ng,

The

.L 4

C1LAP1'ER IV

This chapter presents tlle thinking of Morti111er

"'-

Adhr about the metllod he advocated for an inquiry about
freedom.

Firat. the writinga oonaulted to obtain Adler's

ideas on the subject are presented, alons with the :reasons
for the particular selections.

Second, a presentation of

hh conception of method h made.

Laetl;y, the implications

of hie ideas for education are shown.

=-=

A perusal of the published books of Adler reveals

a. consistency amid their variety.

While dif:t'erent areas

of investigation are explored, the same guiding principles

can often be seen at work • .U.I3

TtLis can be _partly exempli-

fied by a brief consideration of several of his works.

In

1937• when Adler was Lecturer in Psychology at Columbia
Univerd tY, he liJrersent.ed in pia.leqtig an exposit. ion or the

role of' dh.lectic in controversy and discussion,

He

attempted to understand the kind of thinking which takes
place when people enter into dispute, or when they carry on
in reflection the polemical consideration cf some idea.,

----

He

116A stmili\!Lr insight ms.v be obtained by ret~rdng to
the appendix which briefly presents some biogra.phic~l and
bi'bl:togre.phical material about ?l!ortil:ner Adler.
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e.ne.lya:ed a threefold description of dialectic
lo~ical•

<OS

empirh!Al,

and aleta;pbysical,., He presented an interpretation

of the possible function of dialectic in philosophy.

He

also indicated the poa$1 ble subJect matter of a SUlllma
Dialeotica..
In 1936, he applied himself tey demonstratins that

much of the controvere;r in tb.e ;peychol.ogica.l. sciences
resulted from trying to answer philouophioa.l. problemB with
'

H

II

For Adler, in ~· .~ H..U )lade ,g!

scientific metnods.

Man, th.e llorde:t'line bliltween psychology and llhilosophy :1.6

j

overstepped when it h

I

of tne m\ture of aeienoe •m.d philosophy.

blurred by a lack of underetanding

For example, he

showed that Freud denied man's natural freedom of self.,

l

determination •
In his work 11s Edi to:r-in .. Chhf of The f},ref\t ;tge§s;

A Sxntoptieon .IU:

~

Qi£SM

J3QOk!il

.tt m

he continued hi$ dialeetica.l work.

constituted volumes two

IM'ld

Y!'EI@terl'!. world,.

These two voluraes .

three oft the fifty .. rour

volumed work lQ!· (f:£0!! ,igg]Sq.

What .he hall ind.ieatfld in

more general ideas in )~ili&l!U'!tig, a-ttained more 1\lpeoi:ric
and p:raotioa.J. exprealilion in the essays he wrote for tiA<UHt
two vol:mnes in 1945.

·AI'! expreued and underlying auump ..

tion of the work was tll.a.t in the tradition of

westot:~m

thought 1 the bes.t binds of ea.oh period and persuasion
!IIXpreliHsed their views on common tn.tbjeots of dhoU.~ilion ..
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lnstitu:tfl ·of· PhilosophiCal, nesea.:roh in San FranciSco.
He was edHor of the first publilshed work of the
~

;Idei

£l1. Frped.om.

in~tHute,

:l'he stud)" wa.s conllerned with th.e

twenty• five oiilnturies of· controversy lll.bout the
mea.ninQl Gf tree.dorn in \ll<esterri 11 terature.

:ru~ture

and

:tn the tirGt

volume ef the study, publililb.ed in 1958• · an e,xplanation of
the dift'erent we.;,s in whioll fr(l!edom nan been l1l1dfl:rllltood in
the We a tern tradition

construction fJf the
presented•

I

wa.0

undertaken lil.nd

ialt1lH1S and

The secGnd volume,

to:pioe

II.·

di.alecti cOlil

~~~ol:>out

publish~li

freedonl was

in 1961, contained

~

the dialectic&l examination of' the ool'ltroversies themeelves

l

and the debate of disputed qu.ea tion:a,

I t preilented a

dialeoticlll.l oonllltruotion of issues and the debli.te in the

twenty ..:rive centuries ot th'@ recorded disousdon about
t'reedom,
While Adlel' t<&.a J!latu:red as a writer and a tl:linke:r,

it ought not to be assW!&ed that ·the ideas of hill theory
of dis.leoUo h<!.ve .eo clumjied .'that he
iniiial id.ea.s.

lui.~<~

aontra.dhted his

He has l'fllfin!ild hie theory of dialetlltio and

applied it ttl otner tQp:l.ce f'o:r study• but it dGU not seem

to he.ve aubetantial.ly changed,.

Just a.s Joh.l:l

Dew~y'

a

the$ry of logic received intellectual eoruHderation through
the Course of .!d,e career a.nd did not eubli1tantia.J..l;y ehtm8e,
so neither d.id .Mortimer Ad.ler 1 s theory.

Hefinement ot'

did npt .. conetitutal contradiction of doct:rtnes. ·
While

!Ul.

a.rl&lysia of Adle:r'e theory of' dialeutio

Qe>Uld be 1nade fro111. hie earlier works and ·the development
of h.J.s ide·&s traced through 'his la.ter works, this etudy ·
concerned. i tselt' with the .ma.turfi e:ltpr•al!l<ion

in

ru

I<&ea. 'i!f zrudom.

This wa.a done.

or

h:ta theory

beo~use itl

th!ii.t work

hill hlli.s, made tb.e i'ulleat expression of hili\ th$o:t;y ...nd be
explicitly e.lilPloyed :t t to oonetruet the "conversl!.tion"

whioh. \V1illl!tern niters hil.ve had about ft'eedom irt the past
t'lll$nty-five hundred yea.:rs.
II •

COUCEJ?TION OF iiEl'l:WD

To gain an insight into tlw conception of' method
Adler advocated for an inquiry into tre;allom• Wllioh would
be f.a.ithful to Adler.• fl tninking on the I!!Ubjeut. :1. t WOii.s

eonsidered neoes1uoey to approll\oh. it :f'l'Olll the eon text of
hi& philosophy.

Accordingly an ane.lyeh of tM salient

ideas of his pniloao,ph:ioe.l doctrine iS undnt&ksn to shed
light on his <!oru;epti.on of meth@d

freedom.
thll.t

The re...ao:ne for

~int

~·or

!.OP:Ifl.'O~?>oh.ing

an. inq.Jitiey into
the l)roblem t:rmn

of vh!w wna previously men'Uoned before t.he

salient ideas of' Dewey' a :philou;ophioal dootr:i.ne were
4ilHIUSf$ll!.ll

and are sttbsta.n'Ually the s~We now 9

l!'or ~~dler

.lit :ph.iloeo~Jllioa.l

invt\H':i tiiat ion is eonc(;)rned

=

!Iii

ao
with the pursuit of truth.
subject thought about.

It is a knowledge of tile

The truth of a. philosoph:l.oal

statement d0pendlll on ascertaining the f'a.ots concerning
the subject 'l>hought about.

A philoeophioal doctrine* when

true, gi vee knowledge of wl'ta.tever rea.l:l. ties are the objeota
of inquiry •

The truth of a philosoph.ioa.l statement con-

cerning the 1\!Ubject thought a.bout depends on the ta.ote

about the subject itself •.

For Adler, statements about reality involve concepts
which are primarily the mea.ns of knowledge, not the obj.ectv
of knowledge.

l'ltood, but that

'fhlll concept is not Vlha.t ia aotu111.Hy underby

which the intellect understands.

Ideas

ha.ve no being eJtoept as perceptions of thought a.nd are
J

inst:ruments whereby re&.lity is known.

concepts (intelligible

IIJileotes) a.rise from the intellect's power of abstracting

theat from (iljtl)erienoe (sensible species}.
Ph:l.lE>sophy arises from common experiences,.

The whole

set of experiences which men have ooour naturally throUGh
the ordinary operation of their senses, their memories,
smd illlti!.gina.tio.ns,

These ordinary

experien~:~en

present the

immediate eouree of induotionl.l, of genara.lhie:d knowledge of
the world of experienca.ble
a.l'!

objeotE~.

Ph:Uosopb,y illl regarded

the continuing PUX'SUit ot' truth• and the divergent

opinions a.re :regarded as voices in a continuing conversation
in wli:l,ch truth hi at e take •

--··-~
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l'hil<>so:pb;y for Adler is in one senn a.n individual
ta.sk and. :l.n ;,\notber nenl\le a collective one.,

A phil.osopluu.•

"can pursue in comph·t;e isolation his objective of' knowing

wba.t hi or should be the cal!Je• "llo In a.nother sense it

ca.n be collecUve for:
•• ·.philosopl::un.•a tuwe addresBed fjklellleelvee t0 ttle

opinionlil of tlle:l.:r predeeessorlll or contempor&:ries; a.nd

in the preeence of a tU.verfl!ity of vien about subjects
on which they have formed some theory, they han be<~n
concerned to ori tiehe the poeiUQns tQken by others
as well a.s to defend tndr own.ll'l
Adler does not intend to

undervaluE~ ·tt~e im~1orta.nce l!lf

tile ind.i'Vidu&l contrii:lutiona of grea.t

pointing out the oontribuUon

tll.t~.t

pk<Uoao~lhers

by

accrues to plJ.ilo$O:l)hiea.l

knowledge when the oollecti.ve task is performed..

nis con..

cern is that what is esnntial to tile collect! ve tmsk ma:y

l

not be done or .ma.y be done poorly.

He contends tha.t

philosophy ca.n be a colbcti ve eJ:ideavor only if philosophers
confront one another in the light

~at

ttnar differentuae• or

conduct their inquiries &ga.inst the background of the
total plliloaophioal
irlg,

divert~ity

to whic.b. tluey ct:re contribut ..

To wm.tever extent divf.n.•sity involves genuine dia-

as;reemen•ts 1 con trove:rsy a.nd ratioti!J\l debate oe,coule an
essential p...rt or the ph.i1ot~opb.ica1 ente:t•p;dae as a whole. :ua
1115

Mortimer Adler 1 The

~

sa: Freedom,

York: Doubleda-y and Co., Inc. • 1958) , P• 61.
ll'7

~•t

1

PP• 61·62.

1~~. 1 P• 62,

Vol. I (New

~=

Dia.le(!tiqal.• ,;.,s@WlU~I;!ona

. !J.'he ratitmal

~-R~t;l.qn~l

el:u~x-aoter

ment a.ml dJ.I!!&Ii£l'eeant•

Debate

of d.eba.te presupposes agree•

The. meanings or agreement or

di&a.gnement are used very precisely by Adler.
wi·tn .tM oolllil:ofi

een~:~e

uc 1\l.tarts.

idea of agreement ordinarily ueed,

that men are said to be ,;i;n. agreement when they anewer the

ar.we quution in the s.r.we way;· and in disas;rsernent wru.m,
to the ll\\>Xtle question,· they gin ooilflicting or inoompa:t;.tble
answers.

He refines the notion and for him;

:M:en a.s,:ree mum they al'l)) or tme mind on a lla.rtioular
eubJeot !lind affirm the er.we vroposition or subeortlle
to till$ ea.me sta.t,eme.nt about :i.tt k\tld tb.at. they di.llla{!;l'l!le
about .a. particular subJect when wltiii.t they think or aay
about i t coneistll! of Judgment"' or etatawtents that t>u·e
e:l.t;her oontra.dhtory or 1noondetent.ll.9 ·
When the things they respectively

IMHHilrt

a.re either

contradictory or inoonsietent 1 both Btatementa cannot be
true..

j

When tb.e tlli:ng.s t.hey reeJ.'lectt vely

a.f.lE1tlrt

a.re contra-

d.iOctory, both cannot be false.
It must be understood t.IJ.at one peraon ma;y olaim the

truth :fol' the v:l.ew he holds and ela.itll that it ret.J.uiree him

to cleny a similar cla.in>
takee, but i:r

l:l~th

by thllt

otnel' t'or the posHion b.e

st.atemente can be true, then the two

!!len differ; however, so far

~s

theil' sta.tllimente go, they do

not d:i.Ga11ree.

The insight into the preohe respects about whieh

83

men muet

ag:re~~:

is

N'er ila it.

ment~oned

explie:ttJ.y. QY A!Uera

.unders tlil od t}la.t tlll~ two stages
ot agreement. whiolll are prerequisite .to disagreement
are Ml!IO prerequiaite to agretlnetr!i.; .Olfla.l'ly1 t~e
:Qil!lfeg~ !iij&:£t!!Sl!l'!i!! differ 11'1 Idnd :f'ro11.1
Qgree ..
mente ( o:r disagrtuments) they lllall:e. l>oaeiblth .~
~e:nera'llY.

ns

The point that ne is l!U!.king is tha.t the prerequ:l.eite

a.gx•eememts •(tlwot the men M'e oi'

~J>nco

mind on a :pau"ti<lular

subject) differs in kitld tron1 tlle:tr .agreel!4ent tha.t tlley
aff'il'lll the same :propolili tion or $ubscr:tbe to the aame eta.te..

ment about it.

so.

to disa."ree, the prerlilquisite agreements

(that th¢ .lllfltt t:tn of one lllin~ on the .Jillll"tinul.a.r aubjeet.)

di:tfera in ldn<l from. their <>gr<nlment that in t.beir diaa.gru ..
mont what they think or say about the aubj eot cons is ta of
jtU:i{l;snenta

or !lb.tements thlat are eillher contradictory or

inconsistent.
j

'l'.he l!l.bove ideas 11\re what Adle:r oa.lla india-

pensa.ble <i.ialeeticll'!.l prerequis i teth
Ua.vinl a Cltil.lllmon subJect under dis.c:~uasion and baving
a common understud.i.ng of the question to be Mswered
a.re the two indispensable oonditionlil for do~~iin&.l.
ag:re$lllent aa well as doci>orll.l cU,l'lagreem.ent. · "'

:poqUiMJ!. N!;ntment and Disyreament:
He dis.Ungubnes between dtalect:tqal and dootrtnal

(categorical) llJ.Sreemen'!>a or diaagreements.

with another a.beut wut h

------l20I!li.i\•,

p.

lo,

12 l.I., !d·· •.. ·•
"'
p. l'....

tktEI

An

~~t~rUlll!!llt

r.igb.t Mswer to a pa.:rttou.la:r
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question about a pa.rticul.ar subject is a categorical
agreement.

A disagreMent about wha.t is not true or is not

the right answer to a p&rticula:r question about a particular
subject invol vee categorical dililQ$reEHnent.
presents is:

11

Sinoe

whG~.t

The reason he

an a.uthQr holds to be true Ulilua.lly'

depends on his Whole theory of the ma.tter or doctrine,
oatego:rioa.l agreemtsnt and dieagreement

also be called

o~:>n

'doc trina.l. t "l22
In Adler's theory, both

pre~,!!,)luieiteltl

are essential

•-;;,.'

for :real doctrinal agreement or disagreement,

When they

are present, the men are in a position to agree categoric"
ally or doctrinally by both saying "yel!l" or by both ea.ying

"no"t ol' to diSagree by aa.ying Myel(;" mnd the other sa-ying
"no."

Tbie is so t'or contradictory propositions.

In

addition, if one of thlil tuen asserted the truth of a prop..
osition and l!tllother auerted the truth

of.~~t

proposition, doctrinal dilla.grEUllllent would

contra.ry

~:Llso

result.

It' d ther of the two di&leetical :pre:retlUbi tea f'or

1\greemen t or disl\grtH'Iment are absent, then the parties in
a disousaion d.o not doo1Utinally agree or disagree.

Theil.'

agreement or disagreement il!l apparent, not real, since
they ca.nnot Join iaaue or side together aga.inat others
unless there is a meeting of miml.s 1 in the

--------·-------l 'l2

"nu.

liltttiU

that there

65
is a common eubJeot or ooflllllon question alJGUt thl!i! !i!Ubjeet

truo'l;. they undertake to discuss.
the

114tlree~nenta

tha.t

oonst~tute

Ooneequently, Adler calla
such a meeting of minds

"to pi cal.," ll23
He dbtingu1ahes between complete and minitilfkl
topical agreement.

Com11lete topical agreement "oomriste in

having both a oo!lllllon subject and a oommonly understood
question about it. " 124 Minima.l topical agreerJUirtt "oonshte
in having a oollllllon subJect of discuslllion but failing to

l!lhare a common understanding of the question about it .• "lll5
The diatinc:!tions that Adlet makes originate

neceasar~

:Uy from the ta11k of getting behind the language used to the

thQugb.t the J.uguage intends to express.

In penetrating

behind the a.:ppe!ii.ruce of ag%'11Ullltent and disa.greenmnt between

propoeitionltl or eta.te:nenta, there a.re
cal relations that

the

w~

I:UIIITerE~..l

poesible logi ..

exist between the propositions and

positions of wen asserting or denying propo•

dootr~nal

si tiomu ( l) determinate relevance, ( 2) inde terJnina te nle•
vance, and, ( 3) complete irrllllevance.

Deterlllinate relevance

consists in ''actual <loetrinal 114l$reement or disaguement.nl2tl

..

----------------'l"'
l ......
~

124

:tllld.•

l25.wg.

l26Ibi!\.

--~---

-------- --

---

------

~

!ndeterll~inlll.te

'l't'lleVl!J,nOI/i oGneht15 in "the p!)seib:l.lity of.

doct:finli!ol l!.gt'et'lttltilnt or dilllag:UtHllillent." 1 :n

Cotaplete i:r-

:f'elevanoe .uea.ns ·that there ·is "no possibi:U ty of doctrine.l
ag:reemen.t or d:l.eag:reement,. n128

Adler assigns a prerequiei te condition for each ot

theee st.a.tes of propos :I. tional :l;'elationa. · l!'or determinlil.te
rel.eVll.nce the pre:requisi te · coneiete ot'

11

oomplete topical

&.greement• <l..e., tile same subj eet of d.iecaseio:n togetller
with e. OIJl!l!llon;J.y underetood 'lueliltion ~\bout it." 129 Determinate releVMOEI l'equirea tbe prerequiai te of'

topical o.sreement,

i,e., (1)

of d.isouasion.or (U)

lil

"~ninil'lllfl.l

the same pa.rticu.ls.r subject

CGmmon general subJect that

elllbra.cee .the different. pa.rtioul.ars being dilllculilr,ed.. ,,130
For complete irreleiTance thoprerequisite is "the total.
absence of topied <i!.gl"l\lll!Uiilnt; i.e., two diaUnct Md
logically unrelated subJects of dbcuslilion • .,l3l

A 'eru¢ial problllim• fo.w Adler, is whether tiiverse
ana were to the slilJUe quen tion oQJ!l constitute genuine dis ..

a.greelll.ent U' the answero t&ke the form of definitions.
unleu .there h

For

aQlll.e Wfii.Y of id<.mtifyin{l; tlla.t which is the

Col!Won subject of diverse definitione, the m.nswerl:l do not

C<Jne'ti tutt · dise.greeo1ents but ditferenoe111.

:ta there a way

12'1~.,

l30Ibtd.

l28l!W!·

lSl;rui\1,.

129~.

8'7

of

idl\lntifyin€~

114 subj111et of diaouesion without defiuin~ i t

se that. with the
diaairce~M~nt

lii<YJI<ll

e.ubJut

CIC~mmonly

uralililra tood

tr1

mind,

c&n llltill ex.ht about how it should be def:tned.?

Ue sta. tes the problem. in the following cU. lemma.;
Either { :i} t.wo men employ tl1e e<W~e det'ini U.on to
identity the subJaot &b.ey a.:rlii dhcn.liiHil1ng 0 ill whicb. e&&l'l
they oa.!UlGt disagree abl)ut its dd'ini ti<»!li o:r ( ii) tney
un different det'initiuna.- in which case they m.re not
diSC11UIIIBing tile lll~M~e suhjeet. &l.rui cannot tUuagre~t <>t lli.J.l•
On either alternative, liin~:veelllent about d.ef"ini.tions
·
would. seera impoesUlle. · '

so:o,

:fie notes til111.t Pl!l>to, in Bi,
dilelllllllll.

cottoernin~;

learning and dieeov·ecy and Professor

Iiudolf Oa.rn&p p;rQpolllliHl a.n 10newer to the

of explica.t.l.ol!l in hil'l work, klli§§J.
bili1fY•

sta:ted a similar

dil4i!illilla

Fpun,Wi,!.&!on~t

in termr.s

At

;\;!'!:OR~·

Carna.p lllll!.intli>.ined that the proOI;Ullm of expli<l&tion

cotll!lilil ted in tra.nei'tlrming a giVen iiii.Uifll or loss inexact

concept into a.n exact
the term

UliHiii f1lr

on<~.,

it the

He ea.Ued the given oonoept or

explie<~.ndwnJ

propose4 to take tlle ;vla.oe ot' the
pos•Hi for it* 'the expJ.icatUIJl.

the ex61.et concept

flr~Wt

or thtll term pro..

l:l:e 111.lU1> m!iiointa:b<ed tim t Uut

p:rroeess or explLo&tton lltll.de :f'or u:.l.entif'ie vrogrelis precisely beeattu t.l'Ae oris:inal <wnoept wa» re;plaoed by a
better or !llOl'fl

in

tt~e

~uet

d..eveli)J;Unant ot'

1me.

So e:xplioat.ion

w~1:1

:!.:ruiia pentJable

c;. ~tdonce.

Adler obr1H~.:rvet1 that "Thl\l sQllle :procGss ocottrs in

-------'---

c;·-

philt:~aopbyil"l 33

He! noted. t1:1a.t.;

{}!ll.:rna.l,) :ref'&:t'e to l!ilitllttltd Huas•l('li a ¢h~&:rva.tion tl~•t,
in the development of ,v!tilol.'lopnioal thought, we pa.sa
. :t':rom a !l()nf'uae(l• Mn...~Uoulatd FH':.P,ee of <tn o bj eot we
are conllidering to a dhtinot, IU'Uoulated sense. 'rhe
latter HU.I!I!i'HUi'l calls the "lll:ii:Pl1kat 11 of the. forruer, 01.nd
rega:rlis the two ae united in a nyn·thet>is of identtf'ioa..
tion. One would ttot "*llt:v.Uoa.te .'lihe otllef
both .w~;~re
not O(HliUI:rned with· an id@nt;i,oa.l ol>jeot •..3·

!t'

AdleJt a.llllo noted that i.larnap :rdel:'X'iiHi to l?NfesliH>r

o.

:11.

l.a.n~rd'

:m.

s exam.inat:L.on Q:f' G.

J&oore' a .notion of

ana.lysil:l and stated tl'J.&t hi~J conception of e:~tpl.ioandum and

c. :rr.

explieatum wam to e0111e exttmt miruihr to wlu.t

Lang..

ford. called aru..lysan<iUlll {that wb.ioh ia to be analyzed} a.nd
anaJ.ysane (the analysts fit it).

The

dJ~~ila.rity

reeidtH.'l in

the fact ttmt p¥lilosoph1ca.l analyda, according tie

P:roft~tH!Ol'

La.ngford, pr0oeeded by subsU t.uting an im,Proved formulation
for a hu sa.tilllfaotory one.
it h

l':r:ofe~sao:r

Langford wrote "when

the pur,Pose of a.nalyiUS to iuue in a dd"inition, the

uauall.y that of suppl!i>ntina a :re.laU nly vague

motive h

idea by a tnore preoilUI on!h":U.it;
For Adl.e:t'• the rd&t:l.on of
ie comparable with the

~•l~tion

of

S!(~n&tn4ws

wld definiena

·~~li~~

tum• or of analysa.ndwn and ane.lyi:!Ms..

and explioa-

As he t.ttlderstood

u,

133

~·

134llt.!i.. p. 19.
135
c. lt. tang:t'erd, "The Notion of I!J'll<l>lyeh in Moore' a
:Pbilosopey," .·~ &)b:t.#HMHlllJI; .g1 il• l• IQpr,t (Vol., IV o:t: Th.e
Ul?lY:t: .2! Uxtng li'!l,ilQ§c:Pljen, i'fiseonsint Georltll Banta.
PU:blislling co~, 1942), P• 329 •

which is to be d.e:t'ined, (i.e •• the defin!eJl.dlAfi) w:l.thout
employing this

o~

that definition, each a definiens, to

accompl:bh the identi!icatiort, 11 136

The solution to the

p:roblem must show now the subJect thtl.t is identified in a

eerta.in w&y ca.n also be defined in a varil'lty 0f ways w!lioh,
while dU'fning from Qne anothel't all ah!U'e the elements
of .meal1il'lg whieh.

~Served

to identU'y the eubJeet in the

first place.
It h

Adleao'e contention that in the proceu of

defini tiont which h
analyeie, the mind

dlllila.r to that of explioa.tio.n and

Pti.IUJElfl

fron> one underata.nd.ing ot an

obJeet. to MGther a.nd better

tiling.

underllltt~ondine

of M1e iil&lla

'J:'he ident.:l.t;y of thtl objeot oa.nnot be

deaonst:e~~tted

for it ill lmown by the mi!ld in the very act by which it

eeeu that an obJect it be.lll unduetood i!la.thtqua.tely can
137
al.so be understQ!ld with gre~ter pree:l.sion.
For exwnple,
a

llll.l.n ay

realiae that a girl is walldng tOWi!!.rd h:l.lli and

later recognize her a.s his d&Uihter.

00nsequent1y• b,r ha.vin& .in mind the 1uwe subJ&et,
by be.ing in to piaal agreement 11.bout the ll!Ubj ect to l>e

defined (i.e., the identified definienQ.um), 1:\aterminat:ton

--------

lSG.n!l!H P• 20o
l:S"! Ib:l.!&·

90

idl$n~iftca.tion

of a gtini>nlsi.ya•

lili:~J . ~ . st~tement

of its

de:Uni tion• senes to denote th.e object billing eons ic:lued
•e~

well.

~t~.e.

teO connote its

llE~<ture

or ch!u•aeter.,

idflin.Ufica.tion and a definition point to

~

!!:Both

.a,n

Jhil.!b !.§.

b&:i,Qi !!,li!nl!!ide,req e.nd oi'f<u: some forslltal!l.Uon of Wbl>+l .U, .!!f.•~lSS
Thll! deno:ta;l;ion of the initial :tdenU:t'ieti-Uon ( dt~~fin

ill!nd\wa) embra.(les the: conflicting dei'inUions ( eaeb. of tb.e

d:U':ttuu'llil) •

The fact th&t the confl:tcting: det'in:l.t.ions

embocly the content at' the iden.tH'ying
something w;hich b
s.e. identi.fie.l.il,

formUlati>:~n

comlllon t.o them bothl i.e,., the su.hjeet

Each definition also goel'l beyond the iden.ti•

tyi,n' fo:rmulat:l.on by a.ddillS

thi~L~

or t:l:l.ii!.t definitive ,point.

Each d.efinithn as ... whole abo. den<>tell
J

d.ellGt\lls

di:t't'erent object

li

of thou.&rht wilile being a ctollllllon subject in

identification..

':l~h~~t

collllnon ill'ubjtot b

th~

d'<~n<>ted

ini tia.l

by oppolili:ni

defini tiona, t'or the ide.ut.U'yir±g t'ot•if.lulation dfilnoteG tna.t
wllieh oonf':Uct.ing. def1ni'tions Mntain a,a part Gf thelll3elves.

EMh det'inition b

a more def'inite formulation ot· tl:1e

idl'mtifyins fowmul.a:t,ioll'l.'l connotation.

aaeh of' tbe divngent ddiniUona tha.t
the identif.iaatiol'l. or a. nubjeot

l'JI.a eompllU"ed with
~

expr~lUllilli:l

be Ginn to it,

a. ooneeption of

.

--- ---- -----------

-----~-

-

--- --- ---------

it that h- rel<;;tf:vely vag1.n1 and ina.deqU¢l.te.ul:SII ...
'1Vmna thia h

a'-'G!t~hdft$d, 1 t.b,e

i,niUa.l i.dentif:tea..

tion Md the i!lttba'!flqttent di\lfini tiona oo·th .point to thlll

!!lUll

ob4 eat, wt ll11i ide:nt:tfic&tion ia leslil predrH:l' or epecifh
thil>n the defirU.tioniJlt both dt~notl\i.tinly 1;1.r1<l' aom'lllta.t.ivaly.,
Oonsequt!~ntly 1

fl:run the

ident:U'ha.tion of

liltl

posl\\:l.ble to p:retJent

~~ta.lli.il rt~la. tively Vlli$U<'

or g\\lnlilrio

obJect um1el' eonsider&ti0n, it h
ineom~ttibU det'i~iUons

whioi'l (lom>ti-

tute dilllllli$l'eement, wi tllin tll$ tilJhel'e of l!liniml topica-l
~:reemen:t.

trutf.l o;r li'i"lBitx gf :£1!fi!lHiP.U.
In

dil>tiiUSili~

=;--

the truth or falrrlity of definitions,

Adler dis tin~uieb.es between ver·ua.l a.nd real defini tiona •

:Both are different kinds of d.l.lfini tiona.,
tions meM defini Uoru1 which
tb.a.n

a.ntto\Ul<ita

how

~e

intend~d

not

a. writer or speakor

o•rta.in word; a.s• for eMJ!lple• when

Verbal defini"'

ill.l'l

to do aJ.ore

propneil to uae a

author aa.yel

lterea.fte:r I lifha.l.l use "ciemooraoy• to mea.n liluoh and
mueh • · '!'he resolution of one .a.uthor to ulile tha.t word
in one tllllnl!l'e does not Mntri.\d1Qt tu resolution ot
anothe:t> author to uee 1e in a cLifhrent usnee• Su.orl
detini tions engender no. proble111 af bow men disa.gree
by ot'te,.-ina d.itfertmt conceptions of the l\ll!lollie thing.
It h only a '~ford the;y are talldng •~bout and there is
notl'l.ing 'par&do~hal a.bout · tlle lllat~le word' e bein€; uaed
in dift"llli'Eint nueee by diff'IU/'OI:l'~ lllliUl, El!!l.Ol'l for l:!ii'S
own ;.>w:'lJOii!Elfh

139~ •• p. 23.

l4o~., P• 25.

•

---

92

a(i:t'lHI<Mmti\i a:llQUt d.&fiilitionl!l can involv® .oppol!led !ii.OfJ'Il.rtiona
i

j

cotuilUning whillot h

o:t·rared

:real

!Mil

true only it' '!>he oppci!Jti(l de:tini tiorla a.:re

r~tthe:r

than verbalJ i,e.,· a,e, attetnpte to

undentand the reid n&ture of things ratlllilll tkJ&n e.s indica...

ti ont~ of the

meuiill!llll men winh \o <i.t tach to words.

Merely verbal det'in:i.Uons are neither t:ruc nor
J

talett

~~md

allow for diffuenoes of opinior• aa to the

utility or oonnnienol1l of oompi1ititliii detinitiQnl!l, · Hea.l

]

dei"initioluiil dhagnements are true or !tl.ll!le; i,;e •• not

j

offel?ed merely to

:i.ndie~~te t~ow

a. word a!lall be

under~tood

but a.l111o aa a.ss&:rt.ing l.'loilletlil.ing about the nOtlture of t!le
aubJ<>ot being dl.$1\!Umeed for wh:i.ob. tl:'Uth. is claimed.

:i.sllnl& about

.\ietinitio~•

ente of thfl ae!:l.ni ti~:ms

existlll only {l}
~:~.-u

in

th.~~Jir

wlllilll.

AU

thl!i :vropon..

ide.ntifie$tio.n of

the objeet being <!Oil$ide:ved; ( 2) U' the defini tio:ns

proposed are such that both gg,nnot be t1:ue of the

sa~ne

obJ eot. 142
In addition to or.mceptua.l issues which

concerned

<ii.:t'G

with quut;:l.ona about the "na.turf# of tile subJect under con..

s:l.dera.tion, or by questions a.bout its kindl!l and properties, «14 3
Adllllr also distinguisbes between oxilltentia.l

illlaues.

E.'tis tentia.l islSues

or existence

ot

IU'e <:~onoernsd

~,<.nd

norma.t:l. ve

wi tll the reality

the t~UbJect under CQnlliderlil.tion;

11

(1i1.) whether

it does .or Olil.ll exist, (b) how or where it exists, or (c) how
l44
1t lll>ote or is acted. UPOJ'h •
:Wornw.rt:.i ve :l.liliH<tHI are raised
by "questions wllhh el.\ll. for j udgaen ta of Vll.lue roother ·than
of f&crt, ".'1.4 5 Tb.ey could be termed i$!!Ulillll or pol.io;r.

In all three types ot iasuee there

:1,$

.a joining of

issue tb.roU81:l. the Euwe id.entit:l.aation o:r definition of the
j

lliubjeet under

com~Jiderat.:l.on.

one type of issue
types.

c~n ~ffect

'!'he poaition thM is taken on

the position t&ken on the other

Argumenta e.pp:rop:rti(;l.te to one type of iailue would

not be a.pprtrpdate to the otber types of

illl!II\UH;,.

Of the three typn, oonccptual isatvas have a certain
z,>riori ty over al.l the otMrs; and &lllo.ng coneeptu&l
iillllues di~~~reoments about de:tin:l.tiona have an obvi.o\Ut
:pritii:Y. 4 .
For .AJ:.tl.er, there ilil a. difference oetweliln an :l.l'.l.sttl!ll

l4a.nu••

p. 26.

145

:1.43~

p. 29.

l46!.RU

••

144~., P•

::so.

l.la1!!•'

.,

Jil~

31.

and a. contrcven:·sy •. An :Lmstul
topica·l

a(;tre~ment

~>derivee

ft~<Jn!

thl'l

14'7
whicb. undo:t'li<UI its formation.,• ·

l!lingle isaue considers a

coll!~Aon

au.Oj et;t and a eoitwon

ate.nding of tile question raised about
topical

its unity

~e&lllEmt.

u.

A
under~

'l'here is colllplete

The unity of a otmtrovlilrsy "derives

from a eeill!lton aubjt'H'.lt; i,.e,, a.ll ita component in\tes !llue'!!
rela.te. to tile llli\lll& subject,." 1413 Tll<~.re ia r4illim.al topiC!iOl
qrfUtmlmt, i.e,., s.greem.ent about tile liHI.bjeot a.lon¢•
.A

cerH>roversy; ia .more complex tno an iss.ue..

involves a niAlllber of iss;ues whioll are

l'd<~ted

It

t);y l:w,vint;t

a

oollllllon subJect .\U'ld lll.ls!.l takes a ce:r'ba.in fo:rm or struotu:t'e

tram the other wa.y111 in wbiell theee heuel!

JlUl¥ be rii>late<i•

one ot' its conetitaont iuttelll lliaY be logiea.lly dti!JiH:mdent

on a.nathn.• in: th1$ aenee that

f1.

:PQd ti ~n taken on o:ne iuue

in il1 some ••nner det.el'l'ldned by tnll! pod thn tli!.ken on
MOther; or two bsuoe llla.Y· be logically· intel'de,pendent in

'the

stmtH~

!Almn<>r

tho\t the :poeition taken on either o.ne is in some

~~~offechd

b'y thlil posititi>n

t~ken

on

tb.tl other

Qne •

.!Jut even if· two heues a.re logiel!l;lJ.:Y independent, they

a till belong to tht

e~

ec;n troveruy it' tb.e;y h<we a

c.QfllJ'.l!on

subje.et,.
! f a unit of

oontrove~ay

l.4'1~. • P;. :!.12.;,

148J:!!:ld.

involved a aingle a.(lt or

-
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---
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is !lues, that

~:~et

.w:oul.d eoneti tute the ecyrtt:rove:rtay a,bou.t

tl:!tl unit.

:u: a. unit of I!H,nt:roverlly

inv~>lved

a. mingle

li>tat

of

ilisuelli, that rout vtGuld oontltitttte the oont:rove:rsy a.ilout tM
ur11t.

If the' ul'lit of

oontl'ovt~~rsy

eon tained .il®VIilr"'l die.t!not

seta of i!a!lluee, t:twn ell.oh o:t' tho r<H!IVe:ra.J, unUs, of.

oontrt~ ..

ve1•sy would be a·ogardeGl as l'>ne of tho cont:roverl!liea .of the
unit•

1~Mh·

hafil Ull:l <nm un:trying attbjeot 1

~~IH<~Y.

identt ..

tied by the minimal topical a.g:reemfJlnt.
The l)lil<rtioula.r iaamu:l. that are d.:l111tirtot

J

eont:roverey ·are

!l1llt

tot!i!.llY unrelati!ld.,

tile aubJ ect of tJoe gl!lneral contronrlll;.n
whole

O.O!l t:'toversy itil

bslHiS

of

l'b.ey. 1.1.ll .tall under
Vlh&t

uni;fies tlle

a minimal top:f.ca.J. a.g;>U!ll&l'lt

nl:IJeet of tM !ll&neral controvll!rllly.
Q,g:t."illl!lnlent

llubJe<~ta

on

the

Tlle mini!ll&l tl.\l:)ioaJ.

ia implicit in what enl'y one of the ll!pecia.l

tt111e<~~rt111

about the &enerttl

i!la.Cih oont:rover!lly of

apii!d<~>l

l,lontrover~>Y•

:l.$tsuea from

'be1u~

J:t prevents
in a

atatE~

of'

eompl.ete irrneva.noe to aU the otner oo.ntrove:r$ie·& of
special ielsuea,.
The

ilHtve:ral

apecia.l aontrt\verll!ii>OI about the gener4U

eo11t.rov•u:·ey com be diBtinguiah:ed t'ro1n one a;nather by
reference ta t.hEiir distinet IHlbjeets, eMh an :Lnue tlUI.t
ea.n be. id.enti:t'i.ed as different :t'rom the. ottte:l.' p;o.rticula.r
ifleues wb.ioh are the l!lllbJect of the other .Qont:Jt'overdes.

The general controversy can be ditltingubheci from the

several special eontrovtu.•des by
in genual b

~he

its unityintt eub.;jeet,

fact tha•t the ieeue
StH;h

a. f:'IU'Iera.l oontro•.

versy abo.ut an :Lsoue a.riees when the b<.Mii!C question about
the ldn4s of ilileuu is re.beli, and wh~111 iuue1:1 are Joined
abou~

wnetl:u1r the l!lub.;Jiilct of tllii\1 or tna.t I!Ji!eeiu.l Clontro•

veray is or is not a ldn4 of. the general controversy.

The

eubjecta of the special eon trover lilies are involved in the
~eru'lral

controversy, but they are involved orilY inao:f'ar as

they are a.t'fh•&ed as real or distinct iuuea which fM.ll
i

I
!
~

under thG sub.;j EHilt of the tNeneral controversy.

Like each Qf th.e epee:f.l:ll. cont rov&:r.•filieo; the general
controversy ie one unit in the whole and not the who.le
eontroverey.

j

However, it if! through the general controv·ersy

thu;t; the 111pedllt.l oontrovel'll!h& are relahd to <me M()ther.

Beyond the 1eneral OQI'Itroveray t.bere is no other &ore
prehtUlfil i ve contreversy.

ooq~..

.All the un:l.tf.l of controversy • both

special and general• are contained in the one a.U.. eJ!t:braoing
liiUbject.

It is d1$nificant to refer to tb.O!I

controversy.

It is more preo:ble

tQ

~;ubJeet

of:

apeak ot the oontrovera•

ies abo\lt the subject, not the eontroveray a).;Qut the subjeqt;
&Qeordins to Alilar.

:ru,iltn'!:£ih&l M!I!U\!
Dialectic eaucdved aa om underetandil:lg of tile

~•nwnp..

tion$ tu~AteEI'la.:ey to attain ob.;jeei,;ive trutb in rational debate
hu a. role to l)la.y in philosophical otm traversielll aruL slloul.d

.
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1 t does in. fact• in

cerned with.

~Y intellect~a.l

ol>Jt~ctin

put suit wh.:l,ch 1a con•

tru;tb and. in wb.tch, therefore• agree-

ie tht \iltimate &.oal !Jl.tld .diSI'il'eement ilil resfll.r1i!ed
st<a.ge., and d.it~~pute as. a. means of reaching u,,. 149
ni1U1.t

as a

we thinlt: thlil.t d:l.~~ol,ej:~t1Citi,l cla.rifie.a.Uon can be of
llttbsta.nti&J. n:rvice to uhnce !ilnd iltator.r JJJlt:l.Y: or

flffllJ!icia:t.,lr in

then

in~tHMICCtll in which the

'ifiiigree-

m.entlil that occur ~e phi.losophical in fttl':racta:r and
have a. predominantly t.l'!.eoretical oa.st.
.

Cl>:nsidered from tile <Oepect of U!':re.etnent or dbagree..
m.ent required in theil' schm.:ee• a ph:!.losoph.iclii.l doctrine,
like a sctli!lntifb l;heo:r,y of the enrpiriea,l lllciencee, h
!
!

t~om.ethintl

men t •

1

tW.t SSI!Htnt:ta.lly cl!!.lle for agreement or .tU.ea,gree ..

From the liltMne po:l.n t o.t' view, a. poem., as a r.•oe1n 1 ;.toes

nlllt agree or t'li&ag't'ee wit& tmlltlle:t'.
not a.sree ol' dieagrelll with (i)llfl

Ji'Geta:~,

iilnother'~

a.s pGots,

Q.g

••:r.o asll: wh.e ther

:Ho.!ll&r a.nd Tolstoy agree• b

to :inquire, not about the epic

poet.ey of th• ;p.;!,M Md Ju

AUJl

~5fll:Qi;

bUt lil.bOtlt. tb.d:C

ph.:l.l<>lllf:IP.b.ical oontent..lll!>l
So. wi\b. l>'ell:pnt to 01.greemeut and disOI.greement,

pllilosopby' &nd so:I.IUloe .stand tom;etllu as against poet;tW.
:But ag:r\ilement lilllld di ea.greeme:n t do not oceur in the li!!>Wl.e w6y
:tn philo.sopby Md. tCifllnoe.

-·------

~t'hey

differ in tthe temporal

p(l.tt~r:ns lilf.aani!!.~lent

of

~1'¢¢rul1nt

1md

and

~u.s~gX'~~men't .. and

~,uat:~.g:re~>.ltlii~~t.

in the

.mem.rd~

t'or ei\j;ih• ,. In the· ee:tem;cea
~.ll!Xl'lllZ:U~on•

coru:petent l!!e.io:r:ttintlll of t.h." lilai.ile

,.l'lort'line in the
::r::

~\'Vle

field.•. ten.lii to.

ar!.;t l!thi:Ju t the

~l'<ih1) a:oc;>~.t

ptllil:1Up,peo;it~ona

Adl!llr. !:lxoo.:Ml i.;!.:i.l!ll!'igre'lll!lent
J;113.:rtthulll!,:tfaet$

t~. fit$ ~td

tb.e 1%'

at!Cl. . t.echttiqt<!!llfl 1

the

pa;•obl<~~ls

in sol vin~ th,e:ll,., According to

\lillCUl'$

only between lil¢1entists at a

f.or~rl.t~merz*

or did not lu;,ve

t!llo:!.n tt!eo3;•etic.lill

d'I!VeloPJ'!lent~,.

earlier century •

tm re

t<::!. be solved

w'tlo ,l?O<>t,;a;;r.nd fewer
.tl:~e· lM.'i.v~mtal!>e

of .eer...

"Aiil betwetm a later. &nd

a.X<.e Ull\ttally

~r.lcad

diffe;ranO!ls of

oPinion atbout U:lH1ful h.fpot.heflen t.~nd en.tewt.ain~bla th~;n»:ries. nl52
In philOI$Qpby

~ op~'ozi te

dba~reernentl.l! jJ;,

a.nd

temporal ;pill.tte:rn .of

dbea:rnable•

~ii.'GM>Olfl} M()llg p)l:i.J.cl~o:Plter<>

<~f:h~;;:re

b

t~:rae•n.ente
eo~:~s:l.de:r<t,bla

l i Vitog at ?<i~llll.y SEHJ~<.l'ated

t$.!1!.:;w;. not onl;!r in tl'lei;r t'ormul.""ilion of thl!ll pertinent qw11s•

t:l.o!~m, ~u'i; ab.o in ttv~i:r eonviotitm ~~s li~> tl~e .• tru~t~ ~newel'!11o ,.W.'S
In :;e:i.llnee anli J11hilo0ophy the eotlaequenoell of a.g:ree..
~nt

anrl

cU.n~l'a~men t di:t'f'illl"o .

In utenet~~ tne d:l.!i!agreemant ot a. b.t~r w!tll an
•~rUer gene:ra.tion usually meiil.nlil the correetinn
priar
fi!l'l"Ol'lil in Ol:'llliUV&.tion QJ: theory by J.Ut)i}$!:Jql.lllllilt dill!OI)VIO'l'..
tes Oli' torntul.a.thns; ~M"td thll! lii!UbstanUal, a.gr~HJ',znent crt
Q:t>lltlll!llj)O:t'arbt~. irll.U.I.lates tl'l10-t the pl'ii'!Oi:r;>l@l.\1 and

of

methods

at

a !lleienee ~tre well est~J~.bliA:~Ji.ed.J.54

--------~------l52ll:ll.do

l63,nu.
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In a particular 'orancl:i of acientific inquiry the extent ot
agreement li!.lllong the competent investigators
usually

indicate~;~

rapidly.

•~nd

the oris ta

its maturity and power to advance more

Agl'lHII'o!ent, even unanimity • i8 not regarded as a

barrier to progl'eu.

!n the philasophioe.l inves·Ugation of

a basic subJect, the extent of agreement is not usually
considered the sign of the maturity at: philosoph:l.cd thought

on the subJect.

D11illai'];re$mertt 1$ generally :r•egarded as tne

mark of its competence and vigor.
For Adler• disagreement is not inimical to progress
in pl\ilQllH>,Phy only when it is obJ eetoi ve <&nd ol!i.pable of
l'ational resoll.\tion,

In that rempect, philosophy <md

science diff'er in two \'lays that explain why dialectic oan
contribute to the p:ros;ren of the one but not the other.
J

Except for those instances in whiCh d.iaa.greements
liloientistll) are et:wtmti~o~.lly ph:l.loi'H.tPklioal in
eha.:raete:r,(a) no special dialeotiea.l effort is required to identity ~he subJ ecte on wL'I.:I.Cb acientiatliil
differ or formulatC>l the questions on wl:l:lch they di&ilil~>gree;
and furthermore, (b) w:l. tl:l regard tG liiUOh questions,
sOienUets Ul:lua.lly 111ettle their dift'eren1H1e by exper:l. ..
Mnt or obeervatfgg ra.ttter than by controversy and
rational debate. ·
a.Jllll\1'1€1;

A purely lllCientitic pnblem, for Adler, is one whiClb
ca.n be

t~Qlved

exp$rimental1y by whatever obeerva.tiona.l

techniques •11'111 obtain the lll.PGCiial data needed ttl> test com..
pet:l.ng hypotlHUlelll or tlleories.

Within that

~S]ll'Uire

of

;"--

l(lO
:problel!la, tb.ere is l1 ttl.e .nncl ror .t'l.ideutioal work to
indicate the elea.r oppoai tiou of eom]H'Iting tl'l.eoriee or
.eypother:ua~>•
wr~ioll

or 1nake explicit the subject or. quel:'ltion to

e:xperiaurmtation or furtller obtllflll"Vation would. l.la
,.

deeia:!.vely relevant..
matter tht.•t h

When acientililtil d:l.ea.gree about a.ny

auacepttble of experimerrt, tlle;r

eXpl!!rim!lntt not a

deln~te,

eon~;~truot ii.ll

as the beet avail<\ble llit!anr; ot'

olarit'ying !lind aettlino't the iaaue.

The very same r11ethods

wttieh ecientista use t.o solve their prolllel00 1 they oan a.l<;o
use to settle their t.Uaagreenumta when t::nnfronted witl'l eom..

peting solutions.

I

Uow!ilver • in philosophical nllll.ti.ers, except in the
c;-

instances in wl:tiott diaoipllla ado.Pt the

j

the thought of their masters,

d.H~leetie

l~mgu<~.ge ~~s

well <>S

is helpful.

(a) Gondderable dia.J.~otied llif'foltt 1~ needed to

idanUfy tk!.e IHtbJ eetl.'l I.C\lld

fti1"UJU1~J>te t1~a

ques UQnlii a.i:lout

wllioll pb.:Uoup,hera ll<!!.ll Pe ahl.lm1 to be in topical
lliEint

IHI . tlleir d.ootrin<~.l dill.a.tJ;lt!iH<l~entl!l

il'u~thermare,

.,.gree~

e<>n be mt,•d.e

(b) when philosophical bHH:tea
are dholc!Vl!ired .and d4lltined.. ·tneir nl;lolution ia
faoili tuted by <.U.Iil.leotiea.J. olarificati~m ot· Buell
cox<trover~,;y a.a al:ce .. ey e.:datll implicitly .in the tra.di·
tion at tnougnt, and, c;gll.:l.net. thi!i> ba.e.kgrotm<l., by
carrying tM d.*' bate r;z~a1·d in r:;;s e;xpliei t o.nd rt~.tional
a lllliUU'll!l:t' a.s po1111iible.
e:x:,plioit.

When philosophers culgage in controversy, their
roo thode ot' a,rgumenta.tion• togo ther with the iUa.teot:l.oal
n1ethod of clarifying :such controversy, are not thenl!lelves

.l.Ol

the primary methode of inquiry by which euh

individu~l

pb.iloaQpb.er lilitttilmpte to sol'lre the problema he ;poiHlil fox•
hil'llli!leJ.:f'.

Fo:t• Adler 1 they a.r!l ii<.UXiliary ;pt•oeeduriHI l:>ella.use

tlw primary me thode of ph !los oi;bio~:~.l inquiry do not tllem-

udvee euft'ice t'or tite conll;t:rue·t:i.on of con trovermit'lil

I'll'

the:

conduct oi' rational d."'b&'te.,

Unlike eobnt:l.sta,. philo®ophex·e do not employe th.e
same mem.ne to prouou.te thllili' :l.nquirhe and. to nope
with the problema that result i'rom thl'l di vn·a ity of

theories which emerge from thlilil' efforts • :~hill dit..
t'arenoe doee tlot beepel\lk an intellelltu/1!.:1 de;!:".i<Henoy on
tile p11.:rt ot the p:b.iloeophe;rn ""e i.lolllpi!.red with fioientia·t:s. :R<\$the:r it is li!QJlll>thing in the Vi!Ury nature of

~

'

I
1

philosophy and in the methods of pn:iloeophioal inquiry
which ~~lakes i t more difficult to tell wnet.lle:r pniloso~
phers are anawertn~: the allime queatiQrw jj.i.)out the &alile
object• and r<tO:rt ditt'icult, ool}!Siil!luently. to deternU.ne
whether Oli not they disat{reiii• .1.51
Adler do4<!s not want to give tJJ.e impreudon tl:U.'I.t he

naa oversimpli:t'ied the ma.tter. bY presenting !))UCh a ahlil.rp
distinction between science and philofilopey in tbe :vointa
nltmtioned above, so he Ulu.mtl'l'litee th11 ll<>inta by preliHlllting

a recent e:lQiii.rll.ple c>f

~·

conflict :l.n scientific.: t;heoriee.

Albert ll:inl\ltein and Niels Bohr
i.l'li ttlenrielll lll:t' nature

~>nd

adv!li.tll~ed

a.p,p&ren"tly oonfliot-

our .knowledge of

a.

on the

bl!l.ds ot' exx>erimcntal knowledse of the beha-vior of etil:l..
168

atOlllio :pa:rticleih

------~

ll.W~., fl• 72.

l58Pat.ul A. SchUpp ( ed.), Alber~ 1\IJeMd,ru J'tii~
Wl§l.I'-~•!ll'ltint (Vol. VII of' The ~lb:t(lrx; ~ Lhi~ i.IJ:tl9!9•
l{hfilli'!J! 1 Will!oonsint Ge~orge :santl!l. l'ubl:i.shil1f! Oo., 1949}, p,p.
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If tb.ere watt a genc~tlae illsue betwt'llsn Eirmtein !imd
HoM' about wMther everything in natuu bo.a tb.e deter•
mi'l'l~.tte ch.araetel:'· required by• the law of QQll.t:radietion,

that itl!lilUI h na·t euueptib.J.e of experimentll.l re!loluti{ln* Both mtlm .knew wall. the inllH!lCa;paole liJid:tathns
of experimental reatuu·eh on suoatmuie pax·'l;icles t beoa.uae
of .the way in wb.ioh the i:nat.rum!l)nts of ooeerva.tun
·
i!.ffeet the phenomena beinl$ Qbefi!rve.d.. Dut · tMy d.Ut'ered
about how tb.e$e limitatio.tiS akiould l:#e interpt·eted with
regard to the ultimo.te etructure of rea.J.i ty. since
the$$ lim1.tations cwmcct be overcome Einstein tmd l1ohr
cot~.ld look for further exJ,~erimenta.tion to resolve tM:I.r

differen<Bilth They oa.n only ;;mgt:;.ga in' dhii!ul?llion, ::,a,
they h11ve ~ ~yd iu>:ee the dialectied ~ll'lthod 111i~~tt~ be of

a.ome h0l;p • 1

, ·

li'or Adlllfr, tlltll

.

neces~JIM'."~

tiling ia to raco8;nhe the
prool~lll!l

clear dhtinotion between seien&ific

aophha1 J;lroi;lems l :problems <lt.rlf!WIIl:rQ.ble by
and problEHiilll a.newera.ble by d(ljbate.

questions can be recognhlilt'i.

4i.S

qu~a&!Qne

can be

expe:dmellt<~.tion

.In t.hif!l way 1 scientific

scientU'ic qUEili!tions even

when :philosophere atl;elllpt to get
pn:tlosopllical

and ph1lo-

:tnvolvli~<i

in them ;;md

reeogni~ed $tiS

;ph.iloilop.b:tea.l

ques tionll! even when scientbts get involved. in tt.tem.

:t'his

ia especially liil',Portant for thoee inetartcea wh<m e"'eh group
gets involved in 111aoh other'lil field on the fringes o.t:

uientit'ic and pllilolilophica.l inq\tiry.
Di;~leetie

h ot' va.lue in defining baues and elarify.
disputiUI whex•eve;ll' there a:re phil.oaopil:!.oal pro\:tlema,
not only t!loee which lie frankly in ,philof!opbieal terri ..
in~

tol'Y~ but «.lu those whieil occur in the. borderlands
between philoMpl:\y and one of' the lll·CisnoE~a.li:iO

l51lf'ln.

.,1

,~

~· ~··

160~•• P•

As Adler sua it, philosophizing not accompallied uy
adequate dia.leotill!i!.l work gi ve!il philoeopey tk<e
of being more like poetry and
really h.

las~~

~•ppeil.rance

like acienoe tluln i t

Whertever the agreements ••nrl di.eagre@men<ts of

pb.ilosopherm are lett implic1 t o:r concealed• tb,e claim th.at
pllilol'!opey, like l:SCienoe, is concernt!d witl:l objective truth

b

'fllose wh.o wiall to beli ttl.e

open to ohlil.llenge.

pey can charge that the

,poetry.,

IIUIX'taly

he

doe~~;

maintain tll;;J.t "taken

j

J

~-e.g.,

Jilut h& al.so contends

tlley tliil.ke on pa.rt:l. eul<~.r

~•a

l)Oili tion,

Whole!!•" two grel:l.t philo·

neweyta and Whitehead's, do not

illllliediately ocmtradi ct each
:poe~<~s.

philoeopl:l.ioa.l ayatel!la <u:e

While Adler does not llh&J.re that

eophical doctrines

1

g:ree~.t

plliloao~

otr1er IUI!II'e t:tLan do two great
tht.~.t

:l.liH~uelil C~i<n

inl'lofar aiil the poaitionlil

be isola ted, they

found to be in ll.grntnent or disa.gru:aent •
agreement or d:UBa.greel!lent 'lthieh h

et'l.ll.

be

Tile objective

poasihla in phiJ.ollH'>b).ey,

but not tn poetry • rema.:l.ne indiscernii)le w:l.tl1out the <t:PIJli•

cation of dialectic to

philoeophic~l

discussion.

l?h:l.loaopey' s dietinoti ve oh11.raeter is :t'ev<>aled by
the f'act that. while d:l.a.leouc :l..s :t!la.p~Ueable to
yoet;ry and negligible for science, it b both 11li:PPli·
cable to :!>h:l.J.oaophy a.nd nlso :necelilflary f()l" ttle full
aotl:l.evem&nt of pl:lil.o~~>opey•lll objeotivee. Tllis under..
standing of the role of dialeQtie bl thlll philoaophic.il.l
enterprise as a. whole. b.dpa to correct tillil fa.ln i.fl~Qge
f!Jf itse.lf t!:w.t pbilo!llophy lilo often p:res~mte, not only
to its or1:fUs• ~rut in the lil-Pologet.ioa of its
defender&. ·.

l6l'th4ll

~·~

.,.

v-•

7"

'ijl•
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Qf ~ili,J.o§gpgi()<J;l lli,!}§S

The genera-l o bjeoti n

or

tl:llll work of the Inl'l ti tute

of Pbilosophieal Etu;;e;u·oh,. which Mortillllll' Adler

he~tds,

ill

to •k:e em effort· to take stock of \lell!.te:rn thought on
subJe:ota whioh h.l:l.ve been of contimlins :phtl,niH)phieal
in1Hurest frolli the a.dvl!lrll;

the present da.y.

ot

,phil0so:pl:l,V in a.nchnt Greece to

'!!here are five

sentl!tNi.tl

of 11111 a.pproa.ch to the st·udy of idea.th

cl:le.ra.cter:l.at:J.os

They a.:re: (l) non ..

historisal; (2) nf.m•ph:l.losophie&l; (::!) !lon.. partise;nJ (4)
a.p;pl'oj!;iJllately oonapr$Mns1VIil; and ( 5)

slllf~limiting

a.s to

what can be found tn the written record of :pb:Uoeoph.ioal
thought,. out gl.'ling bey<l!nll whli1.t can be explicitly :found
ther~

by trying to exp:U.ce.te wltat is implied or only

il!lpl:l.l;lit,.l62
Obvioulllly 1 the

uteri~:~.la

being

11 tuild,e.(% Zll'lil

l:liato:ri ...

oQ.l in the ·lllenee tW. t the ma.j}o:i:' 4ooW!l(lnta in the litera-.
ture of <tl:>IY tluio pb.ilowophh\a.J. ·sul::tjeot !~<>VII their da1ii:Ul

and platUtlll in thlll hh tiU'Y of ·!;bought on the uuvJ t:~at.

stud.Y 11? non.. nimtoriolil.l in aiui, .in the mtmse tillil.t it
deliberately

abl!ltl'~;t.cts

untext and ptltte:rn.
all contemporary •

_______

the doC1.lt40nts from theb• M,storioal

It considers them as i f they

l'b.e d<lCU!lltilnts a.l'-e t:ret1.ted M

>'Hill'tl

rep;u ...

aentative of tl!ie voice& &f theb' &uth.orl!l pa,x•ttcipa.tina
,

,_
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with

o~e

another in

··.~

<tetual.. dil!lii!unlil hrh

l'lW I#.,Pl1ill'O&oh b n.on•pluloll!Ophioa;:l in the aenae

it 4oeifl Mt undlartaJte to

tnoU w

a theo:r-.r af the idw& under

or to defend. any. tl:leoey l!.l;a · t.rue.

li!t>l:'li.1:1.4~;~:rcation,

W)flill'JI

de~lep

ot a.

tk~.at

The pr;t ..

philoeopbic!ll.l appr\l'l<'l;li!h is to develop or

de:l.'cr.ui a theory llr,bout the subj e.et Wlder eona:Ldere.tion wt1ioh
its

«~JtJ,itHl'.lnt

claims ia true.

The priJll&ry moti vs of the

ncm•phUo1ilopl:.1ca.l a.pproa.oh "ia to develop e iltpothelllia !!!<bout
the eGntroveraieu i•aplieit in the

I

1

literatur~;~

oi'

&

ph.iloso.

;phha..l lintbjeat and to support that eypotlaesia by :reference

ta the

lletu~l

dQ<tui'llenta ·that rlilp:relillettt :te4orded tl<ought

about tlle ¢~ubjeGt.," 163 ·The d.istinethm ot'fered ia or1e Qon•
=;=

enning non-philOi:!o:ph.iol!l.l truth abQu.t !>he bot\;1
i tl'leU in. the l i teratuu. and i;,he
J

lJhilot~~olJhieal

or

thought

truth about

the aubjtllet.
'l'll.e non.. pa:rtiriHMl enaraateriatie .ot' the «.pl)roaeh
me&ntl tlla. t 1 t til limi Md

or tl'ue

pi<~ture

of tha

to

twyins to preli!etit <J.l'l a.tHmrate

<ilont;rovei>aie~l

implh.i t in phfd.o,.

liloph!Oal li te:r10.tuu w!dle refraitling from taking p;•rt in
sucl1

eontrovE~:rshll».

It also means th<l. t a. al:tti!t«.ined effort

to be ia.:pa.rt:lal :l.n its t:we&tllillln.t ot· all

pointt~

ot' view a.nd

to deal with tb.em :l.n <>n obj $1lt:l. VI!$ a.n<\1 11ii!Utral. lJUtl'ln.e:r b
made..

I t tl'hlil neith~;<r

to favor nu:r

ttl ~eJudioe ttte
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ph.Uosophfcill.l .poe:Uiorul ,dr 'ti€1!\\'llil .u .et..u,dies.
111. ~tt~1llJ,'lting to eover the ,IJiw<'l$p of !t®!lltern t!lot~ght

on

m,

and litllltliUIHiioU

i~~J

reoelv:tng ·itill du(ll em:pha!!is in

'fo the ext.ent tbat the

wholfh

r<~p:re2'entl!lti11'e

Wllol<~J

illte$X'&ted With tM

llt:ritnd from the past, w:t th. eMh

a.re

cu~:rent

fundalil.ental philo!lopl;lieal eubject•
~!i!f!

dtHlU~Ientill

a.;pp:roaol~es

in~

ltiett<re of' the
li<elected t'o:: etudy
si~!'>ii':ic<>nt

ot' the l!la.jor or tt>olllt

of thel)ry, tb.ll! eux"\l'ey

t:radit.ion

tll,~e ~J~vel,>.Praent

of

~r. bii$l!O~:t(led

irv'luiry

Ute daai:red

tY.pee

~Oll!PX'!l'hetn'l~ve ..

ness in a¢ope, and th111 uo.mprell(l!'ll!livenee$ of the iill'.udy ia
&llPl'axilllr.tllld.

·l:>inue no :flull f:ta.lllework of pi>ilttsophioal cont:r.o.,
ver&¥"· about a bawie ide~ al:r.ea(iy el!iil!lte, it oamnot be

simply extrm.1;1ted :t'rol!l the l1 tera.t1.ll"e..
be

l!l~u·dy

baing and

:li'lllporta,d., it
elarU'yin~

tl>UIIt

I

!1l.

be t·ormed by

a

y;rooeas of

~.rn&l.ll..

whii!t ie mo:rdy im:plio1 t in th€\. exta.nt

pllilolill).l!hical t.U.ver<>i ty. .
lii.bout

':l.'l'l.e frM.t&Wo:r.k ea.nnct

a

om .the philo<w:pl:li cal diverll i ty

pa.rtiouMl.r aubjeot in ·thlil

1it3:t"ll>~>U:rlll,

Qons.truct:Lone

are under·llt.tken :l:'or w!late11'01' ell'®ente ttf con.trov((lray are
warrant€~<!.

by t.ile evidenue or '11"HIW!il a.¢tually lllllld,

tiona <.14tn.t!llly dehndell!..

s.'h~£~

ti!l.' IJQS1•

0%'1<Q.tn:v('5 qu(i!.U ty in ooM·!irue..

tiona liea in the way a cla:ritying reflection on what "'·l·
rea.c.'ly

elti~Jtl.l

in tlla wol"l·d of thol.li$ht ia

d.m1~,

a.nd. not by

tho add:!. 'Iii on of new doobiMI!l ol' theoriea to tholile pro-

;posed.

"If

~nytll:l.ng

is added, :it

i~

diversity c>f opinions irt. the l;!.ght or

undent-.nding of
wzl.icl~

on61

~:~holild

·f~he

be

_::::-::-

J.0'1

form

&

c:r i tical judgment o t his own • "li!\4

the word lldialeeticiitl'' de'*igna.tee for Adler, "the

ta.sk of rendering an ol:>j active, :l.mpa.rtial• .:md neutrally
:formulated repowt. of a JUMy.eided diuuuion." 165 Dialec ..
t:l.cb1u refere to «those wl1o play
·..

interpreters."

156

tl'u:~

role of observers and

D:l.a.loct:ic ie used t.a

nli~Jll.!;~

"the method

they elllploy 1n reconstructing the oontroversy about t'reedom
th.a.t ie Ji)fii:rt;ly e:x.plioi t uti partly implicit in tlile litera..

ture. ,.16'1 .
Ad.le:i.' e:Jtplicitl,y states tl:!.!li.t

the word.e iii! tlliite
were uf!ed b;v

that his

xa.nt,,

dJ.eaimilM~

S<;>n:>e

ot

Ulil.llll

from the aenec in wh:l.ch tM;v

Hegel, and £ngeliii•

lln4~rstwdiug

ill Wb,ioll..he

He

a.lno ~ekrii.Wtledges

the di.a.leetioiitl flask ;';,lld the

method of a.px•rtHll.eh, ·mile ueuing some l:'eiael!lbl<l.nce to the

1

undc:i:'atlil.nd:l.ng

Oct"

dialectic in· the Pla:tonie dia.logueu and

EUI:peoiilly to A.rhtotle'lil Tnie,, pos:ul11H1es important differences autfic1ent fo:r.• an
are being used in a

f(pt~~:Q:I.a.l

acknowlcdg;~ent

tkAA t the words

and :restricted sense.

h ·La aJ.Iio evid.•mt th.a.'l> Adler' e

~.t~eaning

of dia.lecti ..

106

efforts to state fairly and illlpa.rtililllY ·the bsun whiCh.
they tb.oupt existed between tb.em11elves and. other thinkers;
and

~W.so

by M.llltol'ia.na of tllouib.t who attempt to present

M

objeeti ve acQutmt o:t' the in telJ.fH'Itual diversity whioll they
foi.Uld on

~»

fundi!U!i\ilntal aubjeot and to reeonatruet the lines

of controversy.

Adler' a work U dhtincUve for it

:rer>r(~tt;ents

exeluUvely dialeotical approach to the diiloua;e.ion
ba.s:l.ta suhject ll\nd

a.ttlil!lpt~;;

~;~t' '-'

to enoora.pa1u in a sustained

mannlilr the who.le sweep of that dimouuion.
terest h

an

Ita only in•

in the rdatiQnsh:!.ps of agree.1uetrt. and diea.gree-

men t ttu:.t "ean be found among a wid a diVeni ty -of vie\!llil
( es.cll oi' wllic b. ela.iu truth or imports.nce) t.ogether with.

tlle eonuquen<1>111> tnut oM be diaeovtn:ed

1

t~>

fl«>w fro!ll such.

l"ela.til'>n&hips • u168

While the dialectician does not p<;;.rtioipi.>te in th.e
diuuuion, he doee work to produce an
Cl.11.rifying account of the
word dis ou&~ahn,.

he~

lilomethins that S&W

ha..lll nh:l.fted the

a

tute tlw litera.ttu:'e of

or God.,

--------

di$OUIH~ion•

llbJc,~etive

a.nd

,\Ill Adler t;see the

mean:!.n~

to refer to

t:ow.\1 in tne doewnen1H> wll:I,Ph consu ..
~

eui>Jeet like t'reedom or demoera.ey

;i.09
.oatH~

·t~

llll'l.ny e~n'inu:tes.
ot ev~m w:ritten

It

•G.i.$<HUH~i0n" ext*J'n4.3· over
tew a.ot\U!.l eonveraa.t1ons1
exehangeB, lil;l'l,\ong it$ l1<>l'tiQiPlil.llta. ·
~!.*ill')se who come fl!U'lUr in tlle tempox·a.l apa.n of such. a
diaeU$!!:1ou neoeaauUy ~ape&.k in i.gnorano.e of what thdr
aucoeuora will ~ve to aa;y, and tbll!Y are sometimes not
1\\oquainted with. t.he eont.doo·Uol'UI of all theb cont&IIt•
por~rs.ea.
Tholile who oome l.M.ter h.11.ve the ~dvarrt!i.@e of
being in. a posi ti<l*'i to li!Pe&.k in tlw Ugh.t of wtw.t has
already l>etm said on ttle li!Ubject, out tttey • too, &re
.seldom eognh~~t of tll,e oontril;n,~Uon made ey tr•eir
predeeelilsors.J.ti9
·

In_ this

!1.11 tbe above

·mo-ca!lf!·d
invol.v<>n~

$€11l$6t

vol:ves many

pa.~·tioi:pants

not ex:l.et.

1'1l.e

thli di.eiJUl'l!JiOU

~Mil

a Whole in..

for wllo.a1 the whole diuuseiot< doea

dhetu~don 11.111 lil>

whole oan. exbt o1d.y fol'

those who h!i.Ve exaained the wrHten record and studied the
11tost

eignifioa.nt eontriootione that !lave IHiHiltl made 1 a.nd who

~ve

a.l\'lsembletl and related tile docn.:ments the,t dea.l wi til a

certain topic,.

11

'1'¥ua unity ot ·tb.lil wh.ob lh1.1 in the re.te ..

vanee of its parte to a eo;l4!llon

1 llubjt~et

of' c1it~oouE!eionii••J.?O

:tn the dia.leet:i,oal <Miltl!H;X"uetion of a disctnH!!·ion em a
partieull'l.r topic, .Adler ;:n1.mt ionl!l thre!ll ere<~.ti ve a.aoeata of
the d1a.leetieal taak.

'l'he tii:'l;lt involves the aar:HllllPling and

rela.ting of: (lo(ll.lmentil tluil.t d&lil.l wi t.h a. p&rtiotilar to pia.

The oeeond er@a.'Uvll! aaJlleQt coneerns the
diUulllaicm

!!),$

oon~;~t:ruetion

of the

if' a.ll tile dili!putants were eontel!i.pora;ry,.

atttu1pt tQ find the implicit iM!d expH.ctt.
d.:l.h.!Jil'eeme:nta cone ti tu hill the

t~tird

~reementll

orea.U ve

a.l1Jl)lil(lt.

The

and
Tno

=

IIi

110

of

wa.t

:!,1> ~Mil'tl\li!.UY contl!.ined in tb,e writ ten d<?!IIW!!tlntm of

the l.1 te;r~tur~.
· fhe books ~nd otJler Cl.oct.uium.:lil> of lHerat:ll'e whic.tl

con.tf!;.im th.e o»:l.nbns of var:l.ous a.uthor10 about til.$ partiou•
lar ph:!.loBoi)hteal subJ eot oonliltitute the raw !l.li'l.teri~J.s for
the die.J.ectici an.
Jlla.y

A

~eat

deal of

textu.~l

interpretation

be required of the ciia.lectioian ·to ol:rta.in the a:efined

data he ne eda in the f' or!i.l of

11

the a.ru>wers eal'lh a.utllor

ll~&kea

to queationa whiob he himself pro,pound$ 1 a<H:G!lllJIJl.tlied by hia

cr:l.tioism or refutation of thlil a.newerl3 to thOI;'J(;l questionB
wh.ioh he attributes to other authora, and l'!ven so1lUilt:ttne!ll by

his reje(rllion of the questiom.l other authore aak,..,l7l
Data in this di!lll.eotio&l 5en11.1e a.re <.m<il.log:ous to the
meaning of data in tlle (llmpirioal soieneiiHilo

!n the emJ?iri ..

=

cal soiencem. t.'le wo:r4 "data." t«ti'ers to the observed pheno-

l

mena..

It refers

seillntbt as a
Ids •

u ·f<ne

b~~nis

observatione actuallY n!l!.de 'oy the

t·or d,.:;veloping and testing a

Even tho!Jih sdection e:f the. data

:!.nv~;~lves

hypotne ...
etfol't for

the seteatist, they retain ·tne h' l'!ha:ra.cter a.s i.i vllln, relative
to thlil edemt:Ls II' 11 own bypothesil'l wltli.eh mw. t lJe :l.nvonted or

made.

______

,_

i

l.l.l

:1.1'1 the sense that they

~•re

=

what he ha.s i'ound in the litera-

ture, in contrWllt to tkle conatructions that

~~e

.llla.kes.

Tile

data for the dialectician are otner men•s th.oughts on a

subject; th.lil llypothesia b hie own invention or

con~;~truu

Uon,.
The

di~lectician'a

purpose in readinu and inter.P:tet•

ing the doeU!llellts in the literature is to ohta.in n.·oul them
the data he needs in order to construct

tlle isMuea oi' a

controversy and the topical agreements that underlie the
1

l

doctrinal disagreements on the iseues.

Ylhen he knows the

opinions of a. number of a.utllore who ""re severally answering
their own questions about a. aubjeot1

their oonoe!Jtions of

H. its existenth.l rel&tionslli);le, and judglnents al:iout ita

va.lue, ttl.en he is able to relate them.,

JUa ilypotheais wUl

enable laim to .rela.te uy oollll1lOtlly ;.woeptable conceptions
and questions that l'lil.iae iasuea a.oout the subjects, ami
even to relate tile authors to one another

!;l.\'1 .. partieip!m~a

in a e ingle controversy or eet ot' oontroveraieo 1 a.nd to
refer to thelll as 11a.rtiea to an ililaue• Qn wnieb they can be
conceived of .ha.vini taken one or anothe:t:

poaiti<~n.

'J.'h:l.a process of orgard.dng t!llii data, by tne di<>leeu ..
oian•a hypothetical
data..

construction~

leadlil to new i>Llld altered

"Aa aa.oll development in a. llypmthesia le.ada to further

refinements and reorganization ot' the data. so in turn

et:~.cn

F'-

J.l2

lelll.ds to revidona in the il,Ypoth.esillJ.ff 172

The dialeotioit,ult for
VO\lidity of the nypothetioa.l

l~dlert

j,tUiiatent

h

oonstJ~ucHons

tru~t

the

is tea'ti!i.i>l.e by

recourse to the recorded tnought in the documents of the

Ht.eratare.

'l'hey are the u.ltim<.>&e source

over the diallll!otic<i\.1

oonat;~:uctiona

are

&J:~d oh,IH.lk•

a.l.w~ym

.i'ilo~·e~

tenta.ti ve and

of a hypothetical cha.:raoter, l.l.nd a.a auoh oapaille of crith
oism, eorreotion, or reJection in t'li!.Vor oi' an alternative

eypothlfli!:l.s which may seem to l:le itlore

tert~>ble.

'l'he dia:l.eoticiu usuJll.ll.Jf \leginli! wi.th a number of
competing b:ypothei'HHI• shift.ing fr.om one to. anotb.er,
and aometi!llfia oomi\lining the t·e.,t.ures of lllev.era.l.. 'linen
one hypothesis is finally ~dopted, it is accepted with
reservations kept alive by tiHl likelihood of' other
pol!llllible i),ypot1tetHis. The most tlla.t can be claimed for
the propoliiEHi oonatruotione is their s·~.tperior tenability
in the light of the data. 8ut tile data. os.n always b'e
otoe.lle~ed by other reade:rs ot' the .Literature v•ho
''hear" th.e dise.ull!aion differently; and 11.ny hyl)Otbeais,
no mat tor how pla.u.tlli ble A is alway a open ·t.o further
testing and criticism.lrS
The

dia.leotioi~ 1 a

aaaertions in expounding his

h;ypothefli.a is not a repetition of t.he
writers from

~Vhose

work lle lieri vee the

cypothetioal. oonstruotione are l:llll.!!ed.
differenou in their

l72l,2.i.j!.,
lnll'Md.l!

le.ngu~es

auert~

dat(~
l~ot

ons );)y the

otl which. his

onl.Y &re there

but in their aubjeots as

ll:S
opimion& a.bou t U.w.t subject, whereas the dialectician :i.e

writing about the controvna;r t:tutt :l.a implicit in th111 die ..
euea:i.on ot' a atai1JtHlt.1. and hie atatfiltllente asl)'ert the .l:lypothetica.l oonatruetio.n of the diseueoion tlla.t he reg«.1•ds

rn one st!lnse. the authors

s~

!'•~

f11ueh n•ore than can be

r111flected in the diii.l.lecticie.n•a const:ructiom;;.

~rhei:r

aassrtio.ns reflliHl!.t tile whole texture of their tb.oughts on
the aubj ect.

:f.he dia.llllcM. oia.n h

concern~Hi

only with the tr

•s;reea.uonts, dillllllil'llltllloe.ntlll, and opp¢sed argWI&enf<l'l.

a.no ther

se:ntH~,

tlle dill.leoti ci a-n sa;ra much more than :i.e e:x:-

pl.icitly stated in the wo:rde of the

or together.

In

"Ji'ni"J.hel.y

.iHU:llitUse

a.utilOl"ilt

their

taken

ein~ly

in't.ent.ion:;~ ~>.re I!H>

different Md ileca.ulile their lii.!illierUonj]J a.re rlon-duplieativl!!l,
the two kin•is of writing-.. pll.ilOIH)plliol!l>l ®d
neceaea.rily auppleml!lnt ea.e,h ot~ter. n 1 '74

dial<;~oticu.l~·

'!/hen the dialectician fi<tds that authors wllo an
ta.ldnl!l :part in the dil\louadon of a subject

~;~re

sUont on

some of the pointe in tile dieoul'H!Ihn, he cannot overcome
tile l:l.m:l.tiation of hh metl1od.

Il:e oantJGt go beyo.nd the data.

a.nd imagine what h.ll c<mnot construet ae _o;;u-t of hili! eypotlu&..

sis.

He oa.rmot fu:rnieh miqJairl!S a.nswe:rlil ttnless

-----------------174TMi-'.
,~
.

~·.

. "'"'

1.'• ""'•

~hey

are

.l.l4
-~

cle&rly implied by

tna authocs

w~t

~xqlicitly ~av.

even it

the controversy rema.ins fragmentary •

Yet in the light .of intelJ.igible oontroverBy a.nd
rational dflbate. wloioh are tile ultimate ideal "'t wnioh the
whole dialectical effort aillllll 1 he can criticise the oontro•

veray ile construota. p:rovi<ll.ed tililll iEI done without abandon ..
ing dideotiod neutrality and without Judging the tlmtn or
:falsity of. any phil;H:Hllphioa.l poei tiona repreel'.mtod in the

If auoh oontroveraiee

are det'icient in lll.ny respeot,

the work ef i!llprovin[Jl tlle!ll must be. done by others. We
believe that if the dia.leothal work h1.ts been ·.vell done
a.t any given Ume, the J,lhiltH!lophers of suoi~t>quent
generations will thereby be both stimulated and prep&:red to carry the diseuuion further dtlt somewl1at
illOre clarity ·!ij~ with a little better ohanoe of reach-

ina the truth. · 5
l.II.

IMPLICA.TI014S li'i.lR lliDUCl.i'.TIO.N

:Philoeophical l?rtUlil'!!lfllil

I

It if! Adler's oontamtion th.a.t from
John Dewey u..nd

:llertr~md.

Dai.Hl&'"llet~

to

Ru;uell, phUQeophieal inquiry has

been directed toward tkte discovery of a ijn•w method" tor
pllilosopey.

This

ae~~>rah

f0r a new a<ethod iJ;J eymptoma.t.io

of a deep concern about the apparent failure of philoaoplzy
to make appreciable advances in the underetanding ot' l:lasie

ideu or in the trea.t1nent of

fun~ob~«umtal toJ)Iics;~,

Of-_

.From the eeventeentn g;mtury to t!'l4l! present. d~,
the IHill:liHI of failure has become 1llore li!Ol"ld llll)re o.oute,
a.nd has been accentuated by a eucceaaion of "new
1nethodet" each of which in tu:rm't'ell shol·t of its
promise. '!'M lateet epbodes in this story are mlo>rked
by the reoll!nt rise and spread• fira t of pr¢gruatislll and
then of positivism in the EnglisJ:l... s:pealdng countries;
and or ,pklillf9ffnoloe;y followed by $Xistent1alieru on tne
continent.
.
The eearol:l. nu.- the new noeth<Jd ill the f1flior.Y of

PhilOSOl>h.Jr in modern Umes.
factcu:·

dU.rin~

'fhe search for any operative

the l&lllt three centuries to explal.in why

phi.loeophel'<! became !'lo a.oUtlllly a.wa.re of, Md 1.10 desperat.e
about, ·the l&ck of I!l'ogreu in phUoli>oph,Jf, turns to the t•aot
t~t

modern philosopners worked in a.n r.ge when the

empiriot~l

flciencem. exhibited outstQflding progl'e!ilfi> from century to
century, even from decade to de.Qade,

~;J.nd

=;-

at a eontinucyusly

aeeellllra.ted rate.
Adler• s concern h
VIM

to ,point out that the tllistake

in expecting the delli:l:ed philosoph.iea.J. progress to

result di:rl!llllt.ly from the metllodologi<la.l reforms without the

1

sustained applica.ti<m of a. l!4ethod tor de&ling wi tb. the
diversity among philosophers that wau inerea.sed. by the

multiplication of new a.,pproaohes.

'1Ji'or all its indiVidual ..

ism,. philoao})hy ie a. aoQial enterpriru>. "1.?7
there was the

illililt~ken

l761.l21.!!., p. 74.

177~., P•

? 5•

Beyond tnis,

U!JUIIlption that rJ!.iloso,phy and

=
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n~111U'e

and cta.uaes of

and tlle rate at wl'!ieh it

pro~r$fils•

can be expected to occur.'

GU<>a

the

IH'>lMl

in <me c...ee

a.111

in

the other.,'
Adler diatingu.!mb.e!i between two ft>otors in philosophieal k¥Jowlede£1il;

(1) tnlil dlloisive data, and(;~) t.he

achievement r;f tb.eoretiea-1 insigl'l.t by tiae

develo.P~"~ent

ot'

l!ll)re eomprehensi ve tlte o:t'h$.
In philosophy the deeia:Lve d.:.ta o>re always tne eame-the facts of oollll!lon experience. Tlle hrmu.lation ot'
tlew thei.>riEUI and the improvellll'lnt ot' old oi'les oor·cai.nly
oMs ti tute one oendition lilt' plliloaop.llio<ii.l progrelila, on
·_w ~· .21: ·!!\ ~ exllat~~:l&.!!ll gne~!H!!I~ !d. t!fte yutii
§bgut :Jllj.e 2lil.ieqts !/.t J2hil.Oill!i!l?hie~A1 a!U.U.• .l3ut such
envi!:llo);llllent ineludes the Ji•IH.'Elhtenoe and proliferation
of philcmo,phical errorlil u well as t.lllil inorea.tHl in the
d.eposi t. of pllilosopl<Jioa.l t.ruth tru.1.t ia a.va.:Ua.b.l.e h
the .lli.llllan race at a g:h'en time. lienee the progresl!>ive
envelopment o:l.' philoso~hical truth by a multi,Plic~ty
of doetriM8 mulil t be lllatch.ed by a. proe;reui n develop..
ill!lllt of d:talel'lt:l.oal trut.ll about their dinr:ai ty • · 'l'he
controversies that underlie th.ia diversity mur;t be

ex.Plici tl,y ut fortll aa the lJaek;flroimd O·f eontinu1ng
ett'orts to ret~.olve basic inuee. i f .PI<iloaoph:ica.l
ditferencei! ;r.re ever to eontl•ibute 1uore to understanding than they d<> to cimf'Usion. Suf!lta.in<ild dialectio&.l
work is, therefore, the other condition of phUosophica.l progrefHil• m AU. .!lW1! .21: ~ S!W~J;iR,\!~ !!! l!!.t!
ewtsu£ t !!! .iEUtU !fh~q}l .PM ,M ra!l\4e .l2;£ thf$ I'.!a:!ih!llil,l,.
de ba.tjt_

ftt

ll~i'l ~~A. :rnf

Cont:rover.ay is most ·favorable to proa;rue in philo ..
sophy • fQr Adler • when

the~·e

ia a gree.t va:riety

dietinc.t th!ilo:ri.liUI on 11.ny iuue.

ot

clearl,Y

Juet as the knowledgtll of

only on,e side o:f a question :La not to

undnet~:~nd

the ieeue
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ble.

It foUoWii'l that thill ,diveraity ot· opinion to be

exa.mined dialectically should hardly be confined to pointe
Q>:f view of contemporll.ry origin,.

re11ults when

m~y

A regret·t01ole paroohialislll

)ilQints of view• relevMt to the conte•a..

porary iiisues. l!!.l'e left uncon!lidex·ed or evtm. un.ll:nown

j~.tst

because they happen to b.a.ve been propoeed in t:ulcient
llledievalt or RenaiesatHie times.
eontempor~~.ry

Conversely, the neglect of

thought nsulte in an lllqUI.\lly rliilgretta.l>le

provincialism.

'!.'he l)osll ih!e progrliHls of l:lhilo!i!ophy • science, a.nd

dialectic does not have foreseeable limite •
ue to

philol:~t'lptlize

As 111en eon tin~

fro111 genl!lration to gener&'tion, and

the diVflrsity of' views on any aubject grows more

i

the work of dillllectioa.l
expanded.

el~U":ification lli!llilt

~,~.e

e:x:tent~~ive,

be continued and

It ie Adler's hope.tb.a.t the 1.Usousl'lion o:f philo·

sophical subj eots in wh:l.ol:l. the imp lid t eon·troversy rerll&.i:nu
implicit can l)e transformed into one in wh.iall fruitf'ul

debate based on the. dial:utica.l 1i!Xplica.tiorl and cl*llri:fica-

tion of the extent corrtroversy may l'J:I.'ing philosophy to its
maturity in the future.

'1The reason for this dl!llayed

!llaturity may be tha.t philosophical prebleula are more
different

th~ou1

soient1fie problems, hwnanly s,,ea.king, if

c==

A presa:lna: contemporary problem concerns the Qondi ..
tiona of in tellntual co.:ll!lluni ty in a aoo :l.ety that h

oom•

mit ted. to QUl turaJ. plura.lhm.

As h.ii! v:l.ewe :1. t 1 tb.e extre;ne

alternatives llluet oe avoided..

The extretne plur••lh.m of'

ilumrohio divfn•sity whhl:! .a.lmost a.bolhhes intellectual

community o:r th<i.t of :regimented eon:t'orllli ty which alatost
abolishes intelll!'.otua.l diverai ty should give way to t1:!111

condition of

«~rJ.tMt\

G,ivex·dt.l! 2!.

give:uj,~ 11'Li~hin

tile

,tt_amewor;!s .2! ,m intel,lutwu. 22/Y~Wm!t;z.,. ,,,tso
What we want is not UlOU and. more di vere i ty out a.
lfi vuei ty that h ;uore <.ttui more in tell i~i l;l.le. wr.u.. t we
w~~ont is not "disagreement • in ttu> p"rely nag11t1 ve unse
of a m~ert~ &b$enee of i.!liljl'illlil>JHm t but r&•ther tl}e mort of'
dieagreel1Umt which conatitutelll genuine controversy. in
whioh t.l:l.ere is a meeting 9f rlltrHls, Jil., Jo:tping f.lf ifiHll~es.
and the oPt:>Oai tion of arguJnents that enli&ht!lllUl the ·
dit'f&renoel!i o:f' opinion ~<.n.d even. te.nd.r; to relilo.l.ve them.
Disagreement may be taken as .a !$ign 1 even aa ~ sign,
of' freed.olll of thought. It llilil.Y be reg~c;rded l<!il .iml,in~
ptmaible to the purauit of .truth.. aut fox· that very
l:'EHil.$On, it !ilhould tlot be ,,a.lulild for 11<.1~. own aa,ke i:Ju·t as
a device taM easoellgno• fo.:r learning. Diversil;;y, disagreement1 an'tLoont1'over~Jy lilhquld,. therefore, oe fliiUte ..
ured by the intellectual good!! th,ey Yhld. T.llll!y are .
fruitful only when mllln can learn lilOtt>etning from them..l(il

Th!il e1npi:<ub b

CJn ·the li\llderute.nding o:f'

OOill•<lOnly

-';-

ll9

standings, agreements a.bout the
diaa.grc:~e

results in a

meetin~

i::H;l\Hiill

of minds.

on wllioh disputants
Their dJ.ffereneea

are underi'Jt.ood while they do not share id<Sntiea.1 views.
"The unity involved in intelleott.w.l

oo!W~<Unity

is unity of

under& tandint~, not a unanimity of ~.~oesent. ,.l€1 2

Pn\lgsopa gf Liberal, Edwmuon
l!'or Adler, a liber;;t.l eduoat.ion ie one tl'uli.t concerns

itself with the bade idillae of tlle West' a intell.eotual
heritooge.

The unity of the Western eivi.lbation does not

lie in a common body of beliefs. efJ.pouaed in al.l epoona of
Wee tern hi at ory and uni versa.lly

share:~ d.

trn:ough the vrea t

tod$.1, but in its in·trioate <mel au..ny-ehi;;d di.aculn:ion of

basic ideas over the centuries.

A liberal education which.

proceeds by reading and Uutu>sion llll.u;t be ccmvereant not
only with the

"~pl:l. tudll

of' the whole recorded disotusaion

of' these matters, it rnust also be aecotllp!!lniild by sol!le underIii tanding

of the agreetllen ts, disagree111en te, !Mld arguments

tl'ul!.t co:tUltitute the controverllliee which 13,re to be fora<ed in
that disculll:t~ic:ua. ul83
Adler whhes phi.l.olilophy to perf'o:t'll'l ite educational
role of liberating the lllind tro111 the dominant p:t•eJudices of

-----·-l82J;b!d..
.l.l:l 3l.!i!ii!,. t P• JOtVi •
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teachers

tQ

escape fro.m the)

do&~:m~Uam

of indoctrination in

whatever doctrines happen to 'be in vogue at the .tuoment.
Teachers and students should be able to approach
the :l.uues invQlvcad in the ooneidert;;.tion of fundaaumtuii.l
ideas with intellectual detachment. But a.e they approe.oh the diverl'>:l.ty of oonflhting view wHh em open
mind, tb.ey should be intent on discovering for thelllaelves where the truth liee. This tlley can do in an
intelligent and responsible :fashion only after tlley
have aequ:l.red a olear understanding ~i the inues emd
the rationale ot' the oppQsing sides. 4

Wh.ile the goal is to discover the corwnon ground
which underlies differences of opinion and then to transform their diversity into

r~tional

and intelligible

controversy, the range of contemporary diversity is scare., ..
ly ever

1

re:present~:~.t.ive

twenty-t'i ve centuries.

of the range of man's th:i.r1king over

"The study of :.t'uruihl.lllenta.l. ideas

oemnot help being improved if it ie guided oy t1.n Qrdered
sense Qf all the strains in the w.hole record of' human
theught about them., .,lB5

-------l<34.l.ll:!!l·
l85Ioid.,

--

~

CO:IU'.IUUSON Ali!D CONTliAST
Ol!~

TID.'; TWO OONOEl?'.t'!ONS OF ME'l'HOD

Since tlle c<>noeption of method for a.n inquiry into ·

f:reedlllm of i.lotn John Dewey <md MorUlll.er

Adl~r

bas been

:preGented, this clmpter deals with tlle eomllariaon and oontrast of their conceptions Gf method for an inquiry into

:t're edom. When the method

e<~.ch

wri tel' &dvooa.ted. for :inquiries

into freedom W&e analyzed, the dU:t'erent
quiry beea.me 11-Pl)tl.:t'ent.

of in-

lll.et~.ningiil

Inquiry into :t'reedo.m wo.a

use.~d.

to

mean ( 1) aase:rtiona concerned with tlte truth about freedom
;itsel:f'l ( 2) search for knowledge about
pl:l.ieal

1

ide~~~os

about freedomJ

~md

~>~.no tiler•

a

philot:~o~

{ :3) a$cHilrtion!ll about the

tt-uth of a. "d iseulila ion" a. bel ut freedom.

Dewey's

instrument~list

or

to ot'fcu.• a. new m.ethod for arriving
re~~oli ty :~md

fr\\ltHlom.

pra~ma.tio

philosophy seems

&>t an 'l.mderstanding of

The boasted advantage of tile

nllllthod~

ology that it points to real experience merdy indicates

its comrn:l.tment to realism..

Dewey proposes a mtJtklod for

arri vint~ 11.t efficient auertions at;! out realill.Y ruad freedom.
Ife aearoheEJ for the byJ;Jothesb which

moat et'feeti vE~ly
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truth or the molilt. effective a.f;leert:ton a.bout freedQm in the
lil i

tua.tion.
The ruethod for dealing <Vith the JphiloBophie«.l ideas

ot' oth111r :pklilolllophere was an e;jl:tension of his expe:d;llenttl.l•

In ;preatuaUng hi.s tb.eory of trutl:l 0

ism and. instrumentalililm.

his epis temo1Cl!ltil!!a.l theory, or hill theory of f'reedom 1 to

mention

~

few instances. Dewey took note of previous

philoaol'ihios.l theorin.

Jie expresaed hilli underetand:Lnge of

wh.a.t aome ps.st and contemporary theories maintained, re:t'utt:ld some of them to hb

and replaced their

s<~.Uafa.otion,

theoriee with his own.
lflllile he >llli!.Y not always have been ii:X,illicit in pre-

1

oilaely pinpointing previous theories or in ahowing wllioh

philosophers ma.inta:tned these theoriea, he diti propose hia
solutions ·to the problems lUI more valid,

Hii.i whole

approa.oh would. have been mlllaningleu it' il> wll!n a.aaumed
that he did not think: that he understood th.dx- ideas on the

subject.,

It' he did not a.rr.ive at the t:ruth concerning their

ideas, he would nave been setting up straw arguaents and
refut:!n~Jt

theae, but not the posHi ons of tne ,philosophers

wh:t ell he ela.imed. to be re pacing.

their stateutents would

ue

'£he

liruth or falwity of

irrelevtont to llb aasertione.

It

oton be ooneJ..uded. that Dewey at least implh:l tly lll!.\inta.ined
a corlee:ption of method for

undert~tanding

aesution& of otne:e
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Ylilt it can be <;>;rgued ;;;.gainat l)@wey that on the one
hand, if he did not ;.mdet'ata.nd th.eil'

id•~ae,

hils ideaa were

irrelevant in attelii.lpting to retutfl theirs and on the other

I

j

. hand, if' he did a.r:dve at an understanding o:t' their

id~HM>

(ideas repr!'laent:a.ti ve or th.eir ideas and hence obj eeti vely
so} • it follows that he went beyond hi.:!! own theory <>f inquiry.

Jl'or l!l.n understanding of another's ideas, objective•

ly :re;preunta.tive or tMb ideM or ·orutht'u.l.ly reflecting
their pos.ition abo 14t a, subject of diseuse ion, ia not open
to eontradictory mssertiona.
In :re;ga.rd to dialUtioal lllethod., Dewey

e.xpl~oi tly

resoun.ced Hes;elianism and conf3idered elements of :Pb.ton!Q
and Aristotelian thought to be jlt the ;rootl!l of pl:lil,oso:phi·
cal contusion in modern thought.,

Elelllcnh of

di~J.eetic

in any of their tnoug.hte Wl'Htld !.mve bean l'epugna.nt to him,.
He would not havfi conceived that hie new phUoeophical
methodology could bear any

ret~eHJblamiEIIil

to their the o:ries.
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J\.dler advoca.ted a nwt;l1od for

&n

inqtd:cy into fru-

dom, in tne unee of a metnod for arriving Ott tlle truth
about freedom i tulr.

Ellilosophiod method for Adle:r con-

stated in the intellectual identification ot' a subjeet of'

collllllon experience and. tt1e rationul. analysil!l of the meaning

ef the experience.
Ad.J.!)r' & metbod :for

dealin<~

wi tll thlll :philoao;phioal
~.t.pglication

ideas or otb.er philosophers waa an

of the

identifioatioxl of tlte subj eet under considera.tion and tile

I

I
~~

l

question being asked about i't•

~h:hl

un;;~overod

pro():'>dure

=;-

the meaning and definition of' the terms used. and J.$d to
art understanding of the ide& exprll!eiHitd by tb.e

:1-!:orUmer Adler a.uume!l that

ide~s

writer~

wtlicb a.athus

t~xpr1n1s

in

their boob are underste.nd&b.le and tn~t in readin~ and
thinkin~

ideas.

about tneir wri tinge, hili oan underatand their

He explicitly employed this tuethodology in

£t.t ;!\'£1ll!i!d!8 to und.ersta.nll the

The.~

philosop.hiQ&l ideas of tlte

more lilign:l.:f'iaamt wr:I.Un of the bet twenty-f'ive hundred

yE!ara a.l:!ou. t thlll eubJ eot of rreedom..
However~

he went beyond the understanding of' their

ideas in h.ie dialectical construction of a. "discussion"

a.bout t'nedom.

1!he unique feature of this aullthodology

conSists in the construction of neutrally formulated
hypotheses tested by the data, the literature on ttle
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t&i.tllil) ¢ontrol the

~JYpotMsia

or nypotheaea ( th~ neutrdly

formu.lated constru.c'Uo:ns about :the ideas found in the

literature}.
.hypoth$ses

He affirms the tentath'e nature l>f the

bec.l!liUI>lle

the

dat~.l

which they verify &re

Clil.pti~ble

of other !Joe a i l'lle diiiol<!!Qt:l.ca.l Collll.linliltione and 'Variation&

depending on the a:peeit'ic partieipation in the dieou.eaion

and the

l'JJ~ture

of dialectical diuourae.

affirmed or denied, .Preoiaely
~f

the ideaa is

a~;n.:~hlilwed.

beQ~uae

Unlike the deraonetrlil.tor who must

pick true premililea to arrive at

1

dialutioillll h

tho truth ar t'lilllii ty

!1l.

true oonolt<a:l.on. the

to trl!ll tx•utb. or :t'a.laity of tile

ind.Uil'~t:rent

ideas beca.uee the:re is no caused

linl~

between the

prEHJl:l.files

and the conoluaion.

TMre wae

&

striking simila.rity in the

e.l.lllllllints

oi'

metllodolt}gy wlliett Dewey advocated for ph.:U.osoplliea.l inquiry

into the effichnt auertionm {truth} oonoermng the elilej-Ht

dialeatit:~al

freed!)lll•

inquh:'y into tile tratll about m. di!Htuasion of

In both of thoiHi

iru~tano$s 1

aBoertain the truth of their

they proceeded to

statement~>

by tflt'erenoe t.o the
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oiw.ngeable character of the 4ataJ i.e •• the ponibili'ty ot
new and different data, and both affirmed the tenability of
the hypothesis in tlle light of the d&ta.

The hypotlletical

quality of the truth oi' their aesertions was shared by both
thinkers.
Wll:Ue some similarity waa found in e ome of the ele-

ments of the different methodologies described, it ie not
being anerted without an awarenes.s that radically dift'erent

I
i

l
]

tbings were bei.ng considered by ea.oh philosopher.

Adler

Wtl.S

explicit that hill! dialectical method was being ueed to con•
struct a. discussion of the subJect of freedom which was
explicitly lil.nd implicitly eonta.ined in the l:l terature of the
Wturt over the previous twenty-five centuries.

He ex).llioitly

!llQ.int&ined that tbe approa.ell wa.o not identical w1t11 a
phi.losophioal approach to the eubjeot of :freedom.

i,!oreover• Adler did not conceive that true philosoptlica.l assertions about the suiJJ eot of freedOJn would he

subJect to contrlll.dictory flux and. change.
granted that the mind of

ll.lall

He w<Jultl

h<o~ve

has the pot en tia.li ty to grasp

th.e truth about the suoJecrt of freedom, but with the undel'•
etanding thlil.t a true auertion by man would be in the na·ture
of a confortaity with real:!. ty,

A true at!i.tement about the

subject of freedom would not change from day to day, or era

to era.

=

12?

si·on at: freedom wa.e th.eoretioelly O:Piilll to :!'lux wld change.
Dialeot:!.o&l oomatruotions were free and reJM!J.ned so beoa.uee
t~ey

could not enoounttr tile limits o:t.' freedom; ioe., the

objective evidence of neaeslllity that can be recognized as
such by the rlli,nd i tseu.

For dia.lecUcal conatru.otion

exh!ts in the realm of dieoou:t•ae w.hiob. includes in its !Hit
the possible

~nd

actual.

Dewey patterned all thought and

truth about the I!!Ubj eat of freedom on h:i.a scientific con..
oeption of' inquiry.

Hill instrumentalist tl'UHI!I.'.V .j.ed bh1

regtil.rcl tne t:rutl:l about the subject .of

f:r~edom

t~>

as oonsiM;ing

ot: eypotneats of relat:i. ve v-.:<.lue open to flux l11X!d change.
:Dewey' 1!1

l

d~M.al

of a.l.l necessity in rea.li ty invnlVee. logi ..

?ally the denial of &ll li•d te of' in te.lleotut>l t'reedom.

intJt:rumenf#alillm .l.ibt!lratee ,lllind by denying all

His

neee~H~ity.

0n the issu.e of understMdir.g other pb.iloe•:>!)h.ers •
id1UUl1 John Dewey and Mortimer Adln reaoh
~:rt~ement.

a. defi:ree of

I t is an almost trivial trutl'l that neitnu· tile

wri.Unge of John :ner.vey nor those of l\!:ortiJ!ler Adbr !l.X'e

la.olcing in instanoes in which they olai111. to understand

ideas which otne:re
did

enga.g~

h~ve

e:x:p:t'f.HIIiiillld a. bout the !i!ubj e~t.

il'l pllU.oaophhing about tile

~ubject

Both

o.f.' freedom,

and in I'IJ!lEIO:i.fi o tnsta;nces. directed tneb atte:nt.ion to otMr

ph:U.oaopllet"ltl' viewe on the subject littl!l ll.filli!Uted thllir own

=
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disagreement •.
'flil agree or disagree to tally, in pEtrt, or not at a.h,

with th.e ideas of another, tllere must be present the im:pli•

=

cit assumid;ion tb.at the ideas of the pa.rt;v under eonsidera...

tion are unde:rsto"d•

If ·&he ideas are tlot understood,

there would be no grounds t'or the assertion ot' agreeu!ent or

diaagreement.

It is not being a:f'Hrmed til.Ol.t in every

instance in wh ieh authors
they a.etually do.
John

:n~~wey

l!.U\Y

that they agree or

dhai$l'lH!,

What ie being a!llserted is that botll

and Mortimer Adler claimed that they underetood

the i<ha.s of other

What is illore t'und!!IJJH!tltal

:philosophere~.

importance th.a.n any statil!tica.l t{tbulation of' insta.noes of'

=f-

tlleir genuine und.erstanding which led to. agreement or diea.greement is .the theoretical assumption whioh ;:n.ust be ma.de
to justit'y the ver:l.f'ica.Uon of the understandhlg e.nd. the
agreement or diea.gree•aent.

l

In regard to this aspect of me tb.od t·or an inquiry
into treedom, in the

fiHll:lse

of a method for arriving

truth a:bout £>lt<>ther• s judgments

abo~t

;:~.t

the

freedom, it would

see1n tlw.t Dewey a.nd. Adler logically wtntld be in agreement.
Generie<J.lly, tMy would be in a.greer11ent thl.>t they underlilta.nd

tile ideas ot' others, if they as!Hilnt to

l.ll'

diaal!mt from

others' a.11sertions totally, in pa.:rt, or not at all.
Even while agreement ia dhae:rnal:>le in their views

on understanding another's idi\la..

~

contrast is also evident,

=
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=

a.l.l. inqlliries were applied to , tlle unliernta.nding, of, another• to,

ideas, , the wa.r:rant;ed, a.aser:tionll which 'liermina.ted the irlquiry
would have been eonoeived of meriting hyt)othet:l.oal lilt&tua oy
Dewey.

Even, wnile &lllsigning the assertion lzypothetioal
:poa~Sillility

status, Dewey would have implicitly granted the
of ta.tt.aining

&.

true undln•ettmding of a.notller•a idea on the

eulilj ect.

Ad.ler also would. ha.ve Illainta.ined the, pomnihility of

attaining a truE! undereta.nding of another's
jeet.

id~~>a

or! a. tottb·

But it the idalil. ot' another w<As Mttmlly understood,

if' tl1e truth ot' nia idea. was atta:l.ned, the ai'Hle:t·t:l.on would

be true (confo:rm.irlg to tb.e :rebllity it eX.Ji)l'eBses).

U' his

ideas were not actull!.lly und.erat.God, tl'lt.li aiHl!ertion would be

f.ll.lu (not oonf'orra:l.ng to the rei!J.li ty it expreinJee).
It follows tlla t the, difhreneelll in apJ;Jroachee are

not il:!.mply factual; :1..111 •• thllly are not dit't'eren.oe.a

trom a.
e.~re

<~.rising

d:!.sag:reetu.ent a.bout the fact, timt a.nother 1 a ideu.e

undere tood or known, but ratlMHt that th,e dift'erenoea

in their &,PJProaeh!IHil an alore theoret1.ea.l; i.e ••
:l.t 111eun when on !II lil'ta.tee that he

idea.e.

under~J~tanda

wh~.t

a.no tiler• s

doea

-

~
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·. IV •

~ental

CRITICISM:

doctrinal differences in the

aJrortimer .Adler.

ide~s

of John Dewey and

Both Jolln Dewey !Uld. l\!i:Ol'timer Adler con-

s ide red tb.elllll!el vee philosophers wl'lo were coneerned with tne

truth,

They both would be interpreted lils answering in the

affirm.a.tive thad; tneir

cal and true.

ide<~.s

11.nd judgments

However, their

~»ffiralliltive

queilltion esmnot oe construed ae

agree~ent

Wl/lre

philosopl:!.i·

answer to the
on tlldl' part

about the defini tiona or meanings which they would have
assigned to their conceptions of :ph.ilosof)hY and truth,

John Dewey wanted to reconutruct philolilophy.

In

directing his attention to logica.l theory, it is oovious

that he considere¢.1 h.imael.t t'a.milia.r with mome ,P¥'eviouel.y
proposed logical theories.
expl••:l.ned logical

:re~;~.lity

lie was not lilatilitted tm.t they
1:md &ttempted to reconstruct

logioa.l theory which would a.dequa;tely aecount for .J.ogiotl.l
redity.

AIH1>uming tmt he explained the !acts about logic

bl thinking, he presented hie own
logic.

i~atrumentaliut

theory e>f

His recanlllt:ruction of philosophy meant t.il.l'i rudical

replacement of previous philosophicd ideas with his own.

IUs :reconotruction of logical theoey re;preunted his conacptu~iz~tions
Lo~ical

about

logie~l

reality.

tneory t a-ccording ·to John Dewey's undel'•

standing of it, should be oonoernlid wi tl'l ·the certit'iaa.tion

ce-

of :reflet:t:tve tU:I.ttk:ing..

Tl'l.e eertif'iC!il.tion ·.J>f refl!i!Qti ve

thinking ia to be f'oiUld ·in th.G
id~Hlfl

testin~&

of bypottu1Ueal

in a prol:llema.Ue situation until a w;.>rrant!ild anee:r-

tion e:ffeetivl!lly te:rminatefl the aituaUou,.
l'he Jiirinciple o:f Dewey 1 s instrumentalism is the

id.erlti.tio:•tion of the true with the praotiot,>1.

This :p:re.-

auppous the rejeoticm of 11/.ll apeoula.ti ve ·r.ru·th and all
neeeasiA;y in nature.

Ma.n' s ;pur,Poae b

ma.ni.pula.te tllh potential world

I

quiry •
and

ill.$

to control and

tl'irou~t;h his

1aethod of in-

Mant r; knowl•Hige :!.& only an event in this nature

li/uah follo>V$

n<~tur$•

a

J.~w

o.:r constant ex:parwion,

~

I]

flux, a.nd cba,nge.
;relative to the

Knowledge itt equally variable

n~;~t.ure

it explores.

an~i

F-

Sinoe, aoc.or<Ur1g to

llewey, scientific met.hod l:.as re:plll\ced. previous phi.loao;pni ...

cal a.ff'irmatione of fixity with fluxt

llli'Hl

e·ternity with

eh!il.ngl!i • t.ne logical conuquences of the denial of necelilsi ty

in nature a.nd the espousinG of the relativity of knowJ.edglll
biH)Oll1.11llil with Dewey the debae ing of the

~oal

of the irlttlll•

J.ect from the ptu•euH of ape<:-ul!i.ti ve truth to tlte role o:f
a<l tnstrUlllent of production.

ll<!wey brings man down t'rom

thlii heil\llll ts ot' &peculfJ.ti ve truth ll.l'Hi eont':l.nea him in the

realm

or

pX'actiC<ii>l things.

:Sut I>ewey achieves

thi~>

oy

denying all necessity in nature.
In p:ro:peuain@i hie logi<Ul.l ·theory of. inquiry as
t:culil Gtle

•~nd

representative of wna.t a.etual:l.y lul..pperu.1•

li
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Dewey may have hoped to cUsp ens a with tl'l.l.d.Uional lllOt.a.physical considerations of ·&:ruth and being, but :1.t emu be

-

""'

a,rgued that lle bAs gr.atu:l.toue.l.y a.astu:aed the ;neta.physioa.l
Justification for b.is thu:ry.
~t.ll

Hili! doctrinal 0\liH.;e:t:tion that

ideas El.re hypoth.e.tioa.l is an ontological contradiction.

If the tlltatellllmt ie true in a metaphYsical sensa 1 then il.;e
contra.d.~otion

sense.

O!l!J:l.llot be bath true and false ir1 the same

13ut i f the

jud~Emt

tlla.t all ideas 04re not h.ypo-

thetica.;t. is also t:rue, then cont:t'IMJ.iotory nta.te1nents can

simultantllonsly oe true and int.elleetua.l eoneill>te.noy be
abolished.

! f i t 13 tru.e

t!u~t

all ideas al'& hypothetical,

and 1 ts oontra.d:l.otory staternent thAt aU ideas a.re not
hypothetica-l is t·allle,. then neitb.el' h

h.ypothetieally so.

il!oreove:t' 1 if Dewey na.d ta.)r.en into

lil.lilO()unt tradi~

t:l.onal. logical 01.nalysis, he would l:lJ"Vfb rea.lized tklat i f the
terms of a. pro;p0Git1on are kept constant and only tile
quantity or qua.li ty va.:ried• when one statem<mt ie uni vera!i.l
a.nd affirl'lla.tive a-nd t.be other particular and neglli.tive, both
could not be true.

Trw propositiona t11a.t a.tl. idea11 lil.re

bypothetical and 11ome ideas are not hypothetical cannot
both be t:rue.

Indeed, Dewey proposed a dif'ff!rent ooncep-

tion of· the nature of logic<l.l tbem::y, but it eeemn to be
aeriou.sly and .t<mdWllliUltally inooni!listent if it ia ofhud

as

&

true tneo:ry concerning tile nature of lllgio<tl inquiry.
It is on tile level of lUI:ltaphyeioal a.l!lewnptions tlul>t

-

~
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the ,ra.t:j.onal, d,iffnenees in tne ap);l:roaollea of John
a.nd Mor-Umer Ad.ler beeome more. pronounced•
the

mt:~t&.);lhyliliCal

D~?~weY

=

In add! ti on to

principles of eutradietion,, Adler l;).ffi:rma

the pr:l.noiplu of. id<>nttty, 1\!Uff'ioient reason• oauaa.li ty,

and finality, which in b;l.a mind do no·t
day or era .to er1:0.
tut~.t.

a.otua:Utiea,.

':fhey

two

00rr~ot

a.e~rsum;ptior~s

&l'e

oonsti~

or ground :rules tor ration-

not r!lerely lugioal dhtinotions, but

He dQli>S not put llimeelt' in .'l:;he poeition of

tllinl!iing t.ha.t there

a,

from d<.>;\1" to

T!1ne .meta.:phyeioa.l &.IHHtmpt.iona

the unchanging

al th(!Ut;ht.

ohangt~~

&.1'111

c<;~ntriMiictory

two mid111lil to nery question, that

$idew both of which cou.l<l l:le equ111.lJ.y

or true.

~

l:MPLIO.A.~IO~JS O:f 1'111il TWO COl~OltP.T:t ONS

.. Ji'OR EDUC.A.UO!'I

l'b.e

;relevano~

of p!lUoaQpnist•l ::i.l).!lla.s fot· eduo&·Uon

may be <•p;:>r()aolled f:t:'OJ!! 1!11'\l'el'al )j)oints

ot~

vhw.

In a moet

l'lhltl'ic.tO!d smttee., philoupey is just one o:t· tne ;,oo.ny aub...
. jec.tlil whioh o••n he
Its

lllef~ning

system~;

~li';udied

in

~ollegea .a~td

omivert>ities.

••nd :l.mptHtta.tuHl Witllin c,meeptiona of 0ducational

and iniiit.i 'ttttiqns

vari~s.

In a uwrlil pl'oi'ound

WI;ff.

tlte ph:tlosopilh!!l.l. !MHiumptions il!l oth.lill' dheiplinu Stloh .a.s

medioine, le.w.

hi~ato:ry 1 .

of tlleue lil tudies •·
J

ootu·mes w.l:um

eduaa·tion, illfluenc.& thil oonolusione
e-

P!'liloliH.Ipey

1ut tt;;r~;~ i~tto

teacher education

ef education are presented• llis-

:philosopb.~es

t.o:dee ot eduoational l;lieoriel'l ;ore C\lflilide>red• or
p!tha.l

l.'l.lllt~Ulllptions.

philo111o~

of education pra!llthes a:t·e dhous<!ed.

In

a more profound we;.y a philosopi.t1 of eduoatiun reliltl.! JJpon a

I

view or the world aild •uan.
na.ture of knowhdge,

tt~e

I 'I; :nste on. a oonoep·tior1 of tb.e

souroos of truth., and an eth:l.citl

theo:ry, ea.ol:l catlllliii!tent; with. on,e anotber..
theory ira dll!l>endeat on eth:I.Qul ttlt!ory;
tr.uilory h

dep~ndemt

100

Just

af!l

po.Utica.l

eduoationnl

on prior k'h.ilo::H>,phic"'l asiiW!!ptiGns a.bout

the »ature of ll'i!ll.n. .-.nd truth,
l f education, or 10.t li!Ha.l.'lt one f'und!ll.mental ,s:oal of

$duca.Uon, ·could lae dl!lt!orioed

rMi! ttu1

deliberate

at·~empt by

1:35

society to t'orro. ro.on in ter.tUs of an ideal, then both John
Il~Jwey

and Martirller Adler were concerned with educ<l.tion.

Neither would have considered his idea.e on education
lacking in the qu&litiu by which they could h.a.ve releva.tu:e

to education.

Both would !lave their ideals tuen cogn:U.ance

of \'tith.in an educational ech.ero.e.

In addition to the time

which each epent teaching formally in olaeeroome• the

directions of t!ileir theoretical eoneideratione to eduqa..
ttoaal mat terlil at'f'ord a.eyle
along these linea.

·~>es timony

to tlle ir de a ires

Grli\Jlted t.b.a.t both app:roaoned eduoation

trom tneir philosophical orientatione, their notit,ns of
ideal dU:":f'ered..

They both. ww1ted men wi tl:l.

thl'l

,p.ililot~ophioal

orientationa but their criteria :f'or realizing the id<lal

varied.
=

Dewey's presoripttolu: to provide tbfl means tor ·th.e
intelligent solutione to the probleJOO vrhiob. oonf'r<mted men,
his aeuoh t'or valid knowledge, his rejection oi' many

philollopldtal problemliJ• and tile introdul)tion of hie answers

tor the problema. these were

!>otlle of'

the elements wllioh

constituted and motivated his proposals.
While Dewey my not have

intend<~d

to build a eys-

tema.tie body of' tllou,sb.t the we;y Aristotle or Kant did• he
did philoa.ophhe lon{!£ enough to have expressed his

~
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cal proi:>lelllS.

Wl:m. t wa.s more imvreni va

w~10

the f

~:~.c ·t

that

he. presented a new method of philosoJ:lhhing w!tioh he f'elt

=

could be applied to all .Philosophical eonsidera.t iona,. so
that a. .ey111tlolm could be constructed and ,perpetually reoonstructe.:t.

l<'ollowini from h:h l)w.n <Jonoeption of thlol nature

of r.el.\li ty

~d

truth, the e'if<'U:'"'C.tl$.nging natu:re of. reality

dei111:i,n<,l.ed the fi'YVer-ohangtng :t'orl!.ualationa of'. tiLe truth..
em11ha.llili! on the

Hie

n11ture .of truth does give hie

ever-chomgin~

theory an appeara.noe of dynamtc qu;r;.li ty, but it eqUW.ly
givee it the appea:re.xtoe of being relationistie and incapa-

;,le of functioning in ureaa of vit!.\.1 oonoern Md o:t ultimate
value to many intelligent people.

While ttle novelty of

much of: Dewey' II! theory need not o!ll tienied, rHd tb.er cv.n the
very traditional Qonnection it

~~:~.intlil.ina

with rti,neteentb.

century aoienUfh conceptions a>b111ut ·tnt'! nature Qf truth.
Wlm t JJew•y meant by method wae eo

lientr~T~.l

to nh

philouph:Lcal doCitdMa that ro:r hi.l!1 it not only becan1e

the only method of vaUd knowledge but was even propoud
as a new religious fai tn.

In

~ivins

the Dwight

Harrin~>ton

Terry Fotmdation l.eeturtHil on ftdtston j,u. the lo!l.lih.lt
t;ltbnqe, a.nd.

I:ll;ll.oa.~,

,su:.

he exprall:lal!ld the new f\\ti th for

Ttle mind ot' man iJS billing ha.bitua'liliH1 to a. new lllethod
and idealt There ill:l but one sure road of aeoess to
trutlt-~th~t~ road of patient, eo ... opera.U ve inquiry
operating by means of observation, experiolent, reeorded

=
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While Dewey
pro:Poeea a

eone~i ved

\lie

·Qf himaelf

1!4il

a.n a.ntikabllolutint,

thodology which ia. <>.blllolutis uo.

he

lie presents

tb.e ll.lethOds of aehnt:U'io inquiry as th.e only poasible way
of at ta.in.ing valid knowledge.• . While 1/luah of
UettWd so new and
a.ssertionF.~

dyna.~A~h,.

DewEJ~yi

s

id<~as

his lll.beolutisti.o a.6ml.t!llpticme lllfld

ue in l'I:U1lity ra.thet traditional id>Jaa.

It :l.$ an Uiolll that tot d<ltollCJOl'aoy to funet:l.on there
:bl

I

m~e<l

of truth.

Dewey was eonvinoed that a

whi.oh rfl;p:resent.!!IHi the people amd wniah would

for thell1

&<:It

in thei)l' behalf bad to ha.vo oi tizene poeileSI!Hild e>t'
gence and

uain~

po!!ied.

intell~

that in'iielJ.igence in deterJuini:ng whlilt ought

to be dl)t<e and in jud$ina; the

1

g<rlfe:r:rA~nent

w.~ol.u<a

Of oourae. tor J.)ewey the

of

w~t waa

procea~>

being p1•o ..

will be well. ;per•

for111ed when tl:le (!it.:l.:aen poiHJii!ISil!lllll the f;oientifio spirit
t.~ourae

&nd &ppliea the eeientifio attitude in judging wh&t

Dewey felt tha.t hill pllilOfllOJ?hical

vant tow educa.thn
demoeraoy,
ll1eth<Jd woulil

~nd

m~Dthod

=

vma l'ele-

Gapeo:l.&lly t•or educathn in a

The llOienU:fic a.tt.itude and the uhntifio

oo

the ultimate

&.~riterili1o

for the

valid Ill'O !)J.ema and would. I!IUJiiJtly the valid

tor;~mthn

an~~;·vterl.l.

of

.;.6 he

had lilli~<•n the ntaoenity to l'I1Hlonetruct explll:ti'ienoe. to
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lilduca. tion,.
Yet, in b.il!! undlil:rstanding of f'relildor••• Daw111;r 1 a basic

=

ideas are not so novel in tbe bnuic dietinctione he affirms

nor i,n the ;p1·oors he of'hrs tor th¢m.

Hita novelty in doc-

trine is att.dned not by applicaUon of a new approach but
rll\the:r by oowmi tmetrtn tQ his own y>revious ,pllilosophioal
l!lpeculationl'l.

Indeed, on the one htmd• his d-octrinal con ..

ception of one ll'WilM freedom witl'l aevera.l aapeoto is novel
as a dootrine; but on the oti'ler hand• it iiJ not novel in
the

li~ht

of hh loiiO<"l doctrine a.IJout th.e

11

unitary 11 con-

oeption of (;ubjeot a.nd object,

lil:ortill),e:r Adler' a idea.! for: t.he type of

illrut

which

society should want t<1 p:t•oduco :1.& one who i•%m think in 1.1.11
:fields or knowledge, one who otm 'under!ll tand the meaning or

the truth in all fields.

It ia M

au~mm:ptiun

()f ,\dler 1 u

approa.ch to education that th.e raere accumulation Gf :t'actual
infor1~.~a.tion

d

1s no subf.lti'l;ute for the syah.lllatio and ration ..

exposition of truth.

~~.nd.

:realHy.

lllduolll.tiii>ll is a pa:t'ti•

eipa.tion in a eonverl'la.ticm aimed at truth.

·rne

object is

to ena.b1e the learner to take part in the oonvtu.•sation to
understand any new idea or any new field tlw.t hi presented.

Fornm.l education prepares hitll to be a member ot· the

=

ea.Uo.n is liberal when i t is concerned 1v1th the clauifi ..
catiGn

an~

reinterpreta,t:l.on qf'

bat~~ie

ideas ..

Adle:rt a. prcuacription to :provide the meane for the
intel.li~Jent

solutions .to the problellllil which confront lllllln,

his search for vo;l.:l.d. oollllllon knowledge• his reJection of

sollle p.lliloaophieal prol;)llilllla, ood the introdueti()n of his
solutions for the :p:roj,lems, thtilse \Ve:t•e some of the elements

p:ropoaa.h.

Which motiv&ted •Wr.td conetituted his

atl!l.ndi.ng of

tl:.u~ n~ture

His undn-

of reality• truth• G>tlli inteJ.lec'l:ion

!nf luenced h_il'il_und!!l:ratMdiniJ: of _tlut-distinl.'lt.ion 1:!<&-tween ··

empirical truth 111.r1d philoeopb.ioal truth, oetwe®n

~Srapirioa.l

tact and philosophical fact, between the empirical sciences

and phibaophy, and. the dimtinotions belavll)en natural reason
and supernatural ta.i th.
Mortimer Adler had hiEl conoeptione ii>bout the nature

of

re~;;,lity

Md truth,

llleanina; .of thinkins: to

J>ssu:t•trdly,
~e

J:u~

did not l'llilil1>:rict tne

proceam qf the .Ptwdo41l.l

scientists• nor to th$ solving of the prol>leJU.tio eUua....

tiona as underl'.ltood by Dewey.
when he beoallle mohnt:l.ff.c.
~t.ln enG~e

Beo~a.uee

lllan oM think, he ou

in philosophical thinking.

ini is "u ten tifi e" also.
are valid

liM did not begin to think

~nd

This kind of think..

'l'he :principles wb.io11 1t

d.emonstr&ble t.o :rea.soth

&flli!Ul!!<UI

Adler would contend

tna.t i f tl:aey were not valid• then the assumptions underlying
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soientU'io investigation vwuld not be valid either.
For e:xwaple., the science of medicine ooncerns i tseJ.f
wi tl:l the health of people • but the exis tenoe of :patients as
people is not medically proved or denied--it is silllply
tiUUlumed•

Consent is not required frotn an a.nin1al for an

operation. but except for special extreme circumstances, it
ie required from the buma.n pa.tiEmt.

'r'he consent and free

will ot' the patient are not ecientit'ic but assumed ph.ilosoptl:i.cal aspects of the tuedtcal. praoti ces.

A phi.Losophioal inveetiga.tion of

~"

aubjeet, t'or

Adler, is concerned wi ttl the :pursuit of' truth "'bout the
au'bjeot itself.

The subject itself is tile object of the

philoaopl:lical invutigat:!.on.

I t is a know.l.edge of the

a ubject thought about (the object

hended).

ti.S

intellectually appre-

The truth of a plliloaophical atatelllent about a

subject depends on ascertaining the facts

.!~.bout

it.

A

philosophical asl>ertion or dootrine 1 when ·tru.e, gives a
knowledge of whatever rea.li ties &.re the obj ecta of inquiry.
Consequently, tile truth of' a philoeopitical statement ooncerning the subject depends on ascertaining the facts about
the subject itself.
A philosophical i.nvestigation of t'reedolll• Go,l, love,
or any basic idea, for Adler, is concerned with tile rmrauit
of truth about the sul:lj eet;

f':reedo.tn, God,

Ol;'

love.

The

subject is the object of the philosoph.ical investigation.
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freedom, God, or love ll!.s intellectually apprehended).
t:ruth. of

iii.

The

llllU.osopllioa.l statement llil:Jout the sul:Jjeot de•

pends on aeoerta.ining the fa.cts a.hout tile subject t;hought
a.bout.

A pldloaophioal assertion or doctrine about free-

dom, when truet gives a knowled.se ot' whatner x·ealities
are the obJects of' inquiry.

Consequently, the truth of a

philoaophil:lml l!tatement concerning the subject de11ends on
the facts about the Slibject iteelf.
A cl.ialeotical investigation about the dililcuseion of
a subject, for Adler, ie C<)noerned wUh the purs1•it of
truth about a diaoueBion itself.

•.rne truth of a d.ialeoti-

ca.l statement del)enda on the fa.ots a'oout the di!i)oussion
of the subject.

·rne

dil!oueeion ie the object of the

dialeotica.l investigation,
ject diacusaed,

It is a. knowledge of the sub-

'l'he trutll of' a. dia.lecticl;il.l statement

about a. discussion .depends on <J.SI.H1i:rtaining the facta about
the discussion.

'J.'he

dialeotio~J~.l.

i'ormule•tion, when ·tru.e,

gives a. knowledg!ll of the cont.roversies that t.mde:rlie the
diversity of oonf.Ucting philosophioal doetrines.
sequently, the truth of a. dia.leotil)d statement

Con-

concern~

ing a. dili!eues ion of a subject depends on the t'aots about
the diao U!Hl ion of freedom.

For iJortimer Adler, there is a. ril\dicaJ. discontin•
u.ity J:Jetween the physical and epir1tua.l reallllS.

lilind ia
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essentially spiritual and cannot be reduced to, or
stood

e:xe~lueively

dmll in nature.

in termlll of',.materia.l thinge.

lie 1s a thinking anillll:l.l•

under~

iJ!!l.ll

is

The t'Mt that he

hJ an animal is of' far less importan!le than the fact that

he thinks.

Alii an animal he can be studied empirically.

The sciences of biology, psychology, sooi oloiy • and
pology can shed light

on

~:~,nth:t'Q•

hie :physiologiCal responses and

afford some insight into some aspects of hie individual and
social behavior.
things.

Hut these are not the only or the basic

Aa a. thinking being (tnan•s most important aspect),

;proach.
'.rhe pr ima.cy

furHI:Iiion---Of-educatioll-iSc--held-tl)-~be-the

developmen t of the mind for rat iona.l thought and intellectual excellence.

These are the chief goods from which al.l.

other goode follow..

1

An approach to values muet be rational.

Through clear thinking, based upon adequate grasp of truth,
:fortified hy logic, the mature individual can determine for
himself what is good, what is beautiful, and what 1e just.
The ,Primary goal of' the eurrieulum should be designed to
develop tne tllind Md
It b

~o

transmit tne cultural heritage.

a corollary thil<.t liberal education must be

sb.arpl.y divorced. from vocational iilnd other forms of" speoif•li1led education lest it beoollte involved in considerationlll
which make it impouiole for it to perform ite true !'unction.
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provided by indu:strhliza.tion .should pu.t the poae:l.bility of
l.l.Cllievinei the goal

ot uni verea.l liberal education within

the realm of prt~.otica.li ty.

Liberal education wilJ. precede

lllpeoialiae,d education lest thf.l specialist be deprived of
liberal eduoa.ti.on or the. abilitiy to oomtllunica.te wHh other
men in any field of' learning.
Adler's understanding ot' tne faa t ot' plurali<llll and
the role of dial.ecti<l in ra.tional

deb~1te

W<M> r1;l<avant for

education and upeoially t'o:r education in a. democracy.

In

a se!U1e• present diversity.a.bout a pa:rtieulal' at1bjeat ia
only a. mocrocosm of tile pla.uraliatio maorocoslu in the West• a
intellectu&l neritage,
J

Alon/it dth tho !Hllealing irreducibil•

ity of doctrines and views on every basic $Ubjeot 1 thex·e

e:dsts in the western l:le:ri tage a unity o:t' rEllevance, a con..
tinuity of common themea a.n<t questions.

Thill> dialectical

unity ll!ilrvea to for1a tM inte.Ueetua.l tradition of tlle west,

the tra.dit ion o:f' one eulture, in spite of
diverl!ity.

ii~ll

its doctrinal

'l'he unity.in the W'eet•s intellectual community·

is not one of a.uont but one of understanding, according to
Adler.
Adler is aware that pl'liloso:phiea.l d:l. vneity seems to
h~J~ve

been the splendid patriJllony ot thiloso;pey ·tb.rougn tne

a.ges, thotJgh ®.t times certain philosophers were more influ-

ential tlmn others.

While some plliloeophers ha.ve puehed
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tr:i.buted

at

lealllt negatively to the progress ot philoeophy.

The u11il tipl.ioation of various l!lysterue through t!llll ll.gu iut.a
presented a spectacle of oontra.dictoty and feuding docrtrinu.
but this >VIlW not done witnout opening new
eenting

®.··

displ.&.y of novelty.

ina is:hts or

pn~

However. Adler did ol;l.ution

that the mere <llUltiplic&tion of' philoao:I)X.ioa.l doctrines or
the denial

~'f

l!loGt of them,

the rtH3pective vs.J.:I.di ty of some, lilore, or
a.l~>o

lends a.n a.ir cyi' cont'ueion and aomaterna-

Uori to the public ermrlii.Cter of'

Ara;umentaticn without a.:t·eas ot

pllilosopb.io<~.l
agreemen·~

knowledge.

becomes anarehy.

The n10ed t'ol' so1ue internal conoen11us or eontrol a<nong
ph.UosoJ,ih.ex·s them.selvee needs recogni tton. · The rational

delu<mdlll or a r&.tie>nal in1a;uiry tauat be gi von priority llf

eomsern les& i. ttill vi'Jry :-a.Uona.l cla.ime retUlmble cll.,price a.ntl
its ret'Juta.tion be ruined;.

There is tllG <l.artgei' that ita

willldom ma.y fllouitd more like babble and non£H<~l1~<Hl, Ha critnia

fo'L' credtmoe ma.y resemble whim and fashion, :prejudiae .and
plillllllion~

· The implication for education then is th.at the ideal
neaetH>itatea the a.warenee.s of' the variety of doctrines

which oan be p).'estmtcd about a. pa.:t'tioul<.>r

~;~ui>jeot

of tunda"'

mental .impo:t·ta.noe as well aa of oontiilm,porary l.ntel:eat.

The

v;;.lue o:i.' the dia.leoticll.l a.p,proaoll ill ot illlporta.nofl puciSely
because nf ito neutral:l. ty and doctrinal im,partiali ty.

Ita

=

.1;45

....,. --... 11 6"'-·-··"""""'"' n-f'
""'"'rtns'i"'
""' _. . ....
-~

. . ---

vi~w
nt' ·t.hA
t.hnt]ttht.s'
'"'-~""'-~- ---~~-----

.

a,_.ca_u
__ t
1,1

a subje(Jt with.out adopting any ot' them as true or better.
· Hence if there il:l anything dis tinott ve about the
neutra.li ty o_f _the d;ia.lectioian, it is _ onl;y _that it
pervades &V4U'f aspect of ills work, f'or an !liXOlusively
dialectical approach to con tro_verUal ma.ttars lllUot
a.voicl. part:l.eansh:l.p at every; point. 'l'he kind of obj ective trlltb whicll iS his exclusive preoccupation 1111
dialect:i.Cl!A.lt not doctr"inal. Th!s re1llatns the <lase even
thot~gh lli_s ultilllate aim may be to :l:'urther the pursuit
of dootrinal tl'utn b;y presenting barJio issues in a wfJ:f
that facilitates their resoluUon.li3'1

Indeed, the eharacteriutio of "'n intelligent man

I

would be the impartiality and detaoiment exercised in dealing with views hostile to his own because thlil degree to

which an;r partisan proponent of a. theory, in £1hilosophy or
eoienoe, fails to sup pres II- plil.rtisanehip in s llating :rival

]

tneories, to tha.t deiree he t'a.ils in fairness a.nd objecti-

vity.
In AdliU.'' s mind, people m.ua t be educated to face the
diversity of tl:leorie.s and doctrines that exist with.' regard

to any l;lalilic idea.

Teachers and students should oe able to

apprGaeb. the .hmuee involved in tl1e consideration of t'undl-'0·
menta.J. ideas with intellectual detachment.

Tiley need t_o

nave acquired a clear understanding of the issues and
rationale of

opposin~ positions~

A liberal education tha.t proceeds b;y reading and
l87;a:ortimer ,\dler, ~ g! Jr'reed!l!!l, Vol. I (Garden
Cit;y: DouQleday and Co.t Inc., 1~58), P• 6'7•
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t:r.in.ation ·into

·~thaotever

.l:uoppens to

b~

aao<1Ulda.nt at

tll>~~

mollllilnt, OI1Htaot proceed illl ignoranotll o:t· all the urains of

the vtho.le record ot hW!l.an thought ii>bout

a,

suoj eot.

The

=
,,

inte.Ueotual iHV!n•;;Hy to hill fa<::ed must not only have the
;;;mplitude of the whole dl;>ouuion, but i t xuust be a.coc•ll111'1.11.ied by some undets tanding of the. iii{i:reemel'lta • dia~:reementa, and ar@iWlHlnts that constUutlil t.ue controversies

wntch

Ill:'$

to be found on tl:!.e auhj<llct of

dit\H.li~asion.

To

solve tl:le problem of cu.ltural pluraliam and the ir>telleotual ccm!llunity l'equirea, for .Adler,

~:~,

diecove:ry af the

oonw1o11 ground which undE~rliea differenoi,u; of opinion and ••

transfor!ll&tion of their diversity into rational and
intelli$ible

controv~rsy.

Tb.$ goal ie an u.ndex·sto.od.

dinrlility or a divereity within the fl't.Wewo:~:•k of an bttel·
lectu;;~l

cm!lllmnUy •

sign of 1':t'eedom b

In tl:lh wa;r • dh!ilgi'elihllent honored ae a·

so an

also a. meanl\1 to learrling,.

education h:r freedom !il.nd for the love &nd understanding
about free doll! are the oondi tiom; of free doll!
result~:!

a.lil

we.U a.s tl:le

of :f'reedoll! and must be• !il.ll\ong othel' thinge 1 an

education

~&rounded

in the pl'opu

Fox· Adler• the

U~>EI!$

oit:l.zt~n n!ll~,id.S

of la.ngu«Lge.

intellutu&.l tra.inin@;

to understlll.nd the itHlues which are l:H:IiHg

pror)Ot~IIHi

nature of tlle &rgumenta used to support each
wants a eiti:.Hlnry

int'<:~rmfld

and til(!

ie~".ue.

ah<:mt a widlll range o:f'

He

poa<~ible

-

§§
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is reached.
Because the n$ture of the dialectic method ie such
that i tena.blu the person eonaoioualy e;np,loying it to under-

stand. pluralistic points of view• it does sum to be an
appropriate instrument for education.

Education in

~

demo-

cracy cannot ignore the plurality of' philosophical doctrines
preeent in eo

t!Ui.l:lY

runduental matters but should accept the

responsibility of reruiering tile deba.te of' iliHmee intelligible.

I

Dewey's pragmatic methodology, ba.aed on its own contra-

!

dictory. as eWIIpt ions, and Ut1t tree from serious ooj eo tiona,

I

does not 1a:eat other theories with fair impartiality.
stead of presenting an impartial understanding of other

I

in explicating divern philosophical 0pinions without pre-

doctrines, it prejudges them.

In~

Adler• s dialectia tuethodology

judging them seemta more suitable :for the a.iala of education
in a democ:rG.cy.

Indeed, it would be suitable. for MY sys-

tem of governmen.t which. would value truth above

indoctrina~-

tion or power because it provides th.e means to r:o.r:ri ve a.t the

ve.ry radioa..l. a.uumptions of' confJ.ic t 1~ tll.eories.

-----!
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SchUpp ed.i ted a series ot' books titled, l'hta

J.~vina

l!ll.U.geoph.ers.

Volwue I of the series wrw

devoted to the philosophy of Jonn Dewey.

As the rliiwle of the

aeriea indiea.tes, one of the objeoti iTfH> toot Sehilpp lloped

to aebieve wall! to give several philosopl:leu tlle opportunity

to present their views about a particular 11 ving

pllilosoptu~cr•

philosophy and to afford llilll the opportunity to t&kll note of

their views in a reply IHHUJ.Y•

I

j

1'he

volu~ue

devoted to Jorm

De\vey oonta.ins a ehoi't biogra.phy of' him life• written by his
daughter with hh

part:l.eipl~t.1on,

The voluml!l l.illso contained

the ,'Jlost GOlllplete bibliograpl:J;!r ot' Dewey' 111 writings up to

j

tha.t time and IliH'lai bly to the preeent.

In the light of the

above t'a.cte, as well as the more general a.oquiii.intanoe

professional

educ<~tors

ot

wi tll John Devt\iy rather than with.

Mortimer Adler, it seeme<l. reasonable to prepare a. sketch of
Adler to round out tile reader's understa.ndini;i of some de1;1,\ilS

of hie life and to offer a bibl:l.ography of lll!lillY of

bii'l books ll'h.ioh have been published.

A reader un4l!equdrrted

with Dewey lll&Y easily refer to the work mentioned above.,
Adler wae born in lfew ·rork City, on December 28,

1902.
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1963)'

Hie father, Ignatz, was a jewelry ealeema.n and hie

s

111otb.er, Clar!sliltt.l (i.ia.nl:leim) ,. was an ex.. eoh.ool te&ehe:rr.

In

a middle.;.ela.se neighborhood o:t' uptown M:anilattan, he did not
find uhool too difficult and develo;ped a taste f'o:r wead.ing
and rei"lel\ltivo thinking•

mad

philo~a<>ph!Ga.l

when he w{l>s

IndiCative of his preeoo:l.ousneu

interest b an inCident wtl.ioo took ;plMe

fift~Jel'l.i

wo:rkia&; al'l a copy boy for the

~~

he

read in John stuart Mill's autobiography that the lilnglish
. pidlosopher

hu read Plato before he was

t~m.,

'l:'lds p:romp..

ted .Adler to <b.'aw a pa.y a.dvanee to buy l?lato•s Republio.llall

In 1920 he entered Columbia Uni ve:rrui ty.
John

Er~akine'

books"

oour~ae

s General Ronorlil

:rast li!ubJeet diriHliplines.

It was a tJg:rea.t

Cl)u:t'.lllth

though not ao called.

He 'took

I t out acrou hard and

In time., he

(lt:iUlU.I

to tea.oll tl:te

Honore <Journ• and some of tl:v!l fMOUII! studenh in hill i'irst

j

elafHr were Whittaker Oha,aiben, Clifton Fa.dinu.m, and Lionel

Triiling.

While

te~Aohing

the Honors course, he wae !ii.lso

instructor of pl!lyohology at the uniVersity.
In Adler's und.ergra.dua.te da;ya at Columbia, John
Dewey was an eminent profeuor in the ,philosopey department ..

:!:!Wen then they had. differences of opinion.

At a riluting of

the univ•u·sity plliloeopny elu'b, Adler delivered a paper.
John

D~~Wey

was one of bbl profeuore a.t the time a.nd had

eo~fi t.o

iihe

when Adler

l!ltl'let~n~.;
q~.tOt\114

ed, "There il!J

.tis!

As

1fjft

reported th.e J.nc;l.dent, •wv

tro.111 one of Dewtty*ill :plil.esagel!ll .and colll!llent•

fJI\Ii"i>~inly

110thing of' the lov.e ot' God. in this

utterance," Dewey got up io say, "Nobody is etOi!lg to tell
ll!e how .\!> love: God,u

to ha.ve been mutuG,l;.

~nd

wal.k.ed out.

The

lllil.t"lil.ll!S~ent

enmed

Adler 1 ·.vb.Ue a filtud.ent in Dewey's

el.aea, di,d l!Jil!lld letters to hilt prot'ea!Hlr pointing

o~;~t

what

he oamaidfu•ed. ·t.o be ina.dequacies in hh. prot"eaMr' a lectures.

Ii
I
l
-j

1

t~la.sa

:Dewey wal\1 gracious cnlQUgh to r11ul.d the letter$ in
191

f1,r e. time.

In l\127 • Adler' a work oalled ;Qip.leQUJl wm.a p.ublished..
His u:x;-profeuo:r reviewed the work for. JI!:!U.!.!lt!l.in April oi'

the next year. l92

;Dewey conct:~ded thtl>t the work, "is eon~

oe:rned with a.n illlportant pa:l:'tioult"'r prolalelll• the conduct

ot fruitful dia:.pute, of :l.nhlllllotu$1 eonnreation
some que.stion in eontroVIUi'liiY

SU!llll1$d.

UJ,l

<'~X' at

lel\i.lilt in doubt,.

about

11193

He

h.b M'ticle with the compl:l..!lientaey sta.te;aent thlilt,

":8oth ll!.re evidence ot' the growing vitaJ.ity and independence
on the part of the ;ro~€Jer .American ph:l.loeopllewfll. • • whiclh

w:J.lJ. fltf;!.nd t!:l:'itica.l eo.!liPatison with the. ]:;eat European
~

~--·------

.190~.

l9llq,:l.g.., :P• 7e..
l 9 2JGbn l:lewet• "Tilings Thought, Oonverlilatioi'l 1 "
i'iatiO!h 126;450 1 AP:ti~l 18 0 1.9~6;•
193 ~••

p .• 450, .
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Along W1.1\b.
a&~lllrtio~a,

th~ compli~Jlertta.t'y

chlil.:t'iii,(lter ot' the (;l,t;ove ·

t.lle. me.j or J?Or.tion of Dewey' s review <Mmeia ted

ill pointinl§ out w:M.t appea.red. to him t.o. be seriolUl dif'fi·

oultiea

~u

Adler' a

'f{or~.

Dewe;v was so O()nvinced that the ·

statue of' f.mpirioal. .or eoien:l;if.io theory
e~;'lpirioal

t:M.t tj,me, and that px·oper

w~s

unoutu.in at

inquiry would solve·

dJ.a,leotical :l.nquJ.rin t tha.t he took Adlt'lr to ta!!.k on both.

aeooants.
While hie ex.. t~rofesaor could not a.coe11t the under ..
eta.nd.in~

.ot' dia.le.otio w·hioh Adler eoneidered the

tll.ollt ill!M

poli'tatlt preiHHlta.tion oi' the work, Rol:le:rt .Maynw,rd
the a.eting deal). of t!w Yale Law School, wu
to invite Adlil!r to vi ~iii t him.

.Hutehin~?,

im.prelll~•ed

enough

'l.'he :t'rhndtJh.ip whioh was

lilparked then had oontiaued t.ill the.

p:re~JE~nt

and

<ii.tH'lolli&ted

the!lt in lllltllY lllUtuu Ullde:rtlllltinge.

In 1927, Adl,er took on t,b.e rtH.liJGU&ibilit.iee. of matrimony with. Helen j'3oyntolll, daughter of ""n J;Hinoh manufa.otu:r~
tUI'f

Pol!lsibly .with a

IU!Gd

to augment hit>

i!H!J.a.r.r.

aa wdl

li>il

t9 give an outlet to l1hl dyn®lie ener~a, hf!l tllntsht PillYCholo~a

e.t City College

0f

New York 1
'

leotur¢~d

at the Peopl.e•s Inoti ..

158

Director of the People' Iii Institute from 1927 to 1929.
When Robert .Hutchins oeoamtl president of the University of Ol:!ioago, .Adler went with him.
from 19:30 to 1952•

He taught there

While there, he taught a course calJ.ed

"The Philosophy of I.a.w •"
While 1J:ort.imtu: Adler did not establish a .laboratory
nhool• ilia

edtun~Uonal

istie linea.

He

wt~~lll

ideas were

d~velo:ping

along hUI!lan ..

interested in lelll.rning more about the

subJect he taught, not only its rudiments but ita tnore
t'undalllental nature !ll.nd llisller levels as well.

It liieems a.a

i f he tried to e:Jtemplity in hie tea.cliing the conviction that
a. limited pruent!iii.thn of the ma.terial in a field does not

accomplish much to stir ·t:ne i!llll.gina.Uona of the pupils,
wllile one tba.t ia riehly b;roa.d will help the learner tG

ma.eter ea,tn.•l.y all the preliminary euentia.le and reach out
to ouo.!!le: ll<ore completely alive• lllln1Sitive, emu·geth, an.d
ze&ttul.
Although Adler did not make use of "audio•visual"
materials (in a. narrow and teetmol.ogha.l eense) • he did
!:>ring the full f'Oroe or hilll pneona.lity into hi$ lectures

v.nd uminare.

'iVitnout attempting to retlllll.ke replioas or

himeelt in his students, he di.d bring the richneel'.l of his
e:Jtperienees and intellectual insights into ilie cl&saes.

insistence on cla.ri ty and refinement o:r thought were of

His

paramount

imj)orta.nc~.

Hie own

&Wiil.l'6neslll

of' thl!l nature of

:ra.tiona.l deb&te, whioh neoesllita;tea the unQ.era·tanding of
controversy to consist in the dispute of issues
llll'mtt~

by

argu-

f'or Md against, in addition to h:l.l'l re81.l:l..aation of

the funda.mtmta.l premie.PI'l implied a.nd assumed in auolA an
underata.nding• were. shared by him wi'llh hia pupils.
'l'his desire to posaeiHl Md to be posmeli!ued by truth

is a do(ll:l,naUng cnaracte:ristic of Adler's personality.

If

one ca.n ~>a.in some inferential insight into the Socratic

method from Plato•a Di@1l 0gues and interpret th.em in the
light of a 111killed cross-examination whlllln questions
asked with deliberate prfunedi ta.tion

~nd

C1.l'fl

determination, one

can visualize Adler employing the same Socratic technique

It wlll.s

durin~;

the time

tll~>.t

he

w~a

on the faculty

of Chicago Uni versi i;y that he wrote several of hio booka t'or
selective critical audiences and one for a wider audience.
The yea.r lli/35 111aw the publication of' Slrill!lil• t,a.w, .!!!Lrul ;a,ooi!l

Elai_!nce, oo-a.utb.o:red with Jerome Miobaelt in which they
attempted to point out the Philosophical assumptions of· the
social seiencem.
Phdpa

Hutohint~a

His ;QiMrw&rt;ic!!i!, ao.. authored with Maude
published in .1935• poin·t>ed out the limi ta.-

tions ot' the st!il.tistic!U lll)l;lroaoh in l!Ulll!Wering or attempting
to solve philosophical prol>leme.

Two years later his treat-

ment of aemtlletio theory ap1;•>and in tb.e puolication of Art
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.1oru1

!:fugenq~~

The next ;rear• in

~ ~

I£a.a

~

.Q;t.: Ma.n,

he presented a general exposition about the oon!ilequencea of
:platonism and positivism in psychology and explained some
of the false pb.ilosophilla.l assumptions which Jrreud and
other psyonoana.lyats had made concerning the nature of ma.n,

The same

yea~,

he presented his critique of the rational

proof's for the existence of God proposed by st. 'l'bom111.s
Aquinas.
~ ~

1'b.is was published under the title,

gent;Ulilll.

m.s .full({ lS! lj,ead .!

~ook

u.

'J:ho.ma.e

:publiahed in

1940 beca.me a best aeller e.nd helped to give his name
national publicity.. -The-same yliial'--Witnuaed- tl'Ull

appear~

a.nee sf a leu popular but more erudite wor.l>: 1 :&;ro blems;, .Q;t.:
T.b.om~sta: ~

1'QW!!r4. ~

in 1941.

E.r29lei!i gt' Species..

A JL~aJ,eqtie

~.!£orals:

k'sumAAttsm .2f. Politiga:!; A:hilo!lop;t'!J!'. was

How ,iSl.

~

J1boy! \'j'Qr

i~Hiuetl

!IW1 fef!:ce emerged from

publ.:l.ca:t:.ion in 1944.
When Williwl Benton l:leem.me afUli&.ted with the

Encyclopedia Brita.nniclll. and desired to publish a aet of
the Great Books, Hobut ;H:utehinlll was appointed. editor ot
the proJ eot and Mortimer Adler the auocia.tlh•eH3.itor of
the Grllla.t J}oQka of the westnn World•

Adler .wa.e editor-in•

eh.iet .of the two-volwna index of the work ealled Ihe
;td.eas: A l}yntopi(ion.

grea~

Adler coined. the word ayntopioon

which.. li te:rally means collection of topi<ll!lo

Tiley represent

the most significant topics treated in the books of the
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refexena.es to the relevant

p~a

~aasages

where they are

d.boueaed hy the autboru .ot·. the oolleetion 0

introduced by

fat eeB&y

:Eseh toph ie

and is Q!lalyt.ically <U. vided.

How-

ever, the. lll.S.terial 'for the topic o.:>mes fa;oom the ..utllors
liU'l.d euta a.eross the subject fiW.tter of b.hto:ry • psychology,
phys;l.ee, lJaetry • fiction, ph:l.loeophy, i!l.nd tlleolo!g •

work

engf~g<ld

19 52..

I

J

This

a great dea.l of hia attenti•;m f'roDJ. 1945 to

I t probably

nu been

the ruest montu!l.enta.l at· hill

director.
of \'ieste:rn thouGht on
i~

philosophhll>1

aubjeet~r~

in1Hire~;t

wi'doh lll#.ve

bliHiln

of oontinu.. --

from the advent of ph.ilotiHl,phy in

ancient Greece to the present dOt.Yo
This undel!'taking c10.n be oon:;;t:rued ae an outgrowth.
of Adl.er•s previous work on the §:vnjiopiq,2.n.

I t is lla.eioa.lly

a.n ana.lysh of philosophical literature from the penpecti ve of the «i:teat ideas.
lle traci'ld h

~rtili1er

Its ntore

fun~ntal

ba.eie may

Adler• s undarllltand.ing o:f the nature

of Jmowled.ge, liU'l.d truth, tlte meanin(S of !lhilot;Jopby and

uienoe 1 a•.nd the function of dialectic in hurruii.n understand•
ing.

Deca.u!:!e of the releVIil>noe o,f fX'elildonA tQ lllOdern lii'e,

freedom

Wall

chosen

IMI

the fi:ret

idltH!l. t;o

be treated.,

In
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lw5a.

Vo.i.ume ! of The

~~~a

if Fn<>d!!& was pubJ.inh.ed•

l9t>l,. Volume II of the. study was published.
sisted . of two bonks or llleetions.
with a

pnl!lent~Uon

tioal enterprise.
t~ffort

:tn

VolUllle I oon ..

JSook I concerned itself

of the 'nature and method of tl1e
'The nature of the wnterprise wml

dialeo~
~n

ta t..'\.kf:l stock of Western thought on the auuject of

f3."eedoll11 wioh lli:l.s been of continuing phil.oeop!doa;l interest

from the advent of ph.ilolllophy in anei ent ih'eeoe to the
prfileent da;y.

It

not a.

W/il.S

hUto:~.•t

of ideas nor even a.

tres.tment of the history of' ph.ilosophioal thought about
freedom.

1'he method ot' the en terpr:l.!i!€1

li tera.t~re on tllie i
rather thli\l'l a

dcu~~.

th~>

to a.p1;roaol:l the

from t.he s tandwo:h~t of liln observer

pa~:tici:pa.nt

Book U p.r ell!ented

W~J~.Iil

in the

d.iahot iolll.l

verse oa:noept.:tons of f'reedQm.

ph.UoliH>phio~l

t~xa.minatioll

discussion,
of the di·

Volume II, 'which. OQntained

llool! III .of .tlle study• oonta.i:ned a dia..leotical ex.amination
ot' the co:ntroveruiE!s about freedom.

It p:reliamtl.ld a

f'or~.

tion 'Of the iasuel!l whioh were being dill!Ouea·ed and liM
argumenttl t.ha.t constituted each of 1lhe oontrove:t•eiea.
central tzy'potheflfim, wllioh wa.e

all the

~tt thol'~

tu1.d of

eon:t'irn!~d

:t'retr~41om 1

The

b'f the eonelll;ption!ll

Will.$ th.at a

IIIaH

ill fru who

hal\l within himself thlil ability or power to make what he
doe!~~

hie own action a,ncl what he Mtlievea il.is own property.
Sin.ce l953• .ll.dler

h~;,a

also conduert.ed Executive

Selllina.:re dt!l'ing the summer ltlonths a.t Aspen 1 Oobra.du.

:ll'rom

l53
lw55-l956, under his leadership, similar seminars were held
at Island Steel in Chicago,

The Executive Seminar of tho

Institute for Philosophical Research now operates under his
direction at the Inliltitt!te'a center •

.His

Great Books

seminars in Chicago ltave celebrated tlleir nineteenth a.rmiversa.ey.

A Ulllil<U' program has l:>een oonduoted since l958

in san Francisco.

Mr. Adler

over the course o£ years has

given numerous television a.nd radio talks and public lectures on a variety of subjects.
The

I,he

~

year 19!58 saw, in addition to

·t.ha. publication of

of ;!j!;teedollh tt1e birth of two other works.

Adler

co-authored lit! Clt&lit!!llist Manifee1q with :Louifll o. Kelli!t'l
and The
j

UtvQl:!!t~o.n

l!! E4,ug£;LttQ.P.. wltb. Milton s. Mayer.

Since then• in 1961, l;b.e new C§Qi:l\aliiilt, also GO•aUthored

with Kelso, and his own G4ea.t ld.erag t!:.9.!ll Gnat

1962, have \leen pu.bl:l.lilhed.

.~oojl;s,

in

He and Robert Ill •. Hutchins

ucently co .. authored two volumes oalle<l Grea;; ;tdeas

lQit~.

Volllme I wa.e published in 1961 a.nd Volume II in 1962.
The Institute for Philosophical Researoh has been,
iiJ preflef!Uy • ll.lild in tends in the future to be engaged. in
employing the sallie lllethod and purr;;uing the eame objective

in attempting to clarify ideas on love, progress, Justice,
property, and othe:!l ideas ba.eicl to the 'l!eat 1 a intellectual
t~aditiona

and lite.

If Mortimer Adler' a idea.a !l>re viewed in the light of

tl'!.d.r

:rel~Va\'lae

to cont empol'ary .oonaiderat iona oooa.a ioned

by li£r. snow's delinel;ltion of the two eulturea, ·t;M eoientif·

io lll.nd the hullll'l.nistic, a goodly portiotl of his

illumir!a.ti.ng.

ide~>a

a.re

Hirl ideeoo treatine tl:l.e natul'et ooo:pe, and

limitations of scientific inquirY and the nature, aOG.Pf:\ and
lim:!. t&tione of pb.iloeophio inquiry were· years a.ll.ead of oonteall?or;:n·y interest in ·the ilubJ$ot+

The work that Adle1''a institute ha.e been doing con•
firms that the

r~<.tiona.l

proctHHl of inquiry competent to ad-

vanee l!lan 1 a Jmowledge of' ·fl.llld&.illental truth, i.e., pll:l.losopb;y0 has betm.

att~illtt#d

to by the exieteMe of philoBopllioa.l

ill!sues debated over the aourse of ·the last twenty•i'ive

centuries.
As a eo:rol1a:cy 1 t,h.e work of the i:nstitu te would
deny th• v&lid:i.ty of an Msum.ption whioh.

1

vn:n~1d

trelll.t the

eli versi ty of pk>Uoeot)hiCa.l wri Ungs and thinking. as indica..

tive of the impoe!i!ibil:l.ty of :t'ational debate.

Aciler wou.J.d

like to ue pllilosopll.ers uaa.k:e tl:l.e eft'ol't to more thorouglllY
supply the a.rgwaents and eoun·te:r arguments which exht and
whililh eiifhe:r have no't J;;eon dhpute.d at all or hm.vlli been

inadequately disputed<!

